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Orthographic conventions and morpheme glosses 
 Quechua text in this manuscript is generally written following standard conventions for 
Peruvian Quechua. This includes the three vowels, /a/, /i/, and /u/. Vowel length is represented 
with a double vowel, as in /aa/, /ii/, and /uu/. Spanish loans are sometimes used in the course of 
transcribed Quechua text, and in these cases, I included the Spanish vowels /e/ and /o/ when 
pronounced. Where necessary I have included interlinear glosses. In these cases, the first line is 
the transcribed text with hyphens inserted to break up morphemes; the second line provides 
morphemic glosses; and the third line is a free translation. I have used different transcription 
methods according to the analytic context and purpose of each transcription. For this reason, 
further conventions are indicated with each transcript.   
 Below is a list of the morpheme codes used in this dissertation. With the exceptions of 
NOM and EV, the abbreviations used in examples follow those used in Hintz (2011, p. xxi-
xxiii). A list of glosses of all case suffixes is included in Table 10. 
 
Morpheme code Morpheme  Gloss 
2   -nki   second person 
3   -n   third person 
ABL   -pita/-piq  ablative case 
CONT   -yka   continuous aspect 
DUR   -ra:   durative aspect 
EV   -m/mi   evidential 
GEN   -pa   genetive 
LOC   -chaw   locative case 
NOM   -na   nominalizer 
PURP   -paq   purposive case 
TOP   -qa   topic 
 






 This dissertation explores the relationship between language and environmental practice 
among Ancash Quechua speakers in the Río Negro watershed of the Cordillera Blanca mountain 
range in the central Peruvian Andes. Using mixed methods, it demonstrates how specific 
relationships between people and places—for example grazing routes, place-based kinship, and 
divination—shape how Ancash Quechua speakers conceive the surrounding world for speaking, 
thinking, and acting. By juxtaposing two experimental studies of spatial orientation in language 
with an analysis of its use in everyday conversation, I found that speakers draw on a rich, 
embodied awareness of their orientation with respect to an expansive landscape of named places. 
Through analysis of filmed interactions, I show that this embodied awareness also partly 
constitutes the common ground of demonstrative reference, a domain of language that is not 
explicitly spatial. While the experimental studies of spatial language showed that geocentric 
orientation was the overwhelming preference for speakers in Río Negro, my ethnographic 
research showed that individuals’ familiarity with the landscape varies. Herders work in open 
ranges among the highest peaks, and farmers in small parcels near urban centers. Furthermore, 
while both groups share a cultural understanding of the highest peaks as powerful social 
authorities, herders alone interact with individual mountains through offerings and divination. I 
found that these cultural distinctions between farmers’ and herders’ environmental experiences 
correlated with performance on an experimental spatial memory task: herders were significantly 
more likely to orient to the landscapes, and farmers to their bodies. Moreover, the same 
correlation also appeared within the community’s sub-population of first-language Spanish 
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speakers. In conclusion, this research contrasts with the commonly held view that the most basic 
concepts underlying human language are rooted in innate biology, and that their relation to 
cultural and environmental diversity must therefore be superficial at best. The findings also have 
broad implications for further research, suggesting that shifting patterns of environmental 
practice such as large-scale population movement and anthropogenic climate change resonate in 













Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Research setting 
 1.1. The Cordillera Blanca  
 In May 2010, I took the eight-hour bus ride form Lima to Huaraz—the capital city of the 
Ancash region—to select a community in the Cordillera Blanca mountain range where I would 
eventually do my dissertation fieldwork on Ancash Quechua spatial language and environmental 
practice. The majority of the approximately 120,000 residents of Huaraz have emigrated from 
surrounding highland communities, the nearest of which are only an hour or two’s walk uphill 
from the plaza. For the last twenty years, the city has been undergoing an economic boom of 
sorts. The towering brick buildings that line the streets and the brilliant white 4x4 trucks that drive 
down them evince the flow of money from nearby gold and silver mines that are some of the most 
productive in the world. The mountains of the Cordillera Blanca include Huascaran (Figure 1), 
the highest in Peru at 6,768 m.a.s.l., and attract tourists and mountaineers that are a source of both 





Figure 1. Huaraz with Huascaran in the background. 
 
 But these mountains are a source of life in a way more fundamental than the income 
derived from mining and tourism. They are home to the largest chain of tropical glaciers on Earth, 
and thus represent a monumental store of fresh water. This water has irrigated some of the oldest 
plant cultivation in the New World (Lynch 1980), and the rivers and streams that flow from the 
glaciers currently provide for local consumption, livestock, and agriculture. These rivers all flow 
into the turbulent Río Santa, which originates south of Huaraz in Conococha Lake1 and flows 
north alongside the Cordillera Blanca until it turns toward the coast at Cañon de Pato. Here it 
                                                
1 This toponym is redundant, as Conococha means “warm lake.” 




powers the enormous hydroelectric facility at Huallanca that provides electricity both to the coast 
and to Río Santa’s watershed. Finally, its waters irrigate massive agro-commerce projects in the 
coastal desert.   
 The glaciers are also tied to human lives in another way. As long as humans have settled 
in the Andes, they have revered these life-giving glaciers. The mouth of Guitarrero Cave, where 
legumes were cultivated between 9,000 and 12,000 years ago (Lynch et al 1985), perfectly frames 
the form of Huascaran from across the fertile Río Santa valley (Figure 2). In the century after the 
European invasion, priests struggled to disrupt what they saw as Andean people’s idolization of 
mountains as gods, destroying temples and converting ritual specialists to Christianity (Arriaga 
1968[1621]; Duviols 2003). Though colonial missionaries have indelibly shaped Andean culture 
(Taussig 1986; Mills 1997; Abercrombie 1998), their efforts to reduce mountains to mere earth 
ultimately failed. Contemporary Andean glaciers continue to be the recipients of ritual offerings 
and still intervene in human affairs through divination and healing ceremonies (Allen 2002; 
Ricard Lanata 2007; Altamirano Rua 2014; de la Cadena 2015; Salas Carreño 2016). In Huaraz, 
however, this is not an easily observable fact. As I quickly learned, the cultural importance of 
mountains can appear as a relic of ancestral times even in the highlands towns nestled among the 
folds of the Cordillera Blanca’s skirts. With time, I also came to appreciate how mistaken that 
first impression was. This understanding emerged over the course of numerous interactions with 
residents of the Cordillera Blanca, and these interactions depended on my ability to speak and 
understand the Ancash Quechua language. Indeed, the fact that learning the local language was 
key to understanding its speakers’ relationship with the landscape is germane to this dissertation, 






Figure 2. Huascaran framed by the Guitarrero Cave. 
 
 1.2. The Ancash Quechua language 
   I began to study the Ancash Quechua language with the local teacher and activist, César 
Vargas Arce in May 2010. At this time, he was working during the day as the Quechua teacher in 
a bilingual education program at a rural elementary school in Huaripampa, a small town in the 
Cordillera Blanca south of Huaraz. After a few classes, he suggested I complement my evening 
lessons by shadowing his Quechua classes in Huaripampa. At 6am on May 21st, I met him at the 
place where each day a green minivan collects the teachers who work at the schools in 




during the 45-minute ride. They also expressed their curiosity about the Quechua teacher’s work 
and his new foreign companion. It didn’t take long for someone to invoke a discourse that I soon 
became familiar with as I spent more time in Ancash. Why had I come to study Quechua in 
Ancash, where it was spoken in a corrupt form mixed with Spanish? Why not go instead to Cuzco 
where the pure Quechua of the Inca was still spoken? In reality, I had studied Quechua first in 
Cuzco in 2008, and had since taken courses in the Cuzco Quechua language at the University of 
Michigan. Moreover, I had received a Foreign Language and Area Studies grant from the 
Department of Education to study Quechua in Cuzco starting in July. While I ultimately planned 
to study Ancash Quechua, the only available Quechua program registered with the Department of 
Education was in Cuzco.2     
 This common discourse that portrays the Quechua spoken in the Cordillera Blanca as a 
“corrupt” form of the language spoken in Cuzco also implies that Quechua is a single language, 
and that the variants spoken in Ancash and in Cuzco are dialects or even registers of this 
language. In fact, this position is not supported by any empirically grounded linguistic research, 
which instead describes Quechua as a language family (Cerrón Palomino 1987; Torero 2002; 
Adelaar 2004). While linguists have varying positions on exactly how many languages belong to 
the Quechua family, Ancash and Cuzco Quechua are unanimously thought to belong to do distinct 
branches, whether as languages in and of themselves, or as dialects of languages that also include 
other dialects. Moreover, Ancash is the hypothetical place of origin of the Quechua language 
family—that is, of proto-Quechua—that has come closest to gaining consensus among linguists 
(Torero 1970; Adelaar 2004). This hypothesis is supported first by the conservation of phonemic 
distinctions present in Proto-Quechua that have been lost in other Quechua varieties. It is also 
                                                
2 The next year I managed to register an Ancash Quechua course, and received the grant again to 




supported by the great amount of variation in Ancash Quechua compared with southern Quechua 
languages (Cerrón Palomino 1987:326; Julca Guerrero 2009), which includes both conservative 
and innovative traits. As with the evolution of biological species, the older a particular branch of a 
language family is, the greater its diversity and innovation.  
 Hypothetical origins and linguistic designations aside, I quickly observed from my own 
studies and conversations with native speakers that the Quechua spoken in Ancash differed 
significantly from Cuzco Quechua in its phonology, in basic grammatical categories such as 
tense, person, and number, and in much of its lexicon. A common comparison for conceptualizing 
the difference between the languages is the distinction between Spanish and Portuguese. The 
similarity is that these languages are closely related in the same family, and that while they are 
not mutually intelligible, neither are they so different as to be completely opaque to their 
respective speakers.  
 What all Quechua languages share is an SOV sentence structure, agglutinating suffixes 
with a very limited morphophonology, and a sizable lexicon of word stems that can become either 
verbs or nouns through affixation. While the respective phonologies of the two languages are 
similar, Ancash Quechua preserves some phonological distinctions that have disappeared in 
Cuzco and other Quechua languages in the southern Andes. It is also distinguished by the 
innovation of phonemic vowel length, which distinguishes a number of lexical terms and also 
marks first person on verbs and nouns ending with vowels. More detailed descriptions of the 
language are offered in Chapters 3 through 5. A more complete description is beyond the relevant 
scope of this dissertation.3  
                                                
3 For further reference on Ancash Quechua, Weber (1989) produced an excellent description of 
the closely related Quechua spoken in the neighboring region of Huanuco. Diane and Daniel 




   There is one major similarity between Cuzco and Ancash Quechua—they are two of the 
most widely spoken varieties of Quechua in contemporary Peru. At the same time, they are also 
both at risk of a dramatic reduction of speakers in the next generations. While there are 
approximately 300,000 Quechua speakers in Ancash (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e 
Informática, 2007), the greater reach of public education in Spanish together with increased 
immigration and government decentralization have led to a situation in which most adults in 
highland communities speak Spanish as a second language, while their children are fully bilingual 
in both languages. When combined with the strong social stigma that associates Quechua with the 
economically and socially “backward” lifestyle of rural peasants, young bilinguals prefer to speak 
Spanish rather than Quechua. While it seems unlikely in this context that their children will learn 
the latter language, there is currently a growing tendency to value Quechua as a source of cultural 
integrity and authenticity.4  
  
1.3. Huaripampa and Río Negro 
 My trips to Huaripampa with César eventually evolved into a long-term research 
commitment. While I had originally intended to find a community further from Huaraz and with 
fewer economic and social ties to the city, I quickly began to question that goal. What I saw in 
Huaripampa first and foremost was a typical community, and at the same time one that was in a 
conflict of identity. The children in César’s class were fluent in both Quechua5 and Spanish. And 
while they were already adept at the staple tasks of rural livelihood—caring for plants, animals, 
                                                                                                                                                         
Conchucos variety of Ancash Quechua, spoken on the eastern side of the Cordillera Blanca (Hintz 
2008; 2011). 
4 Barbra Meek describes a similar situation among Kaska speakers in the Yukon (2010). 
5 Here and henceforth, I will simply use “Quechua” to refer to Ancash Quechua, as it is the only 




and family members—most of them also had ambitions that would ultimately remove them from 
Huaripampa, for example to become successful business owners or mining engineers. Likewise, I 
observed that while they spoke Spanish to one another, their parents addressed them in Quechua. I 
began to perceive that what appeared to be a town that had “lost its customs”—a phrase I learned 
quickly from residents themselves—was in fact much more complex.  
 One day after César’s class, one of his students was to introduce me to his grandfather, 
Donato Molina Rojas, apparently a great storyteller. The boy left me with his mother in a bare 
adobe storeroom not far from the school and went to track down Don Donato. While I waited, his 
mother said that she could tell me one of the stories she had learned from her father. I didn’t have 
any way to record the story, and my Quechua was not good enough yet to follow it completely, 
but I understood something about children speaking with animals, potatoes that turned to stone, 
and a girl carrying a bag of bones to heaven in a basket. I later recorded several versions of this 
story, which narrates two children’s kidnapping by the witch Achikay, and is well known in the 
central Peruvian Andes (Howard-Malverde 1986; Weber 2008). I didn’t get to meet Don Donato 
until the next visit, which was my last before I had to leave for my course in Cuzco Quechua. But 
I could not shake from my mind the stories he told me, nor the warm sense of welcome and 
familiarity I felt sitting with him and his wife Angélica in the patio outside their kitchen. Nor 
could I forget the tune of a song that another student’s father, Pascual León Villanueva sang for 
me—a song I now sing to my daughter as a lullaby. Pascual, or Pashku as I quickly learned to call 
him, and his wife Mari welcomed me just as warmly, and expressed their eagerness to support my 
study of Huaripampa’s language and culture. They offered me a spare room in their home during 
my field research, and their son, Gerson, became a close friend during the shifts we shared 




 More than anything, what ultimately led me to select Huaripampa as a site for research 
was the connections I made with people there during those first visits, and during successive visits 
to Huaripampa in the summer of 2011. As I eventually learned, and as I argue in Chapter 2, 
people in Río Negro become attached to places through the same kinds of social and verbal 
interactions that create familiarity among people (see also Salas Carreño 2016 and Mannheim & 
Salas Carreño 2015). Just as herders continue herding in part to maintain the possibility of a 
dialogue with the places that live along their grazing routes, I kept going back to Huaripampa—
first in my mind, and then for long term fieldwork—because of the unanswered questions and 
unreciprocated favors that lingered there.  
 Yet while I originally imagined Huaripampa as the place that would geographically 
delimit my research, I found I could not reasonably ignore the paths that connected it with other 
places. For example, I met people farming in Huaripampa who in fact lived in the town of Aco, 
several miles north along the Río Santa, and later visited them for interviews. Likewise, Pashku’s 
father-in-law lived across the Sawan River in the Comunidad Campesina (Peasant Community) of 
Canray Grande, and his brother-in-law moved to Huaraz halfway through my research. Don 
Donato’s son-in-law was from across Río Santa, in Collawasi. The pastures of Ruriq Canyon 
themselves also have a contested history.  In 1971, as part of the national agrarian reform, the 
canyon was turned over to the government cooperative, SAIS Atusparia (Rasmussen 2015:90). 
The cooperative’s control of the area quickly fell into contestation, leading to several violent 
conflicts between the neighboring communities of Canray Grande and Canray Chico with the goal 
of taking control of the pastures. People I spoke with in Rio Negro remembered these conflicts, 
which ended with the establishment of the official Peasant Communities of Canray Grande and 




 Considering the numerous places where I conducted my research, and the complex social 
and political relationships among them, I was faced with the problem of distinguishing relevant 
geographical limits for my project. I didn’t want to make general claims about the entire 
Cordillera Blanca, given its linguistic and cultural diversity, much less about the region of 
Ancash. I considered first the district of Olleros, whose capital is the town of Olleros, just below 
Huaripampa alongside the Río Negro. However, toward the end of my fieldwork I also spent time 
in the town of Canray Chico and the Comunidad Campesina de Cordillera Blanca. These places 
are south of the Río Negro, which forms the border between the districts of Recuay and Olleros. 
This made Olleros seem like an arbitrary limit, a sense that was confirmed when I learned that 
Huaripampa and Canray Grande belonged to the doctrina6 of Recuay during the early colonial 
period, then to the district of Recuay until their incorporation into the district of Huaraz in the 
twentieth century. Huaripampa itself had not even had official political status until several 
residents organized to acquire the designation of Centro Poblado (populated center) in the 1990’s. 
Until that time, it had been treated as a caserío (hamlet) belonging to the town of Olleros, despite 
the much larger population residing in Huaripampa.  
 The landscape itself provided a solution to this problem of delimitation. All of the places 
where I worked were part of the watershed of the Río Negro.7 Río Negro is also a landmark 
known to everyone in the area, and figures centrally in nostalgic songs. Of course, even Río 
Negro is an arbitrary distinction—people in the watershed move for work and family not only 
across this river, but also west across the Río Santa, or to Huaraz or Lima. At funerals and 
festivals, I met Huaripampinos who had returned from Madrid and others all the way from Tokyo. 
                                                
6 The doctrina was a geopolitical unit used for ecclesiastical administration in early colonial Peru.  
7 The one exception was Aco, however my work there was limited to two visits, and I do not feel 




People in the area I call Río Negro do not use the name to refer to themselves as a group, but I 
found that they generally avoid referring to themselves with anything other than their own names. 
They did not identify with the label Indio, nor with the ethnonym Quechua. They were only 
andinos or serranos (from the Andes or mountains) in contrast with costeños (from the coast) or 
selvaticos (from the tropical rainforests). They occasionally referred to themselves as Ancashinos 
when talking about something that affected Ancash such as outrage at a corrupt politician at the 
regional level, or as Peruvians when comparing themselves to citizens of other countries. Coming 
up with some geographical and cultural limit for my dissertation was thus irreducibly creative. 
Nevertheless, Río Negro is a part of the landscape that is familiar and recognizable to all of its 
residents, and that is tied as much to the glaciers and high pasturelands from which it flows as it is 
to the fertile farmland it irrigates below.  
 The way the people I worked with in Rio Negro referred to themselves—by using the 
names of places or regions—also resonates this dissertation in a broader sense. Place names like 
Ancash or Huaripampa and territorial designations like sierra or costa evoke much more (and in 
some ways much less) than borders, coordinates and territories. Rather, they indicate political 
positions and social relationships, and contribute to framing the interpretation of the discourse in 
which they occur. These dimensions of territoriality and space are central to the critique stated 
most succinctly by philosopher Edward Casey’s suggestion that “space and time are contained in 
places rather than places in them” (1996:44). However, this critique and its reflexes in linguistic 
anthropology (Basso 1996), sociocultural anthropology (Myers 1986), and cultural geography 
(Tuan 1974) have been contained to the analysis of space as a cultural, historical, and political 
phenomenon. Even Basso’s account of the relationship between Western Apache speech and 




associations among stories, their associated moral values, and places. In contrast (or better, in 
response), one of this dissertation’s starting points is the observation that space is also commonly 
assumed to constitute its own domain of linguistic and cognitive categories—that is, we generally 
imagine that categories like up, down, left, right, east and west all have a conceptual existence 
independent of the places that are meaningful in our lives. Can we apply the same critique of 
space here, suggesting that its physical, abstract aspects are inseparable from humans’ social 
interactions with, cultural expectations for, and sensorial experiences of particular places? If so, 
what does this mean for spatial language as a linguistic category and practice? What does it mean 
more broadly for our understanding of the relationships among language, mind, and 
environmental practice?  
 
2. From spatial language to speaking places  
The use of language to describe spatial relationships—shapes, paths, and locations, for 
example—is one of the more mundane and utilitarian aspects of communication among humans. 
In this sense, it seems like an obvious candidate for scrutiny by anthropologists, practitioners of a 
discipline long preoccupied with insights gleaned from the taken-for-granted dimensions of 
human life. Recent anthropological studies, for example, have perceived profound political and 
social dynamics in the minutiae of bureaucracy.8 And if there’s anything duller than paperwork, it 
might well be giving directions. Indeed, “go-straight-turn-left” grammars may look like the final 
frontier of the apolitical. If anthropological interests are any indication, this is indeed the case. 
Few have ventured into the cold, empty space beyond the realm of deictic language, the safe 
atmosphere—so to speak—of the “here-now-I,” where words are indelibly marked by their 
                                                




contiguity with humans. In this dissertation, protected by the breathable if artificial air of its 
methodological environment, I travel into that outer space purportedly governed by universal 
structures indifferent to human idiosyncrasies. The paradoxical fruit of this journey is akin to the 
uncanny discovery made by the space-farers in Stanislaw Lem’s novels—that no distance 
(physical or metaphysical, linguistic or metalinguistic) is great enough to separate humans from 
the nature of their own subjectivity. However, rather than taking this as Lem did—a reflection of 
human provinciality—I take it instead as an indication of profound differences in humans’ 
experiences of the “same” world, and as an incitation to grapple with the nature and consequences 
of such differences.  
In this sense, I follow the line of thought that began with Franz Boas’ observations on 
semantic categories and Edward Sapir’s theorization of phonological categories, and that was 
later articulated in the writings of Benjamin Whorf. Whorf argued more explicitly than Boas and 
Sapir that because different languages presuppose different ways of perceiving reality they also 
potentially entail different habitual ways of thinking.9 As John Lucy pointed out, the research that 
has emerged from this tradition falls into two camps (1996:43). Lucy identifies the first camp 
with the work of anthropological linguists like Hoijer (1953), Mathiot (1964), and Witherspoon 
(1977) who drew associations between individual grammatical categories and cultural patterns 
evidenced mainly by texts rather than ethnographic observation (Lucy 1996:44). The second 
camp is dominated by fundamentally comparative psycholinguistic research, such as the work of 
Brown & Lenneberg (1954), Conklin (1955), and Berlin & Kay (1969) that sought to determine 
correlations between linguistic structure and cognition, and focused mostly on lexical categories 
(45). Lucy argues that both camps lost sight of a fundamental aspect of Whorf’s research program 
                                                
9 It is important to note here that, for Whorf, the connection between language and culture is 




in two ways. First, they did not involve cross-linguistic comparison, and second, they did not look 
at systematic relations among the linguistic categories they examined. In response, Lucy proposed 
a new approach that involved the integration of studies of systematic grammatical patterns such as 
number marking in at least two languages with experimental studies of individual cognition 
outside of verbal contexts with speakers of the same languages (50). This approach indeed has 
been the only one to lead to widely accepted evidence that language shapes thought. However, as 
I will emphasize below, the conclusions are also confined to such specific phenomena that they 
are bleached of the kind of broad sociological significance that anthropology ultimately seeks.  
One of the goals of this dissertation is to reconfigure this approach language, thought, and 
reality in a way that retains its empirical rigor without sacrificing its purchase on the kinds of 
experiences whose familiarity and meaningfulness are characteristic of a particular population. In 
Rio Negro, for example, people spend much of their effort on either strengthening or severing 
their relationship with the landscape around them. Many farmers and herders put enormous 
energy into the productivity of their land and herds, and nurse lingering anxieties about the future 
of these pursuits. They struggle with the contradictions inherent in the idea that the fruit of their 
labor will translate not into a continuation of that work, but into their children’s education and an 
idea of social progress that is by no means guaranteed. Others strive to acquire property in urban 
centers like the regional and national capitals with the goal of moving their families away. 
Meanwhile, families that have returned after living for an entire generation in Europe struggle to 
readjust to highlands life with children who are more accustomed to metros and airports than to 
horses and corrals. In the midst of these fraught relationships to the land, I learned, many people 
in Rio Negro also maintain strong social bonds with mountains, engaging in daily ritual 




worked as herders, the idea that such relationships may someday vanish is the source of an 
overwhelming sense of nostalgia.  
In this context, where people’s relationship with the landscape they live on dominates so 
much of their practical and mental life, I find it hard to imagine studying the relationship between 
language and space in a way that brackets off these conflicts as a distinct question. However, any 
approach that includes lived experience as more than circumstantially involved in the relationship 
between language and mind must also demonstrate some mechanism or mechanisms by which 
actual practices and their patterns in a group of people are related to habits of speaking and 
thinking. That is indeed what this dissertation sets out to do, first by showing that the knowledge 
associated with socialization into a community of speakers with firsthand experience of a specific 
territory is both a prerequisite for and means of transmission of Quechua spatial language and 
demonstrative reference (in both language and gesture), and second by showing that distinctions 
in speakers’ firsthand experience of the environment—such as that between farmers and 
herders—significantly correlates with patterned differences in individual cognition. By 
demonstrating these specific mechanisms linking socially distributed patterns of practice and 
experience on the one hand with linguistic and cognitive patterns, I suggest a different picture of 
the relationships among language, mind, and reality. First, rather than identifying reality as one 
term in the equation, it is rather the larger frame within which language and mind are related. 
Second, the environment becomes a crucial element—not the environment as it is commonly 
conceived in material or symbolic terms, but rather a meaningful, lived environment (see Section 
3 below). Before elaborating on this point, I will first introduce the studies of spatial language that 




draw out the important accomplishments they have made, and to foreground the ways in which 
my own research diverges. 
In the 1990’s and 2000’s, a number of studies in linguistics and psychology demonstrated 
that descriptions of space vary across languages to an unexpected degree (Brown & Levinson 
1993; Danziger & Perderson 1998; Pederson et al 1998; Levinson 2003; Majid et al 2004; 
Levinson & Wilkins 2006). Their findings served as a challenge to the common assumption that 
the egocentric use of “left” and “right”—as in the egocentric perspective use for the “left side of 
the table,” and as opposed to the object-centered perspective used in “the left side of the cow”—
was primordial in both language and cognition. Indeed, this body of research demonstrated that 
there are languages in which the use of “left” and “right” terms for anything other than the lateral 
halves of animals is unimaginable. Just as “the left side of the table” may sound bizarre to a 
speaker of Arrernte, expressions such as “the kettle’s nose” or “my north foot” sound just as 
exotic to speakers of “egocentric” languages like English. Eve Danziger’s experimental study of 
Mopan Maya,  a language in which “intrinsic” or “object-centered” descriptions such as “the 
sugar is at kettle’s nose” are the norm, offers a striking example of how profound such perceptual 
biases. The study shows that Mopan Maya speakers’ tendency to represent spatial relations in 
terms of their intrinsic shape makes left-right asymmetry so irrelevant that they habitually 
perceive mirror images as identical (Danziger 2011). 
While the conflation of mirror images may seem like a kind of cognitive disability to 
English speakers, from the perspective of Mopan Maya speakers, the universal application of two 
arbitrary sides to every object without regard to its shape or orientation must also seem to yield a 
distorted perception of reality. More dramatically, the spatial awareness of speakers bound to 




reckoning abilities of speakers of languages like Guugu Yimithirr, which relies exclusively on 
cardinal directions (Haviland 1998). This idea—that distinct ways of speaking about the world 
correspond to distinct ways of thinking about it—has been called both “linguistic relativity” and 
“the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” (Sapir 1949[1927], 2002; Whorf 1956; Hill & Mannheim 1992; 
Lucy 1996; Leavitt 2011). It is also one of the questions at the heart of most studies of spatial 
language and cognition. Specifically, a group of researchers coordinated through a project at the 
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, conducted parallel studies of genetically 
and typologically diverse languages around the world (Pederson et al 1998; Levinson 2003; Majid 
et al 2004; Levinson & Wilkins 2006). The purpose of this project was first to amass a 
comparable body of linguistic evidence on spatial descriptions, and second to reproduce a series 
of psychological experiments testing the hypothesis that the use of egocentric or non-egocentric 
forms of orientation in language correlated with the use of the same kinds of orientation in 
thought. Although some details have been contested (Li & Gleitman 1999, 2002), the project has 
provided the most conclusive evidence that language can indeed shape thought. 
And yet in the end there was something lackluster about the project’s conclusions. Once 
the major findings had been published, and a New York Times article had accessibly pulled 
together the most exotic examples, it seemed to simply be over and complete. The reason, I 
believe, is none other than the ostensibly esoteric, inhuman character of “space.” After giving 
careful, rigorous proof that particular ways of conceptualizing space in language correlate with 
similar ways in thought, there seemed to be little social or political fallout. Problem solved; case 
closed. While the tentative suggestion that conceptual diversity is an adaptive trait in humans 
(Levinson 2003:318) is biologically compelling, it comes to a halt at the relatively 




phenomenon in question—spatial language—occurs in a social world in which emergent, 
intersubjective meanings are co-constituted together with the differences and relationships among 
among participants. Yet somehow space remains outside these differences, indifferent to them. 
There are no systematic injustices that divide the left-and-right from the north-and-south. There is 
no political violence perpetrated against those who remember spatial relationships with respect to 
the world around them by those who frame these relationships with respect to their bodies. There 
is even a substantial body of research that crosses geography, anthropology, philosophy, and 
history arguing for a human, meaningful notion of “place” against the idea of empty, meaningless 
“space” (Bachelard 1969[1958]; Tuan 1977; Foucault 1986; Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Casey 
1996; Ingold 2011). In short, “space” is an aspect of reality in which we struggle to find any echo 
of humanity. And it is precisely this struggle that I seek to overcome in this dissertation by 
pointing out that “spatial language” is inseparable from both social persons and physical places, 
that reexamining it with this in mind illuminates a profound connection between language and 
world, and that this connection is inseparable from the different ways humans embody their 
surroundings for speaking, thinking, and acting.  
While much attention has been given to the intertwining of social relationships with the 
meaningfulness of language, as in honorific language, the possibility of systematic relationships 
between languages and their speakers’ spatial or environmental awareness has received little 
serious consideration. Research has focused mainly on spatial language as a comparative 
grammatical phenomenon—that is, on honing typologies of the diverse resources human 
languages use to describe space. These studies have indeed uncovered an unprecedented diversity 
in the conceptual and grammatical resources speakers of the world’s languages use to represent 




have simultaneously challenged long-standing assumptions about the universality of categories as 
basic as “left” and “right,” and “up” and “down.” At a more philosophically resonant level, these 
studies have also challenged the psychological primacy of the egocentric perspective. Despite the 
implications that the nature of egocentricity has for more humanistic questions about subjectivity 
and personhood, research on the diversity of linguistic and cognitive representations of space 
have consistently come to an abrupt halt at the structural limits of language-as-grammar. It is as if 
an impermeable membrane separated linguistic and non-linguistic interactions between people 
and places, as if a farmer’s description of his plot and the work he has done there pertained to two 
discrete realities. This implicit, hermetic barrier separates “spatial language” from the “physical 
environment;” it separates the same people into speakers of linguistically diverse utterances and 
actors of culturally diverse practices; and at the most basic level it separates words from the 
humanity of the places they describe and name.  
In this dissertation, I ask what happens if we imagine instead that the membrane 
separating these domains is permeable. The first possible observation in this thought experiment 
is that if the membrane is indeed permeable, understanding the nature of its permeability requires 
the identification of some continuities that traverse it. The second observation is that identifying 
continuities across an impermeable barrier is a self-contradictory enterprise, and thus the only 
reasonable first step is a momentary suspension of belief in these separations between spoken 
language and lived world. Practically, this requires stepping methodologically through the 
membrane, so to speak, by using the methods appropriate to the analysis of phenomena that do 
not lie within familiar disciplinary boundaries (see Section 6 below). Theoretically, it requires a 
recalibration of the idea of environment, disarticulating it from a materialist-idealist dichotomy 




recontextualizing the concept of environment within the framework that linguistic anthropologists 
use to study language, creating space to think about how spatial language not only serves to 
represent space, but also embeds actual places and their moral, affective, and spatial dimensions 
in the pragmatics and structure of language.   
 
3. From language as social action to meaningful environments 
In broad terms, linguistic anthropology is the study of language as an integral part of 
human life alongside—and intertwined with—culture, technology, and biology. In this spirit, 
linguistic anthropologists focus their attention not on language as an autonomous system but 
rather on its relationship with other phenomena such as kinship, ethnicity, gender, and class. 
Research in this program frames language not merely as a code—a mode or medium of 
meaning—but rather as intrinsically bound up in meaningful processes. From the start, this 
approach to language informed the present study of spatial language and environmental practice. 
However, as the research and analyses coalesced, a new theme emerged as theoretically parallel to 
language: the environment. However, the central role of environmental practice in this 
dissertation did not stem directly from my preliminary research questions about spatial language, 
as the former plays a minor role in previous studies of spatial language. Rather, it emerged 
through the intersection of my ethnographic engagement with the phenomena, both in concrete 
and theoretical terms.  
The role of the environment in this dissertation also serves as a theoretical and 
methodological experiment. What happens if we approach the category of the environment with 
the same spirit of relational, semiotically informed thought that has characterized research in 




serves as a constant “frame of reference,” even when language itself is not at the center of the 
analysis. One goal of this introduction, then, is to make this framing familiar enough that the 
reader will be able to remain oriented even when the dissertation travels into places where 
theoretical landmarks are eclipsed from view.  
Alongside the goal of exploring the relationship between language and environment, each 
chapter of this dissertation offers an answer to the question of the role of the environment in 
human life from a distinct methodological and analytic perspective. A different way of 
approaching the question might have been to define each of the terms involved so that several 
possible answers emerge as entailed by (or as a challenge to) entangled intellectual traditions. A 
dissertation structured in this manner may have had chapters or sections devoted to materialist 
and idealist theories of the environment and of the human in the history of anthropology and 
related disciplines. While this is a tried and true method of engaging philosophical problems, it 
would have been an act of infidelity to the ideas and problems that captivated my mind and 
compelled me along the path of research that ultimately led to the question. That is, I did not 
begin my research with this question, but rather with a series of concerns and methodological 
commitments that crystallized only toward the end of writing as a relatively stable constellation of 
ideas that—somewhat to my own surprise—had the relation between humans and the 
environment at its center. The dissertation therefore does not propose to offer a definitive answer 
to the question, but rather to foreground the question itself as an emergent concern that cuts across 
different domains of analysis and phenomena among which “spatial language” (or better, 
“speaking places”) figures prominently.  
There is a basic fact that ties language as a social phenomenon to the environment. Not 




place(s).10 The fact that it is used among speakers highlights the fundamental sociality of 
language. Yet this sociality is inevitably riddled with complexities. When someone speaks, we 
may follow Goffman in dissolving the act into participant roles (1981), we may see dominant 
discourses and ideologies refracted across these roles (Hill 1995; Carr 2011), and we may see it as 
a social act that only makes sense in its interactional context (Hanks 1990; Goodwin & Duranti 
1992; Tedlock & Mannheim 1995; Ochs et al 1996; Silverstein 2003a). Likewise, while language 
always happens at some point in time, its fundamental reproducibility—or as Silverstein and 
Urban would call it, its (re)entextualizability—forever complicates temporal determinations. 
However, the observation that language always occurs in some place seems to retain its 
simplicity. First, while dialectology and the areal dimensions of historical linguistics seem to 
address this relation, they do so only at a very abstract level from which places function merely as 
placeholders for the linguistic differences that are the focus of analysis; that is to say, the places 
defined by isoglosses are as inhospitable to human life as they are conducive to the method of 
historical linguistics.11 Second, some scholars have explored how place names encapsulate moral 
discourses (Basso 1988, 1996) or index sociolinguistic identities (Thornton 2015), how linguistic 
practices such as prayer fit cultural expectations of interactions with individual places (Haviland 
2003), and the practical consequences of cross-linguistic variability in representing features of the 
landscape (Buhrenhult & Levinson 2008). However, these studies have not specifically aimed at 
identifying individual mechanisms through which language and places come into their 
                                                
10 Instances of language other than the speaking individual—e.g., mas-produced print and 
recorded announcements—have more complex relationships with places that may require parsing 
into different moments of textual production and interpretation.  
11 Bakhtin’s concept of chronotope also takes the relation between language and place (and 
always together with history) into account (1981). However, as a scholar of literature, Bakhtin’s 
intention with this analytic category is to capture the way in which language represents time and 




characteristic relationships that are both particular to spatiotemporal contexts and generalized 
across patterns of social difference.   
The initial goal of this dissertation addressed the absence of such a study, proposing to 
explore the ways that language—and spatial language in particular—articulates with places. 
While the environment took on a progressively central role, language simultaneously resolved to 
one of several interrelated dimensions of human life in Río Negro that I explore.12 Language is 
the central focus of Chapters 3 and 4; in Chapter 2 I foreground sociality and ritual practice, and 
in Chapter 5, cognition. In Chapter 2, I follow herders and farmers’ everyday practices, showing 
how differences in the places with which they interact engender social differences among 
individuals and constitute a frame for action (including speech, of course) grounded in the local 
environment. In Chapter 3, I take the spatial orientation that informs language use as the object of 
study. By examining how people talk about space in relation to the knowledge about the 
environment they presume one another to share, I aim to shed light on a concrete way in which 
humans’ engagements with their environment substantially shape their use of language. Chapter 4 
focuses yet more specifically on three linguistic forms—the Quechua demonstrative pronouns—
and their relation to manual gestures. In parallel to the previous chapter, I argue that the use of 
these words and bodily movements is inextricably bound up in speakers’ knowledge of the 
environment, adding the observation that this relationship between language and environment 
relies crucially on the body. That is to say, it is not precisely knowledge of the environment at 
stake, but rather its accessibility to speakers’ bodies, so that certain forms of verbal expression 
                                                
12 While language itself is not the exclusive subject of the dissertation, my thinking is pervaded by 
an understanding of all domains of human life as fundamentally semiotic. Though I do not draw 
explicitly on Peirce’s semiotic logic, I do draw on its spirit of taking meaning as primarily 
processual, dynamic and emergent rather than representational, stable, and reducible to other 




require the embodiment of the spatial characteristics of a remote environment. I make the same 
observation in relation to cognition in Chapter 5, where I present a controlled experimental study 
of nonverbal spatial memory. In resonance with the distinction in environmental practice between 
farmers and herders described in Chapter 2, the study finds that this same distinction also 
correlates with a distinction in the way people remember objects arrayed on tabletops.  
While each chapter provides one kind of answer to the question of what role the 
environment plays in human life, it does so from within a theoretical frame that seeks to 
understand the environment as intrinsically bound up in other meaningful processes. This 
dissertation thus explores the possibility that the environment is as integral to and constitutive of 
human life as language, culture, technology, and biology, and is not merely an economic and 
symbolic resource. By examining the role of the environment in human life from this perspective, 
I don’t expect to provide a complete picture, much less an answer. Rather, I hope to suggest that 
the theoretical approach to language that has emerged in linguistic anthropology has broad 
significance to understanding not only language, but also the places where it becomes a part of 
human life.    
  
 4. The environment as resource, symbol, and meaningful relation 
The environment has had a fraught history in anthropology, and I cannot pretend to do 
justice to it here. Instead, I want to focus on what I see as two central reasons for this turbulence. 
This is sufficient for introducing a distinct approach to the environment that draws inspiration 
primarily from an entirely different realm of anthropological theory. The first source of trouble in 
environmental anthropology is what Marilyn Strathern identified as the “perception of the 




Descola (2013b) calls the “materialist” trend in anthropology. Descola contrasts this with a 
“mentalist” trend, which he identifies with structural anthropology. From this perspective, the 
environment provides the “raw materials” for humans to produce meaning, to lean on his 
mentor’s metaphor of the bricoleur who improvises with the materials at hand to solve 
mechanical and aesthetic problems (Levi-Strauss 1955). The symbolic role the environment takes 
in this approach is the second source of trouble for its place in anthropological theory. 
These two polarized views of the environment—as the raw material for economic activity 
and as the raw material for symbolic thought—have precluded defining the environment in terms 
of meaningful rather than merely utilitarian or conventional relationships. The latter definition 
would be germane to anthropological thought, and to linguistic anthropology in particular, and 
was already nascent, for example, in the biology of Jakob von Uexküll (2010[1934]) and in James 
Gibson’s theory of visual perception (1979). Von Uexküll thought of the relationship between the 
animal and environment as shaped fundamentally by the relations among signs. In his most 
famous example of the tick, he explains that the animal’s sensory organs have developed for one 
single purpose—to take butyric acid as a sign of a mammal’s presence. On perceiving butyric 
acid, the tick releases its grip on the blade of grass to which it has been clinging. After falling, it 
relies on its sense of touch, first to confirm that it has landed on a warm-blooded creature, and 
second to find an exposed patch of skin into which to bore. Von Uexküll considers both this chain 
of actions and the perception of butyric acid to be signs already defined in a relationship between 
the tick and the qualities of its environment. Every subject’s environment, writes Uexküll, is 
delimited by these processes which are as semiotic as they are biological—“the simple animal has 
a simple environment; the multiform animal has an environment just as richly articulated as it is” 




with an organism such that environments are ultimately subjective—that is, only definable from 
the perspective of a given subject. As a psychologist, however, Gibson’s interest was not in the 
semiotics of life processes, but rather in the manner in which the relationship between organism 
and environment contributes to visual perception, a connection he felt could help to overcome a 
dichotomy between mentalist and behaviorist approaches to perception in psychology.  
While some aspects of von Uexküll’s and Gibson’s work have been taken up by 
anthropologists that share an interest in challenging subject-object, nature-culture, and mental-
material dichotomies (e.g., Ingold 2000), their more general movement toward defining the 
environment—or rather environments, as this definition allows for no generic sense— as always 
part of meaningful interactions has not resonated much with anthropological theory. For 
“materialists” like the early Roy Rappaport (e.g., 1967), the environment may take on meanings 
that in turn shape the way it is used as a resource, but the environment in itself is not inherently 
meaningful—it always exists outside of humans’ engagements with it, and as such those 
engagements will always have the quality of false ideologies that evolve to approximate reality 
through trial and error. Likewise, for “mentalists” like Levi-Strauss, forms from the environment 
are the constituent parts of cultural meaning, but the relation is ultimately an arbitrary one (1955; 
Descola 2013b). The environment here is likewise external to human life, but humans’ 
engagements with it do not amount to approximations, but rather analogies.  
The shifting place of language in anthropological theory (at least for linguistic 
anthropologists) suggests a parallel movement in the theorization of the environment. The shift is 
a movement away from closed systems with which humans interact in either utilitarian and 
behavioristic or arbitrary and conventional ways, toward systems that are emergent from 




respectively as polar champions of mentalist and behaviorist approaches to language, linguistic 
anthropologists have cut a middle path by defining language not as a self-contained system that is 
reducible to neurobiology once the contingent accidents of history have been stripped away,13 nor 
as a mere extension of and elaboration on innate behavioral patterns, but rather as both 
constitutive of and constituted by human life. In this view, systematic regularities in language are 
not related merely to its own structural properties or to those of the referents it describes, whether 
mental or material. Instead, such regularities can only be fully described as emergent from a 
relationship between the qualities—both structural and pragmatically contingent—of language 
and the humans that use it.14 Michael Silverstein highlighted this fact when he argued that if we 
include the uses of language beyond its symbolic function in propositional signification, our 
analyses become dependent on our concomitant observations of its social and cultural contexts 
(1976). Mannheim & Tedlock wrote more explicitly of language itself as an emergent 
phenomenon best understood (for the purposes of ethnography) not in the terms of traditional 
linguistics, but rather in relation to its inevitable situation in dialogic encounters (1995).15     
Just as structural linguistics has offered limited purchase on the phenomena of interest to 
linguistic anthropologists because it sets aside the social world,16 the same problem has prevented 
                                                
13 I should note that Chomsky’s theory boasts analytic purchase on certain linguistic phenomena 
within the well-defined circumscription of “competence,” whereas Skinner’s behaviorism did not 
hold up to the accumulation of empirical data on language in the second half of the 20th century. 
See Chomsky’s (1959) review of Skinner for Chomsky’s critique of the latter.  
14 The fact that similar kinds of order emerge from similar kinds of disorder should no longer be 
surprising—nor should it be dismissed as one of humanism’s rhetorical tricks—as physicists in 
the last few decades have moved toward mathematical models of emergent order as a way of 
coming to terms with the gap between the complexity of reality compared with the idealized 
simplicity of classical and quantum models (Prigogine 1997).  
15 This is closely related to Geertz’s claim that “culture is public because meaning is” (1973:12). 
16 I say limited because it has indeed been useful. Having well-defined and principled categories, 
however idealized, is a helpful place to start when trying to identify the linguistic forms that get 




the pioneering work of von Uexküll and Gibson in their respective fields from being of much use 
to anthropological theories of the environment. When we turn to them for help with this puzzle, 
we indeed find a meaningful relation central to the definition of environments, but we also find 
that it always involves individuals, that it is always a subjective relationship, and that there is no 
account of the patterned ways in which individuals vary and interact, and out of which their 
subjectivity emerges. In other words, there is no common ground with the traditional themes of 
anthropology. This is likely why their theories of the environment have not been adopted 
wholesale into anthropology, and it is certainly why they should not be. Yet it is possible to push 
their ideas from subjectivity to intersubjectivity and thus define an intersubjective environment. 
Central to this push is the recognition that humans interact with their environment not only in 
meaningful ways but also in social ways. That is to say, in plowing their fields, farmers not only 
engage with earth as a vehicle that signifies the possibility of nourishment through the cultivation 
of edible plants, but also as a practice that positions them socially with respect to others who 
cultivate the same land, nearby land, or no land at all. It may even entail a social relationship with 
the earth itself.  
The concept of Theory of Mind helps us to understand why this social aspect of human-
environmental relations is fundamentally intersubjective, not merely individual. Theory of Mind 
accounts for the fact that our relations with others always involve the presupposition that our 
interlocutors share with us similar capacities for thoughts (Wellman 2013). It can be added that 
we not only presuppose this similarity in capacities, but we also project more substantial ideas—
dependent on how we recognize our interlocutor—such as shared knowledge about the layout of 
                                                                                                                                                         
contact and movement that can complement ethnohistoric research. Yet the study of grammatical 
categories grinds to a halt at the moment they are put into use in social interaction, and the 




the town where we both live, and expect that our interlocutors do the same. By adding this 
modified Theory of Mind,17 we can replace the subjective relationship between individuals and 
their environments with a social relationship between individuals and their environments in which 
environments are meaningful at an intersubjective level, and in which their meaning depends not 
only on their physicality but also on their sociality—that is, on the way in which they are socially 
recognized and situated in the midst of human life.  
I owe this observation to the time I spent with people in Río Negro. Before my field 
research there, I had read about the status of mountains as deities, sentient beings, and social 
agents. The prominent role of mountains and other “natural” entities in religion, political 
organization, and cosmology stands out as an icon of the Andean in general—hardly surprising 
that the region is coterminous with an enormous chain of mountains. Yet despite the frequency 
and prominence of the social and cultural stature of mountains in literature on the region, the fact 
that they are simultaneously places has not been significant. That is not to say that their existence 
as ecological entities has been ignored. Their physical characteristics are routinely described, and 
their importance as ecological factors in human life has also been the subject of some studies 
(Murra 1972; Brush 1977; Rasmussen 2015; Gade 2016). The cultural importance of places and 
the agency of the nonhuman have also been touchstones of Andean ethnography (Allen 2002; de 
la Cadena 2015; Mannheim & Salas Carreño 2015; Sals Carreño 2016). Yet what struck me most 
was the routine familiarity with which my acquaintances treated mountains. Indeed, the fact that 
these mountains are both physical environments and social entities suggests the possibility that 
the relations between humans and their environments can manifest in a form that is neither 
material and ecological nor mental and symbolic, but rather social and familiar in the same way as 
                                                
17 Rather than a modification of Theory of Mind, it is also possible to think of this as the 




relations among humans. That is to say, if relations between humans and their environments are 
social, they also are meaningful not simply at the level of individual thought, but rather at an 
intersubjective level. 
Guillermo Salas Carreño’s and Bruce Mannheim’s recent work on kinship and ritual in the 
Andes has drawn attention to this mutual patterning of human-human and human-place social 
interaction in the Andes. This parallel can also be generalized beyond the Andes if we recognize 
that in the opposite case—in which environmental entities are not recognized as social beings—
the resulting human-place relations are still social in the same way that relationships characterized 
by “negative reciprocity” are still social despite the denial of their participants’ mutuality. Put 
differently, the environment recognized as an ecological and physical domain organized by 
distinct, nonhuman relations ultimately still only comes to bear on human life insofar as this 
recognition conditions its interaction with humans. Earthquakes, for example, destroy human life 
because of the ways in which humans have come to engage with seismic places as dwelling and 
working places, not merely because of tectonic geology.  
  In the chapters that follow, I use the category of environment in this way to refer to a 
term in an intersubjectively grounded, meaningful relation. However, in most cases, it is not 
necessary to distinguish between this use of environment and the other, more materialist use, as 
the cases that I describe in part aim to make a case for the former. However, there are some places 
where it is necessary to highlight the difference, and to do so I use the term “intersubjective 
environment” with the intention of recalling the above discussion. One reason I find it important 
to emphasize the intersubjectivity of the environment is because it helps resolve problems of 
determinism, reduction, and relativism that plague the anthropology of the environment. The next 





 5. Determinism, reduction, and particularity 
In “The Ecology of Others,” Descola traces the polarized “mentalist” and “materialist” 
approaches to the environment in anthropology, and proposes his own brand of anthropology as a 
middle-path-clearing solution (2013b). However, in the opening chapter of “Beyond Nature and 
Culture” (2013a) he demonstrates a significant affinity with the “mentalist” tradition by taking a 
hardline opposition to the environmental determinism nascent in cultural ecology and blatant in 
cultural materialism. In the chapter, he takes readers on a tour of cultures around the globe and 
throughout history, all with the subtly stated purpose of demonstrating that physical environs have 
not determined these cultures’ particular understandings of the world. On reading this collage of 
data from the most diverse places and times assembled to demonstrate that the relationship 
between environment and culture is irrefutably arbitrary, I could not help but find a surprising 
parallel in research on spatial language and cognition.  
The group of linguists and cognitive scientists dedicated to mapping the diversity of 
spatial orientation in language and thought have debated the question of whether particular 
physical environments such as mountains, cities, or jungles shape the grammar or cognition of the 
people who live within them (Mishra et al 2003:379; Levinson 2003:193; Majid et al 2004:110; 
Haun et al., 2011). While the explicit goals of these studies of spatial orientation may on the 
surface be quite different from Descola’s research, there is a similar logic at work in both. Just as 
Descola wishes to account for the irreconcilably different ways that humans conceive of their 
worlds, the psycholinguists demonstrate the existence of fundamentally different ways of 
representing spatial relationships. Likewise, both projects involve both an argument against 




culture onto others. As a consequence, both projects also face the problem of how to liberate 
variability from environmental determinism—that is, how to produce evidence that shows that 
variations in spatial language or are not determined by purely material phenomena—without 
recourse to universalist or nativist understanding of language or culture as structures determined 
by genetic traits, and thus also by ultimately material phenomena.18  
The objection to determinism present in these theoretical programs boils down to a 
critique of reductive logic. The population dynamics in a jungle ecosystem and the hunting taboos 
of the society that lives and interacts with it have distinct orders of organization, as do the 
physical characteristics of a scrub desert and the grammar of the language spoken by its 
inhabitants. Any argument claiming causality between such distinctly organized phenomena is 
doomed to fall back on reductive logic unless it can show the means by which actions at one order 
affect those at another. For this reason, researchers have gradually been coming to a consensus 
that it is preferable to catalogue and construct taxonomies of their objects of study rather than try 
to explain them in terms of ecological, biological, or geological phenomena. Indeed, the proposed 
solution to the problem of the conceptual diversity of spatial language is “semantic typology,” just 
as Descola’s solution to the problem of the cultural diversity of human-nonhuman interactions is 
“ontological typology.” 
Whether or not some kind of determinism is at work, it remains a fact that humans do 
interact with the other-than-human world that surrounds them in many ways, and that these 
interactions tie them into various kind of causal relationships.19 However, by rendering this realm 
                                                
18 Silverstein (2016) deals with a similar issue in his discussion of variation in the role of variation 
in linguistics from Leipzig to variationist sociolinguistics.  
19 Ian Hodder’s (2012) concept of entanglement provides a way of thinking about these kinds of 





of interaction as interchangeable components in a typology, any possible causality therein is 
instantly lost to the analysis. The grammaticalization of cardinal directions by speakers of Guugu 
Yimitthr, for example, becomes functionally analogous to structures in languages spoken in Asia, 
South America, and the circumpolar north, while the means by which speakers acquire and 
maintain the knowledge to speak such a language becomes an incidental fact (Levinson 2003).20 
Likewise, the attribution of personhood to geographical features by Apache, Andeans, and 
Australian Aboriginals helps to elaborate a typology of the distinct human ways of ordering the 
world (Descola 2013a), while the individual practices by which personhood (of humans and 
places alike) is tangible and effective for particular individuals is cordoned off.   
More to the point, the tendency to typologize is itself borrowed on analogy from the 
natural sciences and is for this reason just as reductive as explaining grammar with ecology or 
culture with biology. Meaning, thought, language, and practice are always in the midst of human 
life, always the result of the particular actions and experiences of individuals, always already in 
the midst of particular social relationships, and always located in a particular constellation of 
places. If there are observable regularities, they must be the emergent properties of these dizzying 
idiosyncrasies. This is the more parsimonious perspective, as we would otherwise have to claim 
that the regularities we observe and typify are themselves the laws that give rise to the diverse 
forms of human life, yet without having any theory of how such laws actually affect humans. In 
other words, we would reproduce the reductive logic of environmental determinism, placing 
anthropological theory itself in the place of “nature.”  
In order to escape this fallacy it is only necessary to take as the object of study the ways 
that persons interact, while keeping the definition of person open to local definition. This 
                                                
20 Languages are learned through social interaction with other speakers, and these happen not in a 




automatically subsumes what would otherwise be considered “human-animal” or “human-
environment” interactions in cultural contexts in which animals or places are treated as persons. It 
is no longer necessary to typologize. If a certain group of New Yorkers has closer relationships 
with their dogs than with their siblings, we can explore the consequences of this first and foremost 
for them, then for their relationships with New Yorkers that don’t share this characteristic, and 
then, perhaps, for gaining an insight into more general cultural dynamics, power relations, and 
historical processes.  
Taking interactions among persons as the object of study also transforms the approach to 
the study of diversity in linguistics and psychology as well. For example, there is no longer a 
question of whether the diverse ways of conceptualizing space might be explained better in terms 
of neurological structures or environmental factors. Instead of these ultimately reductive 
questions, a more fruitful one emerges: what kinds of interactions among persons might shape the 
acquisition and maintenance of conceptual structures in language and thought? This is becoming a 
more widely accepted approach when it comes to social concepts, as can be seen in the work of 
scholars who have shown how grammar is embedded in the structure of social interaction (e.g., 
Hanks 1990; Duranti 1994; Agha 2007). However, it is telling that a similar step has been much 
more difficult when it comes to what counts for most researchers as “nature” or “environment.”21 
It seems as if researchers’ own ontological distinctions sneak up on them, whispering in their ear 
                                                
21 A similar argument of reductive logic could be lodged against the move toward interaction as a 
foundational domain for language, thought, and culture. Such an argument would doubtless point 
to the circumscription of physical processes in individual biology, genetic evolution, and the 
surrounding environment that indubitably shape interaction in a multitude of ways. Part of this 
critique is apt—such processes indeed play an important role in shaping interaction—and suggest 
a separate domain of investigation that would involve the integration of a different set of 
methodological and theoretical approaches. Another part of the critique, however, is resolved (or 





that any causal relationship between the physical and meaningful worlds involves reductive logic. 
But this is only the case if we indeed think of the world that language or cognition represents as a 
domain ontologically separate from human action. The inaccuracy of this view, I believe, is not 
merely relative to the radically different ontologies of the Chewong or the Achuar. Rather, 
humans do act on and in the world, and these actions do shape the way they think and speak about 
it. To ignore this fact that is appreciable to all but the most dedicated idealists is to stubbornly fix 
our eyes on the path ahead, even when it leads us countless times round a meandering loop. And, 
paradoxically, the forking paths that follow particularities out into the world promise a greater 
possibility of unifying theories within and across disciplines than the well-trod loop that stipulates 
the unity of the phenomenon in question.  
In the following four chapters of this dissertation, I explore how humans’ engagements 
with their environments concretely shape language and thought. This concern is framed with 
respect to four distinct questions about particularities of human-environment relationships in the 
Río Negro watershed. I begin with the social, and then move to the linguistic, the corporeal, and 
finally the cognitive. The trajectory intentionally begins with what is commonly thought of as the 
most (inter)subjective and ideal phenomena and moves toward what is in contrast commonly 
understood to be the most objective and material. This achieves two things. First, it avoids the 
implication that the individual is analytically prior to the social and cultural. Second, it challenges 
the idea that social, linguistic, and cognitive phenomena are distinguished by their relative 
subjectivity or objectivity, instead showing how in all cases practices are patterned 
simultaneously at the levels of individual lives and of social groups partially constituted by these 




closely tied to these practices in such a way that separating them in terms of their relative 
subjectivity or objectivity becomes an exercise in futility.  
  In each of the four chapters, I answer the question and explore the consequences of the 
answer to life in Río Negro and to the interactions between its people and their environments. The 
questions are “Why do only herders speak with mountains?” (Ch. 2), “How do people 
communicate verbally about spatial relations like direction and location?" (Ch. 3), “How does 
space inform Quechua deixis—a quintessentially social domain of grammar?” (Ch. 4), and “Do 
different ways of engaging with the environment shape the ways people conceptualize spatial 
relations in thought?” (Ch. 5).  
Each of the questions speaks to very different phenomena and theoretical issues in 
anthropology, linguistics, and psychology. At the same time, each chapter also points out the 
difference made by interactions with the high steppe, called “hallqa” in Río Negro. Chapter Two 
shows how the hallqa is composed of social persons, not simply “nature,” and that habitual 
interactions with these persons shape herders’ social positions as individuals as well as more 
general conditions of political life in Río Negro. In Chapter Three, I show how the descriptions of 
spatial relations made by Quechua speakers in Río Negro rely on an embodied sense of space, and 
argue that this makes habitual interaction with the local landscape a prerequisite for verbal 
interaction. In Chapter Four, I turn to a domain of language that is not explicitly spatial, 
examining how the use of Quechua demonstrative pronouns is anchored simultaneously in the 
dynamics of verbal interaction and in participants’ corporeal orientation to and position within a 
landscape that reaches far beyond what they can immediately perceive. Finally, in Chapter Five, I 
present the results of an experimental study showing that a particular way of interacting with the 




with mountains as persons—engenders a particular way of conceptualizing spatial relations. In 
sum, though each of the chapters engage with diverse phenomena, methods, and theories, they 
converge along a path of inquiry that privileges relations among persons—however these are 
defined—as an object of analysis. 
 
 6. Research methods 
As I have explained up to now in the introduction, this dissertation does not fall squarely 
into any one discipline, but rather addresses questions that can only be answered by thinking 
across phenomena that have traditionally been the exclusive territory of distinct disciplines. Thus, 
while I draw my most significant inspiration from linguistic anthropology, I address questions 
that are not directly accessible to the subfield’s synthesis of ethnographic and linguistic analysis. 
As I found that the questions I was interested in crossed disciplinary boundaries, it became a 
necessity to devise a methodological approach conducive to answering them. More concretely, 
Chapters Three through Five describe and make comparisons across language use and nonverbal 
thought, and thus require comparable data. Cognitive patterns and representations have no direct 
and systematic manifestation comparable to speech, and can only be interpreted as probabilities 
determined in relation to participation in controlled experiments. Language, on the other hand, 
can be studied as an individual or event-level phenomenon—grammar is reflected in individual 
speech, and interactional norms are observable in conversational events. While linguistic 
anthropologists and structural linguists alike generally use this approach, language can also be 
studied experimentally. Psycholinguists and psychologists of language integrate grammatical 
descriptions of language that can be derived from individual speakers with controlled 




some groupings of participants in their experiments in terms of grammatically determined 
categories derived both from traditional elicitation and controlled, experimental language tasks. 
Finally, in addition to grammatical and experimental approaches, language can also be studied 
ethnographically, as a social phenomenon. The resulting situation is one in which anthropologists 
and psychologists interested in language share grammatical analysis as a methodological middle 





 Ethnographic Linguistic Anthropology 
Grammatical Linguistic Anthropology; Psycholinguistics; 
Psychology of language; Linguistics 
Experimental Psycholinguistics; Psychology of language 
Table 1. Methodologies for studying language across disciplines 
 
While there are exceptions to this tendency, it is strong enough to lead to a boundary that 
poses serious difficulties to analytic comparability across anthropology and psychology. 
Individual scholars’ disciplinary associations matter little here—i.e., though some anthropologists 
are involved in psycholinguistic research, the methods they use fall along the lines I described 
above. Because this dissertation represents an attempt to address questions that fall at the 
intersection of approaches to language that originate in the disciplines of anthropology and 
psychology, it was necessary to engage with all three approaches in order to avoid a one-sided or 
circular answer.  
As I have explained above, this dissertation is not interested only in language, but also in 
environmental practice and nonverbal thought. Luckily ethnography and experimentation are not 




adaptation of a more general suite of methods more or less contiguous with their respective 
disciplines. Indeed, this is the reason that ethnography and experimentation distinguish 
anthropological and psychological approaches to language. In short, ethnography helps me to 
address language and environmental practice as intersubjective, sociocultural phenomena, while 
controlled experiments help me to address language and thought as individual, psychological 
phenomena.  
 Before moving on to describe the actual methods used in the dissertation, I want to clarify 
one general aspect of methodology that is crucial to understanding what I mean when I say that 
one “method” helps me to address questions about distinct phenomena. While methods can be 
tailored to questions, they also always potentially exceed them. The reason for this is that methods 
have two facets: materials or information, and the second-order representations from which 
interpretations are actually drawn. For example, ethnography as a methodology is in fact a suite of 
methods, each of which is characterized by a particular practice of gathering materials, and thus 
by a particular kind of information. Take for instance the field notes resulting from a year of 
participant observation. This huge amount of relatively unordered information cannot be turned 
directly into a work of anthropological analysis. Rather, the ethnographer first must go through 
the notes and sort out relevant pieces of information that speak to particular questions or fall into 
specific categories. In this process of selecting and ordering, some information is inevitably set 
aside and other information is emphasized. A linguistic anthropologist may take detailed notes 
about everyday life during fieldwork, and while they may focus particularly on language, they 
will also record many other observations. The information is thus amenable to two distinct 




 With experimental methods, the situation is only partly different. Because experiments are 
designed and controlled to isolate specific phenomena, they are not as flexible as fieldnotes or 
recordings. At the same time, the information resulting from an experiment must still be re-
represented before it can be interpreted. In fact, it is first re-represented in a selective and 
categorizing way—what psychologists called “coding”—and then re-represented in a numerical 
way through statistical analysis. As a result, answering several specific questions through 
experimental methods differs from ethnography in that it requires designing a different 
experiment for each question, and passing through the two phases of re-representation for each 
question as well. While this appears far more labor-intensive than ethnographic analysis, the 
reality is that re-representations of experimentally derived information are generally more 
straightforward than of ethnographic information. The reason for this is that experimental 
information is already highly focused and the goals of analysis are similarly narrow, while 
ethnographic information is broad and heterogeneous and the goals of analysis are not generally 
focused on individual phenomena but rather on interactions among multiple phenomena. 
The rest of this section provides a detailed account of the ways in which I gathered data. 
As I explained above, the two-stage nature of the research methodologies I used makes them 
amenable to very different kinds of analyses. Recorded conversations can answer ethnographic 
and grammatical questions depending on how they are represented in the intermediate stage 
between collection and interpretation. I therefore have structured the following subsections in 
terms of modes of collecting information—notes, recordings, and controlled experiments—rather 
than the three methodologies of ethnography, grammatical analysis and controlled 
experimentations. This structure allows me to focus first on the manner in which I gathered the 




purposes. Another benefit of this approach is that it allows me to respect the different analytic 
affordances of each mode of information gathering. The kinds of questions that can potentially be 
answered by notes, for example, are distinct from those that can potentially be answered by 
recordings. Table 2 represents the uneven correspondences between modes of information 
collecting and analytic interests. The table illustrates the fact that notes were useful for both 
ethnographic and grammatical questions, but not systematically for the latter. In contrast, three of 
the five types recordings I made were systematically amenable to both ethnographic and 
grammatical analyses, while the other two only provided information relevant to grammatical 
analyses. Finally, the two kinds of controlled experiments were only useful for the linguistic or 
cognitive questions they were designed to address. 
 








  focused conversations  focused conversations    
      
Recordings events  events    
  informal conversations informal conversations    
  interviews  interviews   






  verbal task 
 
nonverbal task 
       
 
Table 2. Modes of collecting information and analytic interests.22 
 
                                                
22 Emphasis indicates that a mode of information collection was not systematically relevant for 




In sum, there is no simple way to categorize methodologies in this kind of 
interdisciplinary research, as each mode of information gathering affords distinct kinds of 
analyses, and each analytic interest is addressed through multiple methodological approaches. 
This is ultimately a good thing, as it means that the time spent gathering information unfolds into 
multiple interpretive possibilities. At the same time, recognizing this inherent complexity is 
necessary to avoid the fallacious identification of concrete research activities with analytic 
approaches to research questions. Avoiding this fallacy is in turn necessary to avoid both 
redundant activity and untapped interpretive potential in a context of limited resources. This is all 
the more the case for studies that do not sit neatly in familiar disciplinary categories. 
 
7.1. Notes 
Note-taking is a fundamental part of any research method. For example, the controlled 
experiments I conducted during my fieldwork all have associated notes, as do the video 
recordings. These notes provide qualitative comments on the schematic information yielded by 
experiments and contextual background on recordings such as their time, place, and participants. 
However, I also regularly took notes as an independent means of collecting information. This 
subsection focuses on such use of notes as a method in its own right for this dissertation. As I 
indicated in Table 2 above, setting aside those associated with recordings and experiments, two 
kinds of notes served as main research activities: notes on participant observation and notes on 
focused conversations that I did not record.  
Participant observation is an umbrella term for what makes up the majority of 
anthropological field research—living and going about daily life alongside people that live in the 




ranged from the most mundane and passive of activities—watching a Brazilian soap opera after 
dinner or sitting in a dry goods store to listen to neighbors gossip and chat—to very specific, 
labor-intensive activities—harvesting potatoes in a place called Mashra Uqu or herding a pair of 
donkeys along the four-hour route back to town from Ruriq canyon. These activities were also 
sporadically punctuated by unplanned opportunities to delve into focused conversations on 
particular topics. For example, while taking breaks from counting cattle in Ruriq canyon, I often 
had the chance to ask the herders I was accompanying about their family histories, how they felt 
about herding, and encounters they might have had with mountains personified in human form. 
For this purpose I kept a folded sheet of paper on which I had written a list of questions. I 
frequently had to replace the list, not so much because of use—once I had written down the 
questions I usually remembered them and left the paper in my pocket—as because of the 
corrections, additions and annotations that gradually filled in the blank areas on the page.  
Another reason I often left my list of questions in my pocket is because of the disfluency it 
would have brought to the interaction; for the same reason, I generally wrote my notes at the end 
of the day or during down time rather than in the midst of activity. Disfluency is even more of an 
issue in video recording, while experimentation is in essence the controlled use of disfluency to 
isolate particular phenomena. Having worked with this range of disfluency across methods, I have 
come to appreciate the value of post-facto ethnographic note taking as a practice that is most able 
to preserve the flow of events anchored in the activity of interest. Of course, my very presence is 
itself an interruption, but over the course of any familiar activity, my exotic presence eventually 
came to be superseded by the flow of work (or play) and the goals, products, and emotions at 
stake therein. I came to see my note taking practices not only as a valuable source of information, 




As I generally tried to avoid taking or consulting notes in the midst of whatever I was 
participating in and/or observing, I regularly wrote my field notes in journals in the evenings or 
during other dead periods. I copied these into a word processor on my laptop when I had a 
chance, and I also took advantage of these occasions to fill out details I had neglected and to write 
more reflective or analytical passages.23 In these paper and silicon notes, I recorded everything I 
could remember, regardless of whether I thought it might ultimately be of interest or not. Yet it 
would be great hubris to claim that I recorded everything that I observed and did—there was 
never enough time to write everything, nor does short-term memory work in a strictly linear 
fashion. Thus, I found myself periodically drawing on loose memories and impressions at every 
stage of my research, from note taking to revisions of the completed dissertation. I find no reason 
to minimize or devalue this intuitive side of ethnographic research. Presumably all humans share 
some basic means of storing and accessing memories, and thus it seems a fitting method in the 
study of humanity when anchored in more material forms of evidence such as notes and 
recordings.    
 
 7.2. Video recordings 
During my field research, I gathered a corpus of video recordings that fall into five 
categories: community or family events or activities, informal conversations, interviews, 
structured elicitations, and controlled linguistic experiments. In practice, there was some overlap 
among the first three categories. I often recorded informal conversations (in some of which I also 
                                                
23 I often did this work at the end of the day, sitting at a wooden table in the storeroom of my 
friend and host, Pascual Leon, where he himself also sat to take his own notes on his farm work 
and community projects and on the cases he was working as a justice of the peace. We drew 
attention and teasing from the rest of his family for the two traits we shared: facial hair, and 




participated) and structured interviews before, during, and after activities such as meetings, 
parties, and work projects, as well as in and around the homes of the people I got to know best in 
Huaripampa. Inevitably, some parts of these conversations were about me, my presence in 
Huaripampa, or the equipment I used for the recording (a small digital camcorder, a tripod, a 
microphone, a stereo audio-recorder, and a tangled assortment of cables). While these topics 
eventually became more familiar and mundane, recording always inevitably introduced some 
disfluency into the flow of activities.  
One way I made the process of recording less aberrant was by becoming Huaripampa’s de 
facto event filmographer. In other words, in addition to my research activities, I also used parts of 
my recordings of local festivals, life cycle events, and communal work projects to produce video 
mementos for community members and groups. Enough residents had DVD players and TVs to 
make these objects valuable to them, and I found that people genuinely enjoyed watching familiar 
faces and places as much, if not more, than the pirated DVDs bought in the city and the soap 
operas on Huaripampa’s single television channel. Producing these videos helped make sense of 
my presence in public situations and made it possible to reciprocate in a unique fashion. However, 
my cinematographic services were replaced soon after I left—smart phones have become 
commonplace in Río Negro, and residents now have a vibrant photographic and filmographic 
public presence on Facebook and Youtube.  
 
7.2.1. Recordings of events 
In addition to serving as video mementos for residents, the activities and events I filmed 
served a number of purposes in my research. First of all, in events like weddings, funerals, and 




celebration a handful of people are dancing, two old friends are seated on a bench in heated 
conversation, an older woman is preparing a hot drink, and children chase one another among the 
rooms of the house. Instead of trying to remember the details of all of these activities without 
knowing in advance exactly what will ultimately be of interest, video recordings allowed me to 
participate more freely, knowing that I could return to the recording to observe the details. These 
details also consisted of bits of conversations. While people in such contexts move about 
frequently, it is possible to catch bits and pieces of interactions that are useful for evaluating the 
use of linguistic forms. Before analyzing the use of Frames of Reference in speech, for example, I 
watched through these videos and extracted segments that contained stretches of speech relevant 
to this particular question. Finally, in addition to their value in preserving visual and auditory 
impressions, recordings have also served more generally as mnemonic. As time passed after 
returning from Río Negro, these videos brought me back to the place more forcefully than 
memory alone, and thus helped prime my mind for writing. 
 
7.2.2. Recordings of informal conversations  
As I mentioned above, having my camera set up and running in such events also provided 
many occasions for making more focused recordings of both informal conversations and 
interviews. This usually occurred when I encountered individuals who had already participated in 
my research. I would then ask them if I could either simply record them as they spoke with one 
another with the purpose of learning about the Quechua language, or if I could ask them some 
specific questions with the purpose of learning about local culture. I also recorded both informal 
conversations and interviews in other settings as well—for example at tables in dry good stores, 




Recording informal conversations was in fact one of the most difficult activities in my 
research. The goal here is to capture as “natural” a portrait as possible of everyday talk, yet 
talking about everyday things with a camera and microphone trained precisely on you and your 
interlocutors is not an easy task, and arguably cannot be truly accomplished without hidden 
recordings devices, which pose a serious ethical problem and breach of trust. As I described 
above, people’s familiarity with me and my recording equipment was really the only way of 
mitigating the inherent awkwardness. Setting aside lingering doubts about artificiality, certain 
questions about language, and especially about its use in social interaction, can only convincingly 
be addressed with recordings of informal conversation. This fact has been demonstrated 
convincingly by conversation analysts since the seminal work of Schegloff (1971) and Sacks, 
Schegloff, & Jefferson (1974). Furthermore, given my interest in manual gestures, video 
recordings in particular were necessary. I was also particularly determined to record informal 
conversations because most research on spatial language has focused exclusively on elicitations 
and controlled experiments. While my analyses of the spatial language used in these settings is 
not as rich in sheer number of instances as the elicitations and experiments I conducted, they 
counterbalance the latter with observations of usages in settings that more closely approximate 
daily life. Indeed, these observations substantively change the direction of my interpretation, as I 
show in Chapter 3. 
 
7.2.3 Recordings of interviews 
The interviews I recorded ranged from unscripted, informal conversations to carefully 
planned questionnaires. At the beginning of my research these were two very distinct kinds of 




myself moving back and forth between casual chat and highly specific questions over the course 
of each interview. I conducted these interviews sporadically and sometimes spontaneously in the 
midst of events, during breaks from agricultural work, or on visits to families living in more 
remote areas close to the high pastures. At first I had a list of topics of interest as well as a list of 
pre-formulated questions—family histories of land use, current practices, the places people 
frequented and their names, stories about memorable things that happened while working in the 
mountain pastures or cultivated fields, other places where people have lived and why, what 
differences most stand out to them, etc. All of these topics and questions served a double purpose. 
First, they aimed to provoke the people I spoke with to address my interest in patterns of 
engagement with the environment. At the same time, I also tried to ask questions that were open 
enough to spur my interlocutors to tell stories and speak freely about what they knew and were 
themselves interested in. This more relaxed kind of speech—as opposed to answers to precise 
questions—provided stretches of speech that were useful to analyze not only for their content, but 
also for their linguistic structure, and more specifically for their use of spatial language. As I 
regularly conducted interviews, I gradually became more able to improvise my way through them 
in a way that got at my interests while also maximizing the informality of the conversation. This 
process of adaptation paralleled (and contributed to) my constantly improving ability to 
communicate smoothly in Quechua. It also contributed to the community’s acceptance of me as 
an interlocutor in Quechua rather than in Spanish, the language used to communicate with 
outsiders and in official contexts.  
As I mentioned above, the recordings of these interviews and conversations served several 
analytic purposes: understanding current and past practices through which Río Negro residents 




places (Chapters 2 and 5); determining the spatial Frames of Reference that Quechua speakers in 
Río Negro use in speech (Chapter 3); and analyzing the use of demonstrative pronouns in 
Quechua and their co-occurrence with pointing gestures (Chapter 4). These three analytical 
purposes involved different second-order representations of the recordings. For each analytic task, 
I began by listening through the entirety of the recordings and flagging relevant sections. When 
these were smaller segments of larger recordings, I created a separate file of the excerpt. I then 
created a file for each recording or excerpt in ELAN, the transcription software developed by the 
Max Planck Institute. This software allowed me to see the video file in coordination with the 
audio waveform and multiple tiers of transcription.  
 The transcription process varied in detail according to the analytical purpose. For 
developing an ethnographic description of patterns and variability in residents’ engagements with 
their environments, I needed only a rough transcription, and in some cases I could rely on 
simplified notes. In contrast, my analyses of spatial orientation, demonstrative reference, and 
pointing gestures required more detailed and precise transcriptions. For this reason, I first did 
these more detailed analyses. I began this process during my fieldwork, flagging the most difficult 
segments—especially those where more than two people are speaking at the same time or when 
there was significant background noise. For these more difficult transcriptions, I worked with two 
assistants, both native speakers of Ancash Quechua, César Vargas Arce, a dedicated Quechua 
educator and activist, and Florencio Quito Molina, an anthropologist and colonial historian of 
Ancash. Doing transcription during the second year of my fieldwork, both alone and with 
assistance, was instrumental in improving my ability to speak and understand the language and to 




with a monolingual Quechua healer in her eighties that I had long dismissed as largely 
incomprehensible, I found that I could transcribe most of it without too much trouble.  
I completed the transcriptions for the linguistic analyses over the course of several months 
after returning to Ann Arbor. Having these transcriptions also speeded the process of reviewing 
recordings for the purpose of describing environmental practices. This second pass through my 
recordings was an eye-opening process. During transcription, my attention had been necessarily 
focused on the language itself, and I had not paid close attention to the content. Listening to the 
recordings once more was thus a necessary step for writing a coherent and thorough ethnographic 
account, and the next best thing to returning to Río Negro for further field research. Concretely, I 
created a text document that included notes ranging from simple paraphrasing to verbatim quotes, 
all labeled with reference to the recorded situation—the speaker, location, time, and brief 
description of context—and to the recording itself—filename and timecode. This made it possible 
to return quickly to the original recordings if needed. At the same time, I created a parallel 
document that similarly gathered relevant materials from my field notebooks. This process 
illustrates a way in which the different stages of research methods merge and diverge. These 
documents combined second-order representations of information gathered through video 
recordings and notes, while the same recorded interviews also fed into separate transcriptions I 
made to answer specific questions about language and gesture.  
 
7.2.4. Recordings of elicitations 
In addition to recorded interviews and conversations, my analyses of spatial orientation in 
language and gesture drew on recordings of a structured elicitation. I designed this scripted 




speakers used to describe spatial relations, and of the accompanying bodily movements—namely 
manual gestures, torso movement, and changes in gaze direction. The questionnaire, which I call 
“Spatial Algebra,” consisted of a series of simple questions about routes among places familiar to 
participants. The elicitation consisted of two types of questions; ones that prompted participants 
to name the direction they would have to go in order to get from one place to another—e.g., from 
the the local elementary school to the town plaza—and another that prompted participants to 
name the place to which they would arrive following a particular direction from a point—e.g., 
going uphill from the old cemetery. Eighteen individuals participated in the full study, which 
consisted on average of 25 questions, and there were 478 total question-answer pairs. I describe 
the elicitation and its analysis in greater detail in Chapter 3 (3.2), as this is the Chapter in which I 
describe spatial orientation in Ancash Quechua. Once again, even this focused elicitation program 
proved useful for another analytic purpose, as I included the use of demonstrative pronouns and 
accompanying pointing gestures in the elicitation together with instances from other recordings in 
the analysis presented in Chapter 4.  
 
 7.2.5. Recordings of controlled experiments 
 The last kind of recording I collected was of a controlled experiment. I conducted two 
distinct controlled experiments during my fieldwork—one focused on spatial orientation in 
language, and other on spatial orientation in nonverbal thought. I filmed every trial of the former 
experiment, and in Chapter 3 I integrate the results of their analysis with the analysis of the 
elicitation described above and with qualitative observations drawn from field notes and other 




  I did not film the experiment focused on nonverbal thought. Since it was nonverbal and 
no transcription was required, I coded each response in a notebook during the trials (see section 
6.3 below for a more detailed account). I also kept notes with qualitative observations during the 
trials of the verbal experiment.    
 The controlled experiment focused on language use was based on the “Man and Tree 
Game” designed at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen (Pederson et al 
1998). In this task, adjacent participants separated by an opaque barrier are asked to match 
photographs picturing various arrangements of a model man and tree. Participants take turns as 
director and matcher. The director is given one photograph and asked to describe it to the matcher 
so that the latter can choose an identical one from among a set. The utterances participants make 
during this task reveal the linguistic strategies they use to describe spatial relationships. For 
example, an English speaker may say “the man is looking to the left and standing in front of the 
tree,” using their own body to anchor the description, whereas a Quechua speaker might describe 
the same picture with relation to the landscape, saying instead, “the man is looking uphill and 
standing on the Qitsqay Mountain side of the tree.” In reality, the results contained a large degree 
of variability, which I interpret and discuss in Chapter 3.  
 The experiment I conducted was not an exact reproduction of the “Man and Tree Game.” 
First, instead of a man, I used a cow. This was because the people I was working with were 
familiar with cows and in fact one genre of speech is pointing out and identifying cows from a 
distance. I also decided to use models rather than photographs of models, as I found the flatness 
of photographs to introduce an unnecessary degree of artificiality into the experiment. I was 
especially concerned about this, as I had already observed that Quechua speakers tended to orient 




dimensional models might create an ambiguous situation and lead speakers to avoid 
environmentally anchored descriptions.  
 This was the research activity that made the most demands on participants, but I found 
that people enjoyed taking part in it. One man, for example, created a narrative out of the task. As 
I successively rearranged the cow and tree and he in turn described the scene to his wife on the 
other side of the curtain that hung between them, he added comments about what a fickle cow this 
was—first it was headed up to Ruriq, and then down to Arzobispo, one moment it was licking the 
tree, and the next it was scratching its side up against it. Younger participants also found it to be 
an entertaining game, though I sometimes had to remind them that it was a game of cooperation 
when they were carried away by competitive spirit and tried to either trick or spy on their 
partners. In most cases, there was plenty of laughter involved. This was particularly so during a 
trial in the high grasslands that was completely thwarted by the wind. First, when a gale carried 
away my makeshift curtain, I resorted to having participants close their eyes. Even then, the 
plastic models themselves refused to stay still in the gusty weather. In all, I conducted twelve 
successful trials, including twenty-four participants. I provide a more details account in Chapter 3 
(3.1).  
 
7.3. Controlled experiments 
I waited until the second rainy season of my field research—starting in November 2013—
to begin the second controlled experiment, which focused on spatial orientation in nonverbal 
thought. The rainy season was ideal, as the experiment had to be conducted indoors, and this was 
the period of the year during which people spend more time indoors. Though planting occurs it 




days within which everyone tries to plant. Of course, the sun still shines during much of the day 
in the rainy season, and it did so during most of my trials. Nevertheless, people generally had less 
outdoor work to do at this time. I also had less outdoor work to do, as the spontaneous rain 
showers posed serious technical difficulties for outdoor video recording.  
Waiting for the second year of my fieldwork also made it easier to recruit participants for 
this study, as I had become a familiar presence in Huaripampa by my second November there. 
This was critical for the study, as I needed to have a robust number of participants for several 
reasons. The actions observed by the study were narrower in scope—there were only four 
possible choices in each trial—compared to the open-ended descriptions in the verbal experiment 
described above. The strength of my interpretation of the results thus depended on the 
significance of the statistics. In statistical analysis, significance is gradient and subject to 
interpretation, not categorical. In concrete terms, this meant that the more participants I had, the 
lower the margin of error in the statistical tests to which I would eventually put the data, and thus 
the more confidence I could have in judging the significance of any correlations I ultimately 
found. This was all the more important, as I aimed not only to describe a general pattern of spatial 
orientation, but also to examine possible sources of variability such as language, age, gender, and 
differences in habitual engagements with the environment (i.e., the distinction in the 
environmental practices of farmers and herders).  
I recruited 97 participants, 3 of which I had to drop from the analysis. To put this in 
perspective, consider the numbers of participants in the seminal studies of spatial language and 
cognition conducted in coordination in large part by members of the Max Planck Institute for 




40 participants, with an average of 20 (Levinson 2003:182).24 There are both practical and 
theoretical justifications for the relatively low number of participants in these studies. First, most 
of them were conducted during fairly short field visits that were organized specifically to conduct 
studies of spatial orientation. The researchers were thus faced with the practical problem of 
recruiting strangers for an even stranger activity. Second, most of these studies were coordinated 
with the ultimate goal of a comparative, cross-linguistic meta-analysis. The participants from each 
study were ultimately grouped into larger study populations in this meta-analysis based on their 
responses, and this mitigated the low number of participants in each individual trial. In contrast, 
because my own study was not cross-linguistic in nature, I needed more robust numbers.   
While the study tested different variables than those designed by the MPI, it was closely 
modeled on one of their experiments. The task, called the “chips task” (Levinson 2003, 159), is 
designed to reveal whether individual participants remember the arrangement of figures on a table 
with respect to their own bodies or to the surrounding world—in other words, whether they use an 
allocentric or egocentric Frame of Reference. To get at this distinction, the task asks participants 
to move back and forth between two tables, rotating 180 degrees each time. At the first table, they 
are asked to remember the arrangement of a small black chip and large white chip; at the second 
table they are asked to select the matching arrangement from four pairs of chips. Rather than 
loose chips, I used square cards with a small black circle and a large white circle. The task 
exploits the fact that there are two possible ways of choosing a matching card after rotating 180 
degrees. For example, the “egocentric” match might orient the two figures to the left and right (of 
the participant’s body), while the “allocentric” match might orient the figures instead to the east 
and west. For someone who remembers the original card in an egocentric Frame of Reference, the 
                                                




allocentric match would seem to be a mirror image. In contrast, someone who remembers the card 
in an allocentric Frame of Reference essentially takes a birds-eye-view of the two tables. From 
this perspective, the rotation is essentially irrelevant, and the absolute orientation of the cards to 
the surrounding world frames the match.  
At the end of each individual’s participation, I conducted a brief, standardized interview 
about language history, past and present residence, and experience in the high pasturelands. I 
describe the rationale of these post-trial interviews along with the experiment’s implementation, 
coding, and analysis in greater detail in Chapter 5.25 I did not film this experiment for several 
reasons: the conditions were rigorously controlled to maintain consistency across trials; 
participants spoke little, so I was able to record relevant comments in my notebook; and the 
camera would potentially distract participants and possibly even suggest its own perspective 
during the trials.      
 
 7.4. GPS data 
During my field research, I almost always carried a digital camera with me. This was not 
only to have the camera’s photographic memory at my assistance, but also in order to record GPS 
data. Every picture I took was automatically tagged with information that later allowed me to 
locate the place where the photo was taken. Furthermore, because each picture also was tagged 
with the precise time it was taken, I was also able to figure out exactly where I was at that time. In 
addition to the camera’s GPS, I also carried a handheld GPS unit in my backpack on longer walks 
(or rides). This unit took GPS measurements every few seconds, in essence recording the path that 
I followed. I uploaded all of this data to the Google Earth software as soon after recording as I 
                                                




could. Having the data plotted on the satellite images made it possible not only to more clearly 
visualize these places and paths, but also to easily see the altitude of each point and the velocity 
with which I moved from one point to another.  
While the specificity of this data may seem redundant or irrelevant, it was in fact useful 
for several reasons. First, my primary reasons for recording GPS data were to capture common 
herding routes and to help in putting together a map of the named places mentioned in my notes 
and recordings. The mapping of places and routes was crucial across most of the questions in my 
research. Putting together an accurate ethnographic account of the patterns of environmental 
practices among Río Negro residents required me to be able to somehow represent the numerous 
place names that came up in interviews and conversations. Indeed, as I eventually learned in my 
research, Quechua speakers are consistently aware of their orientation and location. In this sense, 
the GPS data helped me simulate a similar awareness during analysis. Specifically, it became 
possible for me to figure out where named places were without having to actually go to them. I 
did eventually go to many of them, or at least close enough to have them pointed out to me, and 
over time developed a more intuitive sense of the lay of the land. Nevertheless, without 
periodically studying my GPS data during fieldwork, I would have progressed much more slowly 
in my knowledge of the landscape, and ultimately would have had far more blind spots.   
My analyses of spatial orientation in language and gesture also relied critically on the GPS 
data. Because speakers generally oriented their representations of spatial relations to the contours 
of the landscape and to specific landmarks, it was frequently impossible to analyze the orientation 
without knowing both the shape of the landscape and the location of the landmarks around the 
speaker. For example, when I asked a participant in an elicitation which direction they would go 




camera and say something like “down that way.” Coordinating such recordings with mapped GPS 
data helped determine whether the speaker was pointing directly at the location of Wancha, or 
instead pointing west, which is equated with “downhill” in Huaripampa, and is also the direction 
one goes to get to Wancha from the Sawan River bridge. To analyze these elicitations, I first 
located the individual recordings on satellite images, and then oriented speakers’ utterances and 
gestures with respect to the named places I had mapped. This process provided an important 
insight about the embodied aspects of spatial orientation. Without being able to map pointing 
gestures, I would not have noticed—nor had convincing evidence—that people pointed quickly to 
distant landmarks with great accuracy, even when indoors.  
The GPS data I recorded also had an unexpected use. After returning from longer trips 
with herders to the high pastures in Ruriq canyon, I took time to write extensive notes that filled 
in the gaps in my field notebooks. This was an important practice, as I had little time for note 
taking on these trips. I was most interested in what happened and was said in the midst of this 
work, which was done constantly on the move, and thus was not conducive to writing in a 
notebook. Taking GPS-tagged photographs, however, was easier to accomplish, and so was 
carrying the handheld GPS device in my backpack or pocket. Once I had time to write a more 
complete description of these trips, it was often hard to piece together the precise order and 
location of events, especially when everything was so new to me. However, by comparing my 
notes both with every movement plotted on satellite images and coordinated with my own 
photographs, I was able to reproduce the sequence of events and their locations with precision 
that would otherwise have been impossible. In addition to facilitating this precision, I found the 
GPS data also served as a kind of mnemonic. As I studied the routes we had followed, the times 




we had progressed from one place to another, more details emerged from my memory. This 
process of remembering not only helped enrich my field notes, but also led me to reflect on how 
much of everyday experience is lost to conscious memory, and thus on the importance of 
combining multiple modes of observation—e.g., notes, photographs, videos, and GPS data—even 


















Chapter 2: Who can speak with mountains? Herders, 
farmers, and quotidian ritual in Río Negro 
 
1. Introduction: Coca and cigarettes 
On an August morning not yet warmed by the rising sun, Donato and I led two donkeys up 
the hill called Qitsqay at the western end of the town of Huaripampa. At the top, we stopped to 
catch our breath (or at least for me to catch mine) and took in the sight of the town reaching out 
below us—a few snaking rows of houses surrounded by a patchwork of farmland to the north and 
grasslands climbing over foothills toward the glacial peaks that pierced the blue sky to the east. 
After staking his animals on a stony patch of grass, we walked a few minutes along a narrow 
ridge between the fields until we reached the one that belonged to his family. Sitting on a grassy 
clump, we waved to his wife, Angélica, who was now making her way up toward where we sat 
with the lunch they would eat after a few hours of harvesting potatoes. Before getting to work, 
Donato had agreed to answer a few questions of mine about local place-names. I fished a pencil 
and notebook out of my backpack and set up the recording equipment. In the meantime, Donato 
reached into his pocket for a plastic bag of coca leaves. He passed a handful of the green leaves 
enclosed in his fist in small circles before his lips, whispering inaudibly to them, then blew 




During this process I had started recording our interview, oblivious to the fact that a very 
quotidian sort of ritual was underway, and it is thanks to this recording that I am now able to 
describe the actions that I barely perceived in the moment. As I explained the kinds of questions I 
was going to ask, Donato slipped a cigarette from a folded piece of paper and passed it in small 
circles before his mouth, moving his lips as if speaking. After I finished explaining myself, 
Donato answered, “Ya, tapupaaramay Yoshwita,” (“alright, Joshua, go ahead and ask me”). Then, 
after answering the first question, he interjected, “Pero, imanaw kaptinshi Yoshwita, siigarutaraq 
humaramushaq parlapaarir” (“But, whatever might be said, Joshua, I’m still going to smoke a 
cigarette while we’re talking”). Picking up on some, but not all, of the social implications in his 
interjection, I asked if it was all right to continue, and he assured me it was. I waited, notebook in 
hand, while he lit the cigarette and said, “chakcharamushaq” (“I’m going to chakchay”), and then 
proceeded with the interview.   
While I knew that the verb chakchay referred to chewing coca, and was familiar with the 
practice of divination with coca leaves and cigarettes, I believed that the latter was something 
done only by experts, and gave no further thought to Donato’s announcement. While I focused on 
the interview, Donato periodically examined the ash on his cigarette, looking for signs. At the 
time, several months into my fieldwork, I didn’t know what these small, seemingly unreflective 
actions were, and thus did not take them as cues to pay attention. I eventually learned that 
chakchay refers not only to a suite of practices—primarily chewing coca, smoking cigarettes, and 
drinking alcohol—but also to their use as offerings or in order to ask for favorable outcomes, 
safety and health, or answers to specific questions.26 Cigarette ash, I discovered, was also a 
                                                
26 Chakchay is generally translated as “to chew,” and I have not seen it used in any ethnographies 




particularly common divinatory medium. I didn’t learn these things among farmers like Donato in 
Huaripampa, but rather while accompanying herders to the highest parts of Río Negro, where 
daily life was punctuated by the continual use of coca, tobacco, and alcohol to pacify wild 
(chukaru) places, request safe passage, and divine the location of stray animals.  
After juxtaposing my observations about coca and cigarettes in farming and herding 
contexts, I came to perceive a categorical difference. In the agricultural context, farmers address 
ritual offerings to the particular parcel of land they are working,27 and to the distant peaks (often 
invisible to speakers) in the high pastures above. Herders in contrast address their offerings 
directly to the high peaks while working on and among them. Likewise, the messages farmers 
receive through divination come directly from the tobacco or coca leaves, and not from the 
mountains—hirka, in Quechua28; in contrast, herders’ offerings are always made to particular 
hirka, and the answers to their divination with coca and cigarettes come from these hirka, and not 
from the plants themselves.29 In both contexts, ritual offerings are anchored in the specific place 
where they are performed—either the parcel of land being farmed or the mountain on which herds 
                                                                                                                                                         
anything other than coca, though in the contexts that coca is chewed, frequently tobacco and 
alcohol are also consumed, and often in a ritual context (e.g., Herrera & Lane 2006:168)   
27 Occasionally farmers dedicate rituals to the patsamama (literally, “earth mother”). However, 
even in this case, the beneficiary of the ritual is the particular place where land is being 
cultivated—e.g., Mashra Uqu, Mitu Hirka, Qitsqay—and not land in the abstract. Salas Carreño 
has made a similar observation in the department of Cuzco (2016:20).   
28 The herders and shamans that Ricard Lanata worked with in the southern Peruvian highlands 
described the distinction between divination that communicates with specific hirka and divination 
that draws merely on divinatory medium such as coca as the respective domains of altamisayuq 
and pampa-misayuq by (2007:145). Such a formalized distinction is absent in Río Negro. In 
Ancash, Stein wrote that every man in the community of Hualcán could conduct a basic 
divination ritual to determine whether or not a given event would transpire by chewing coca 
(1961:318)—the specifics of which match what I learned in Río Negro—while more complex 
consultations were made by curanderos or witches (brujos) who received their responses from 
“patrons” embodied in places like waterfalls, glaciers, or rocks (324).  
29 Ricard Lanata noted a similar absence of reference to the patsamama in myths or rituals among 




graze. At the same time, the high peaks are also invoked in both contexts, whereas individual 
parcels of farmland only receive offerings when they are the place of the ritual. While the hirka of 
the high pastures alone receive offerings from a distance, either from farmers or herders, only 
herders communicate with individual hirka through divination. In sum, the distinction between 
ritual in agricultural and pastoral contexts centers on the role of the herders who graze their 
animals on the high peaks with whom only they are able to communicate.   
In what follows, I argue that this difference in ritual across agricultural and pastoral 
contexts does not amount simply to a shibboleth of distinct social identities actually constituted 
otherwise—for example historically, politically, or structurally—but is rather a direct result of the 
environmental practices that take herders into constant and close contact with hirka. This is not 
surprising in the Andean context, where territorial associations are defined not in terms of 
permanent ownership, but rather in relation to a given social group’s activities (Poole 1984:149). 
Examining the relationship between herders and hirka in its own terms also reveals a way in 
which this relationship comes to shape social life beyond herding. First, herders’ privileged 
relationships with hirka shapes their position in the social world of Río Negro, as these 
relationships are grounded in the same relations of respect, care, and mutual obligation that 
constitute human social relations there. Second, their social access to hirka not only shapes their 
own social positions, but also plays a constitutive part in shaping the conditions for social action 
in Río Negro more generally. Specifically, because farmers cannot directly communicate with the 
unruly hirka of the high pastures, they seek out herders as intermediaries when faced with critical 
problems such as severe illness, and by doing so frame their actions with respect to a familiar 




another common frame,30 anchored in relation to unfamiliar entities such as government 
institutions, and characterized by inaccessibility, power, and progress.31 It is a frame that casts 
places like Río Negro as impoverished backwaters. In fact, it is this very frame that recognizes the 
practice of chakchay and the sociality of hirka as merely “custom”—arbitrary symbols of identity 
at best, and at the worst as indexes of ignorance.  
 
1.1. Understanding hirka in social terms 
 While the linguistic focus of my programmed interview with Donato was itself part of the 
reason that I initially overlooked the simultaneous ritual, another reason was undoubtedly the 
frequency with which I had been told that such rituals were a thing of the past in Río Negro. 
Beginning with my preliminary visits, whenever conversations broached “cultural” subjects like 
ritual practices, religious beliefs, and mythology, I found that people in Río Negro tended to make 
comments to the effect that nowadays there was no respect for the hirka. At first I was worried 
that my research and dissertation would end up reifying a problematic discourse—circulating 
since the early colonial period—that casts the reality of Andean culture as an inferior corruption 
of past cultural purity. This preoccupation dissipated as my focus narrowed on the complexities of 
spatial description in Ancash Quechua, and it disappeared completely with my principled if naïve 
                                                
30 This analysis could also be made in terms of cultures rather than frames. However, such an 
approach would generalize what are in essence contextually emergent, and thus variable, 
phenomena instead as norms shared across a population. My argument here depends on an 
analytic sensitivity to patterns of variation in practice. Because the concept of frame entails the 
possibility of movement—of reframing or shifts in framing (or footing, in Goffmanian terms)—it 
is more suitable to the intent of this chapter. Furthermore, it is consonant with the terms I use to 
analyze Quechua spatial language: i.e., Frames of Reference. However, I am not here proposing 
any deeper logical connection between the two uses of the word.  
31 Examining social interactions in terms of their framing rather than in terms of “local” and 
“national” scales avoids the implicit presumption of scales that are in fact the product of 
interactional work and sometimes coordinated “scalar project,” as Carr & Lempert (2016) have 




pledge to focus my ethnography on the world as I found it, rather than as I (or other 
anthropologists) imagined it should be.  
Ironically, the reality that I found in Río Negro didn’t make the problem disappear by 
revealing “tradition” as a hegemonic, exoticist fantasy, but rather by teaching me to listen 
differently to people’s statements about its erosion. Instead of hearing these as descriptions of 
objective states-of-affairs, I now understand them as invocations of a particular discursive frame 
relevant to particular kinds of contexts—that is, to a particular interactional state-of-affairs. I 
began to recognize the same discourse in other contexts—in meetings with officers of the 
National Park that occupies much of Río Negro’s pasturelands, with visitors from NGOs or 
government agencies promoting development projects, or with tourists or other outsiders. 
Considering that this discourse of cultural erosion and inferiority itself comes from the outside, it 
is not surprisingly invoked as a frame for interactions with outsiders. Furthermore, because Río 
Negro residents rely on outside resources—medicine, wage labor, imported products, public 
education, etc.—it is also a ubiquitous frame, and probably one that feels quite natural. But it is 
not the only frame, nor is it the only ubiquitous frame, nor the only one that feels natural.  
 In fact, these comments in which I first encountered the discourse of cultural erosion 
already presupposed another frame. Instead of framing Río Negro as a provincial backwater, the 
comments were grounded in a perspective anchored in the environment as known and 
experienced by the people who lived and worked in it. In those early interviews, people expressed 
their dismay not with cultural degradation in general, but specifically with the growing lack of 
respect for hirka. This specific concern takes for granted that hirka can be the recipients of the 




about the erosion of certain cultural practices, these statements themselves presupposed that such 
practices were central to the conditions of sociality.  
 Salas Carreño similarly observed that social practices and discourse presuppose the 
characteristics of mountains in the Andes (2016). Because they are forged in social interaction, 
such presuppositions do not exist in isolation—insofar as they are social facts, their significance 
hinges on the horizon of social relations relevant to the context in which they emerge. For 
example, if I clasp my hands and address a word of thanks to an antiquated elevator after a long, 
jerky ride, I presuppose that the elevator can be the recipient of gratitude, and thus participate in a 
particular type of social relationship. This presupposition indeed tells us that I am capable 
recognizing a circumscribed form of sociality in elevators, but it does not speak to differences 
among elevators or contexts in which they may or may not be social, or to the consequences of 
their sociality. To address these questions, it would be necessary to look more broadly at 
expressions of gratitude (possibly the most ubiquitous and obligatory of all social exchanges in 
my own cultural context), at who does or does not thanks elevators, and at when they do or don’t 
do so. This investigation would most likely demonstrate that there is a widespread practice of 
thanking inanimate things in relatively high-stakes contexts in which their successful performance 
was in doubt. However, it would most likely not demonstrate much social variation among 
individual elevators, nor even among types of objects.  
People in Río Negro engage in social relationships with hirka not as a generic type, but as 
individuals, in the same way that humans relate with other humans not simply as humans but 
rather as fathers, daughters, or more specifically as named individuals. At least in the context of 
Río Negro, mountains do not merely embody some important features of personhood and thereby 




individual histories and thus heterogeneous social positions. This difference between an abstract, 
person-like type and a population of individual persons is of critical consequence for 
understanding “respect for hirka.” For example, my own cultural background gives me a very 
different commonsense understanding of what it might mean to “respect hirka.” For example, a 
tourist or climber may express their respect for hirka in terms of being awe-struck, dumbfounded, 
or mesmerized by their physical qualities. Likewise, visitors in the Andes have begun to espouse 
“respect for nature” by leaving no refuse in their wake. Mountaineers themselves often feel that 
locals lack “respect for nature” when they leave plastic or even orange peels at the feet of glaciers. 
Ironically, such “garbage” is sometimes part of offerings that enact local respect for hirka. The 
well-rehearsed discourse of ecological impact invoked in visitors’ discourse about garbage indeed 
demonstrates awareness of a particular kind of nonhuman agency in which “nature” strikes back 
at disrespectful humans. However, while an outsider may speak of such respect as if it targeted 
particular places, there is no actual distinction between places in practice.32  
In other words, outsiders do not demonstrate their respect to mountains as if they were 
social individuals, but rather as tokens of the type “nature.” This also means that they do not 
expect respect in return—while they may recognize some features of personhood in nature, such 
as vengefulness, these remain at the abstract level of the type, and are not inherited by its 
individual tokens to the extent that they become persons. In contrast to tourists’ enactments of 
respect that reduce particular mountains to “nature,” “respect for hirka” in Río Negro implies a 
social relationship based on the most basic kinds of mutual obligations and care that characterize 
social relationships among humans (Mannheim & Salas 2015). This is by no means to say that 
                                                
32 Any distinctions in practices of “respect for nature” among middle-class North Americans, for 
example, would reveal something about what is included in the generic category of “nature,” but 




hirka and humans are the same. Yet while mountains and humans are indeed different from one 
another, they are also similar in their differentiation. That is, like relationships among humans, 
relationships with and among hirka are socially heterogeneous. Qitsqay and Collawasi Hirka, for 
example, do not get along well at all, while Shaksha and Wantsan are like siblings. 
The relationships of hirka with humans are likewise shaped as much by their own 
individual characteristics as by those of their human associates. For example, the hirka closest to 
Huaripampa—Don Juan, for example—constitute its agricultural land. They are considered tame, 
and it is safe to walk among them (at least during the day) without offering signs of respect. In 
contrast, the hirka in the hallqa—the high pasturelands—are dangerous and unruly, and safely 
passing among them requires constant ritual offerings. Likewise, there is a social division of labor 
in ritual interactions with hirka—only herders who frequent the hallqa communicate directly with 
individual hirka. Others may make offerings to them, but if they want to consult a hirka directly, 
they will seek a herder that can act as an intermediary. In question here is not simply reciprocation 
for offerings, but rather the difference between offerings made indirectly and sporadically (i.e., 
from a distance and out of a general sense of reverence and gratitude) and those made regularly 
and directly (i.e., in person and as an instrumental part of an ongoing interaction). While this 
distinction is not recognized as an institution in Rio Negro, the category of hirkawan rimaq 
(speaker-with-hirka) is used elsewhere in the central Andes to label specialists in ritual divination 
(Domínguez Condezo 2003:13). If we reconsider to the presupposition that hirka can be the 
recipients of respect together with the fact of their social heterogeneity, then it becomes clear that 
the social authority constituted by hirka is not stable (i.e., hirka are not conventional symbols of 
authority), but rather is contingent on particular social interactions (i.e., acts of respect for a hirka 




and its context). Living safely among hirka, and enjoying (rather than being the victim of) their 
authority thus requires individual acts of respect that cumulatively index the relation as such, and 
not a generalized belief or understanding of hirka as authoritative in a certain way.33    
Given that residents of Río Negro share an evaluation and understanding of hirka as social 
persons with distinct kinds of power and authority, and that all residents may make offerings to 
hirka as acts of respect, what accounts for the fact that only a subset of individuals—namely 
herders—communicate directly with them? I suggest that the answer to this question can be found 
in a careful consideration of the practices that constitute herders’ relationships with hirka. My 
description of these practices corresponds to three ways in which herders communicate with 
hirka: ritual offerings and divination made while working on the slopes of hirka, dreams and 
visions, and divination services provided to others far from hirka. Following these interactions 
from the slopes of the hirka themselves down to the towns below helps me to conceptualize the 
manner in which herders’ quotidian experience among hirka in the hallqa pastures accretes to 
their position in the social world of Río Negro.  
While my approach is similar to Bourdieu’s (1977) in that I treat social life as structured 
by dispositions embodied through habitual practice (habitus), I differ in opening the social 
relations in which habitus is instantiated to persons as locally defined, such as hirka, rather than 
                                                
33 “Belief” and “understanding” are slippery concepts here. The emergence out of individual 
interactions among hirka and herders of a broadly recognizable authority is on the surface 
certainly what we might call belief. The stakes of claiming that this is not so lie not in the broad 
recognizability, but rather in a dispute of the underlying proposition that such beliefs proliferate 
as they are—that is, in this case, that the authority recognized in hirka is itself a sort of cultural 
proposition that is passed along as such. Instead, I am arguing that such a particular shared belief 
is in fact the result of an elaborate history of particular interactions. In addition to grounding the 
substance of culture, as it were, in empirically observable phenomena, my approach also provides 
a simple mechanism for change and transformation by allowing a gap between second-order 
ideological representations of beliefs—statements like “we don’t respect hirka anymore” or social 
categories such as hirkawan rimaq—and the inherently unstable conditions out of which they 




limiting it a priori to humans. In Bourdieu’s model (cf. 1991:242), the locally anchored social 
field is conditioned by distinctions in the distribution of access to and dispositions toward 
economic and social capital. In contrast, my analysis of social position is not limited to the 
domain of relations among human persons, but also includes relations with “place- persons” 
(Mannheim & Salas Carreño 2015) such as hirka. Finally, because I treat hirka in the first 
instance not as tokens of a cultural type defined by a position in a symbolic structure but rather as 
social persons engaged in dynamic and meaningful processes, they highlight the artificiality of 
familiar nature-culture distinctions in Río Negro. Hirka do not stand in distinction to humans as 
matter imbued with meaning, but rather as a particular kind of participant alongside (which is not 
to say equal to) humans in the production of meaning. Indeed, discourses that frame hirka as 
natural—as in the National Park’s official discourse of environmental protection—or cultural—as 
in local discourses that resist the Park on the grounds of traditional beliefs—both elide the actual 
social relationships and habitual practices that constitute hirka and humans alike as social persons. 
In what follows, I show that an account of human-hirka interactions in Rio Negro along the lines 
of cultural tradition or belief is inadequate, as it fails to account both for important distinctions in 
who interacts with hirka and. Perhaps more importantly, it also fails because it renders much of 
the experiential labor that Rio Negro herders put into their interactions with hirka as irrelevant to 
this relationship, instead transforming this work into economic behavior and superfluous ritual.   
I begin with an account of the quotidian activities that bring herders into physical co-
presence with hirka, focusing on the accompanying use of coca, tobacco, and alcohol in small 
ritual offerings and divinations. Then, I turn to herders’ encounters with the hirka personified as 
human bodies or disembodied “voices” in dreams and visions. Finally, I present a case in which a 




reach this case along the path that herders themselves follow to their roles as ritual 
intermediaries—from the mountains downward—making it possible to understand how herders’ 
own experiences of the landscape come to bear on their emergent social position as intermediaries 
for the hirka.    
 
2. Hirka in the everyday work of herding 
2.1. The Río Negro landscape  
In order to understand the way herders meaningfully engage with the environment of the 
hallqa it is necessary to understand how that environment is situated physically, practically, and 
historically with respect to the rest of Río Negro. The hallqa is an ecological zone consisting of 
wetland, scrub desert, and cloud forest between 3,700 and 4,700 masl. Pastoralists have exploited 
the hallqa for at least 5,000 years, and the basic residence pattern—scattered compounds of 
several small residential units—appears in the archeological record as early as the Early Horizon 
(1000-1 BC) (Lavallee 1973; Browman 1974:191; Hastings 1987). Individuals’ experience 
participating in pastoral activities in these areas provides them with a body of cultural knowledge 
including the names of places and plants, practical skills, and stories. Herds in the hallqa also 
serve as economic reserves for many families (Murra 1965). In the 1970’s, a large portion of this 
land became state property as the Huascaran National Park (Barker 1980; Mayer 2009), and was 
later protected as part of a 3,400 km2 UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (Young 1998). While large 
landowners did little to alter traditional hallqa land use, the Park’s conservationist policies have 
led to a decrease in human residence and mobility in the region, a demographic shift from family 




These shifts are relatively recent, and the hallqa today stands in clear contrast to the centro 
poblado Huaripampa (see Figure 3)—the most densely populated area of Río Negro. In 
Huaripampa, houses and compounds are built close together, often sharing walls, along several 
roughly parallel roads on a flat area north of a steep slope that descends about 100 meters to the 
smaller district capital, Olleros, and the rust-colored current of the Río Negro. The land 
surrounding Huaripampa is heavily farmed, but as it climbs to the north and east, it gives way to 
dedicated pastureland. To the west of Huaripampa, the round promontory called Qitsqay Hirka, 
perched 300 meters above the Río Santa, is a quilt of small parcels of cultivated land. To the 
north, more agricultural land covers the adjacent Mitu Hirka, Chawkas River valley, and the 
higher mountain, Don Juan Punta. 
 
 





The town’s settlements grow more dispersed following the road east and end altogether 
where it forks at the Sawan River. Here, one branch descends the steep river gorge, and climbs 
the other side to Canray Grande, the former seat of the Canray Grande Hacienda, and of the 
current Peasant Community of Canray Grande—formed during the Agrarian Reform of 1969—
most of whose members now live in Huaripampa (see Figure 4). In Canray Grande there is more 
farmland, but following paths further east, the ground becomes rockier as it climbs gradually, to 
the large plateau of Canray Pampa, at 3,700 amsl. While the hillside to the south that drops to the 
Río Negro and the other to the north that drops to the Sawan River are both used for the 
cultivation of tubers and grains, on the plateau itself there is no more cultivated land. After 
climbing another 200 meters, the path reaches a place where two canyons meet and the Ruriq and 
Arway rivers converge to form the Río Negro. This land is used exclusively for grazing.  
 
 





The northern fork of the road at the eastern edge of Huaripampa follows the Sawan River 
past the cluster of houses at Tuktuk Pampa to some small agricultural parcels at Quñasha and 
Qaqayuq. There are no more adobe or cement houses here, but rather tsuklla—circular stone walls 
conically roofed with tough uqsha straw. The families that reside here all have other seasonal 
compounds further northeast along the same road in the pasture areas of Waraqayuq, Tsaway, and 
Inkatsa. Prior to enforcement of the Huascaran National Park’s policies, these dedicated herding 
areas, dotted with clusters of tsuklla and stone corrals, extended further northeast into Ruriq 
canyon (see Figure 5). Now, however, domestic residence is prohibited within its boundaries, and 
herders collectively control their herds in this region through the Comité de Usuarios de Pastos 
Naturales de Ruriq (CUP) officially administered by the National Park.34  
 
                                                
34 In practice, the CUP is mostly autonomous. On the rare occasion that Park administrators attend 
meetings, they present and discuss particular concerns, and do not stay to observe or participate in 
the ordinary proceedings of grievances, requests, etc. This part of the meeting usually last several 





Figure 5. Map of Ruriq 
 
The Park itself formed on the tail of the Agrarian Reform that dissolved the hacienda’s 
ownership of land in the area, including Ruriq canyon. However, before the Park’s formation the 
new policies’ granting this land to the simultaneously established Comunidad Campesino 
(Peasant Community) de Canray Grande turned the administration over to a large state-run 
“cooperative” company, SAIS Atusparia-Utcuyacu, that administered 8,667 sq. km. of pastoral 
and agricultural land from Río Negro along both sides of the Río Santa to Conococha, roughly 50 
km to the south (Dirección de Comunidades Campesinas 1971; Rasmussen 2015:91). The herders 
that tend the animals in Ruriq Canyon are now considered usuarios (usurpers) of the National 
Park’s grasslands. They are also the comuneros of Canray Grande who previously worked as the 
laborers in the state run cooperative. Before this they worked as peons for the haciendas of 
Canray Grande and Ruriq. What emerges as a constant through these unstable contexts for 




lead and care for animals in the region. While the nature of these herders’ economic, social, and 
legal relationships with their animals, one another, their community, and their state have 
undergone successive transformations, their relationships with the landscape—or more precisely 
with the hirka—have continued to be constituted by ritualized social interactions mediated by 
coca, tobacco, and alcohol.35 
    
2.2. The social and political landscape of the hallqa 
In Ancash Quechua, the word “hallqa” refers to the high region where arable land gives 
way to deserts of tough grass, swampy green wetlands and dense patches of cloud forest.36 The 
hallqa’s idiosyncrasies are not limited to its physical features. Recently, archaeologists have 
found that this region in the central Peruvian Andes has been characterized by dispersed multi-
family compounds dedicated to camelid herding and distinct forms of ritual architecture oriented 
toward mountain peaks (Herrera 2005) and water sources (Orsini & Benozzi 2013). Prehistory 
aside, a number of factors set this region apart today as well. As described above, the ascent from 
the agricultural lands to the hallqa corresponds with a change from tightly clustered, rectangular 
adobe brick houses to circular “tsuklla” houses made from stones and uqsha grass. Likewise, the 
small corrals made from branches, barbwire, or adobe are replaced with large stone enclosures. 
Neighboring tsuklla do not share walls. Instead, they are usually separated by about 100 meters, 
                                                
35 Karen Spalding (2008) observed that one reason that “idolatrous” religious practices have 
persisted in the Andes is that local priests in the hinterlands were primarily dedicated to economic 
endeavors such as mining and intensive agro-pastoral production (287). It is thus not the 
orthodoxies of Christianity but rather that of Environmentalism, with its novel restrictions on the 
relations between people and places, that has the most relevant relation to the quotidian practices 
constitute of Andean ritual life. The same can be said, and with more certainty, about the impact 
of ecomiendas, haciendas, and state cooperatives.   
36 The region is called “puna” in southern varieties of Quechua. While this term is more common 
in literature on the Andes because of a southern bias, Ancash Quechua speakers consider it the 




while the distance from one manada (a Spanish word for herd used by Quechua speakers to refer 
to hallqa homesteads) to another ranges from 300 meters to two kilometers. As there is no running 
water, manadas are positioned close to the sources of fresh water on which they depend. And 
while the towns below have had electric power since the 90’s, there is none available in these 
areas. 
In addition to these distinguishing factors, the region is also divided by the boundary of 
the Huascaran National Park. Established in the early 1970’s, concurrent with the agrarian reform, 
the Park placed an enormous territory37 into state ownership with the purpose of preserving a 
landscape framed as a delicate ecosystem of microclimates and endangered megafauna such as 
spectacled bears, pumas, condors, two species of deer, and especially the reduced but iconic 
population of vicuñas targeted by poachers. The manadas mentioned above—in Quñasha, 
Qaqayuq, Waraqayuq, Tsaway, and Inkatsa—all fall within the Park’s buffer zone, and are thus 
not directly subject to the Park’s legal prohibitions on land use. However, the boundary of the 
Park itself is clearly marked by a gated fence beyond which it is not legal to maintain permanent 
residence.  
The Park’s explicit goals include prohibiting the entrance of any species not native to its 
territory. Yet local herding practices involve the introduction of cows, sheep, horses, donkeys, 
and dogs within the Park’s boundaries. Recognizing the Park’s limited ability to strictly enforce 
such a disruptive prohibition, the National Service for Protected Natural Areas (SERNANP) 
struck a compromise. The resulting policy permits local herders usufruct rights to continue 
maintaining herds within the Park’s boundaries, but within a structure of cooperative governance 
overseen by Park administrators. To do so, Park employees formed Committees of Usufructuaries 
                                                




of Natural Grasses (CUPs) with individual peasant communities throughout the Cordillera Blanca 
to oversee the use of pasturelands within the Park. Members of these CUPs are obliged to 
participate in rotating three-day shifts within the park in groups of three. Failure to appear for a 
shift is penalized by fines38 that go into the CUPs treasury and are used to maintain the 
committee’s fences and shelters. For Park officials, the ultimate end of this policy is to gradually 
phase out use of this land for herding altogether (Gómez López interview 2013), a goal couched 
in the assumption that local practices degrade the biodiversity of the grasslands and marshes 
(SERNANP 2010:213; Gómez López interview 2014).39 To this end, after the initial 
establishment of the CUPs, no new members are permitted to officially join. However, it is 
possible to substitute family members, and in reality the number of animals—particularly 
bovines—has actually increased rather than decreased. The underlying goal of phasing out 
herding is not mentioned in CUP meetings, and obviously stands quite apart from the reasons that 
members give for participating—namely economic gain and social advancement. Another result 
of this relatively new form of herding is that for those who keep animals in Ruriq, wage labor and 
agriculture must now provide the majority of their family’s resources.40 In official contexts, both 
Park administrators and herders themselves frame herding as an economically marginal, 
irrational, and anachronistic practice. In contrast, the following account reframes herding in the 
hallqa in terms of the practices and social relations that constitute it. Framing herding in this way 
                                                
38 Seen from another perspective, herding has now been monetized and can thus be purchased. 
39 Homewood and Rogers (1991) have noted how claims about overgrazing presuppose 
ethnocentric models of livestock management and serve to justify the displacement and restriction 
of indigenous people for the purpose of environmental protection.    
40 In my interview with the director of the PNH, Ricardo Jesús Gómez López (2012), he attributed 
herders’ economic independence from their herds to economic growth at a national level. He 
further suggested that their continued maintenance of herds in the Park, a relic of traditions and 




shows how, even after the restrictions imposed by the Park, it continues to shape the social world 
of CUP members and nonmembers alike in substantial ways.  
Setting herd sizes aside, the main difference between the hallqa inside and outside the 
Park’s boundaries is the way people reside and work. While the shelters inside the Park are 
property of the CUP and host alternating groups of three men, manadas in the buffer zone are 
owned and used by families.41 Women spend the most time actually living there, as men 
frequently travel to the town or provincial capital for wage labor and children spend much of their 
time in school in the town below. On several occasions during shifts within the Park, the men I 
accompanied often noted the absence of women with respect to the necessity of preparing their 
own food. Though my companions impressed me with their aptitude for kindling fires with scant 
fuel in a drafty stone room and cooking up creative and nourishing meals from hastily assembled 
ingredients,42 they never failed to note that the food sadly lacked a woman’s touch. Women are 
indeed conspicuously absent on CUP shifts; however the real difference I noted in the food was in 
the ingredients. In buffer zone manadas, food is seasoned with wild herbs picked nearby and may 
include meat or cheese from the family’s herd. As a family enterprise, manadas also trade animal 
products for tubers and other products from below. For example, during a night I spent at a 
manada south of Río Negro, in Shillakancha (Recuay), old friends of the family from the other 
side of the Cordillera Blanca passed through, stayed the night, and traded freshly harvested oca 
for a sheep. In the morning we ate the slightly sweet red tubers with fresh cheese, fragrant mutton 
soup, and the bread I had brought along. Such food contrasts dramatically with the hasty but 
hearty concoctions that fueled our shifts in Ruriq. 
                                                
41 In two years, I only saw a woman attend a turn once. She was replacing the shift of her son, 
who had died the week before, and by doing so avoided a costly fee.  





There is one final and critical difference characteristic of the hallqa inside the Park: the 
glaciated peaks of the Cordillera Blanca—that is, the hirka—are all within its boundaries. During 
their shifts, members of the Ruriq CUP spend their days locating and herding the animals on the 
slopes of the hirka from the flat marshy bottom of the canyon to the barren rocks at the feet of 
glaciers high above. It is as part of this rugged work that I had the opportunity to see the 
fundamental role that hirka play in herders’ lives, and it was the latter’s continuous ritual use of 
coca, tobacco, and alcohol throughout the day that made this relationship observable. These 
habitual practices underlined to me not only the importance of the hirka, but also the fact that the 
relationship between herders and hirka was an ordinary and mundane one. It was not surrounded 
by the aura of spirituality and sacredness that surrounded offerings I had seen practiced in cities. 
Instead, as will be clear in the following description of CUP shifts, chakchay is for herders one of 
the basic practices that comprise their work: a spontaneous (if programmatic) response to the 
frequent dangers and anxieties of interacting with the hirka, both as physical and social entities.    
 
2.3. Herding in Ruriq 
It is roughly nine kilometers from the entrance to Ruriq canyon at the gated fence of the 
Park’s boundary to Tarawra Lake’s shore at its upper end. The long corridor of the canyon is 
divided into Outer Ruriq and Inner Ruriq by a stone wall with a locked, steel gate at the midpoint 
of the canyon. There are three shelters in the canyon. Two are square stone houses with 
corrugated aluminum roofs held down by nails and rocks, one each in Inner and Outer Ruriq. The 
third is a large, round tsuklla with a conical straw roof just outside the gate to Inner Ruriq. 
Depending on the seasonal conditions of the grasses, animals may be in one or both of the 




On March 23rd, 2014, I joined a shift in Ruriq just after all animals had been herded either 
into Inner Ruriq or back to the town below. The three of us—Gerson, Feliciano, and I—had spent 
the first night of the shift at the smaller shelter in Inner Ruriq.43 The third shift member hadn’t 
shown up and would be fined. Only half-joking, they had told me that I was his replacement. 
Dawn arrived around 6am, but it was still very cold. No one wanted to move out from the layers 
of wool blankets and straw. Yet a long day lay ahead, and at some point its momentum 
overpowered the cold night’s inertia, and we began to stir. First, someone had to get water from 
the nearby stream for cooking breakfast. It was my turn. While Gerson went to round up the 
donkeys and horses that had wandered away during the night, I filled the bucket at the stream that 
passed by the house. I tried with little success not to douse my feet with the frigid water while 
navigating the slippery stones back to the house where I found Feliciano already at work peeling 
potatoes for soup. Gerson returned shortly from rounding up the animals and asked me for help 
finding one of them. I headed uphill from the house, scanning the hillside. The depth of the 
challenge struck me at once. The land before me was a mess of the grays, blacks, browns, 
yellows, and greens of stones, boulders, and scrub covered with lichen and moss. Finding a 
                                                
43 In this description, I follow the course of a typical day as recorded in my field notes from a shift 
on which I accompanied Ruriq’s CUP’s members. Unlike cataloguing isolated beliefs and 
practices, this narrative approach allows me to capture the variability of the practices I describe 
without sacrificing the importance of the contexts in which they are embedded. One challenge to 
doing ethnography that takes the role of the environment seriously is finding a way to represent 
the surroundings relevant to the actions and relationships at stake. This is especially the case 
when on the move. Just as audio or video recordings are necessary for serious analyses of verbal 
interactions, it was necessary to find some way to record spatial information. To this end, I 
coordinated GPS-tagged photographs with path data from a second GPS unit. The combination of 
written notes and images linked to specific times, locations, and altitudes made it possible to 
reconstruct the spatial relationship between specific events and a surrounding environment taken 





shaggy, brown and white spotted donkey with its head bowed to a clump of grass seemed nearly 
impossible.  
Yet while I pondered the task’s difficulty, Gerson was already shouting out to me from 
somewhere unseen, “It’s headed your way, Joshua! Cut it off and guide it back to the house 
before it gets away!” I heard the unruly animal’s hooves before I saw its pointy ears amidst the 
bushes several yards uphill from where I stood. I scrambled uphill trying to cut off the animal, but 
found myself separated by a well-camouflaged ravine, and the donkey continued yet further 
uphill. After a breathless and inefficient chase we finally had the stubborn creature tied up 
alongside the other donkeys and horses. The difficulty of finding an animal in this immense and 
wild—that is, relatively unmodified by humans44—landscape underlines one of the principle 
challenges of herding in the hallqa and, as will become clear below, is also one of the principle 
motives for communicating with hirka. 
After a scalding breakfast of potato soup, “kwaker,”45 coca tea, and bread, we discussed 
the day’s first task. Gerson located a weathered notebook in the rafters and read over the previous 
shifts’ notes. Clucking his tongue, he chided their laziness in neglecting to account for a number 
of animals. Now we would have to find these animals with no indication of their last 
whereabouts. However, both Gerson and Feliciano had other priorities—first, to find their own 
animals, and then to find those of their closest kin and friends. Feliciano—the older of the two—
also had noted on his last shift that one of his cows was pregnant, and hoped to find the newborn 
calf on this shift. Calves are particularly vulnerable in the highest parts of the hallqa, as they are 
                                                
44 I say that it is relatively unmodified because there are indeed many modifications. Some 
examples are the stone wall dividing Ruriq in half, the three houses, numerous canals that irrigate 
the flat valley floor (and which are only visible from above), and the single, sunken, stone-lined 
path through the valley. 




easy pray for condors and pumas. CUP members usually try to bring newborn animals down to 
town for a period after they are born to protect them from these dangers. More importantly, 
removing calves from the canyon is now the only way to ensure their domestication, as there are 
no manadas where this job can be accomplished within the Park’s boundaries.   
The two men decided that Feliciano’s calf took precedence, and so the morning’s explicit 
goal was to find the newborn animal. After packing our backpacks with bread, water, crackers, 
chocolates, fruit, coca, cigarettes, and alcohol, we moved to the semi-circle of stones adjacent to 
the house. Feliciano got a bag of coca leaves from his backpack, took a handful, and passed it to 
Gerson who did the same and passed it to me. We followed Feliciano’s example, placing several 
leaves carefully at the base of some of the larger rocks. Feliciano then began to gesture with a 
handful of coca leaves before his face and whispered to them that the three of us—Feliciano, 
Gerson, and Joshua—were here now, on the twenty-fourth day of March in the year two-thousand 
and fourteen, doing chakchay for the benefit of the hirka and for the benefit of the awicho 
(literally, grandparents). He went on to list a number of these by name: Awicho Juan Karpu, 
Pamparahu, Hatun Wantsan, Casuelapataq. Gerson also spoke to his coca leaves, though 
inaudibly, and I followed suit, trying to copy Feliciano’s precise and rapid invocation as best I 
could. Feliciano then produced a plastic soda bottle full of cane alcohol. He repeated his words as 
he moved the bottle before his face, and then took a small sip that he sprayed from his puckered 
lips in a fine mist in all directions, twisting his torso left and right. He passed the bottle along, and 
we each followed his lead. Now, Feliciano took his puru—a tiny gourd full of sodium bicarbonate 
used to activate the alkaloids in the coca leaves—from his backpack and waved it in small circles 
before his face, once again whispering a similar formula, and adding pleas for a light journey 




llantakunapaq”). After dabbing the white powder between his cheeks and gums with the long 
needle attached to the gourd’s cap, he passed it along as well.  
Feliciano now took an unfiltered Nacional brand cigarette out of a packet of folded paper 
and passed some more our way. Again passing the cigarette before his face he invoked the hirka, 
but this time asking the specific question of whether we would find the new calf. This marked a 
change from doing chakchay simply for the benefit of the mountain, including some humble pleas 
for favorable conditions, to chakchay with the goal of getting answers to specific questions. The 
distinction is one of which herders are quite conscious, and which is also grammatically marked. I 
learned this after asking Feliciano about the alternating use of the derivational suffixes “-ku” and 
“–pa” with the verb chakchay. “Chakchapay,” he explained, is simply to make homage to the 
hirka, whereas “chakchakuy” is to ask specific questions to the hirka. The contrast also coincides 
clearly with the functions of the two suffixes. Both indicate that the action defined by the affixed 
verb is carried out for someone’s benefit; “-ku” marks the middle voice, indicating that the action 
benefits the subject of the verb, whereas “–pa” is used when the action affects or, frequently, 
benefits someone other than its agent (Hintz 2011: 170).  
In the course of the ritual itself, this change in the directionality of agency and benefit was 
also announced with the request “willakayaamay yaw!”46 (Now tell us!). Only after this indication 
of a shift in the structure of communicative roles in the ritual—i.e., a shift of footing in the 
participation framework (Goffman 1979)—did Feliciano make his direct request for information 
to the hirka, asking to be told whether we would find the newborn calf. After making his question 
and blowing onto his cigarette, he lit it as well. While he smoked, Gerson spoke inaudible words 
to his own cigarette and lit it. After every draw, Feliciano lowered the burning cigarette to check 
                                                
46 Willa-ka    -llaa   -ma    -y 




the ash. The ash itself is the primary medium for the hirka’s messages. The direction it points can 
indicate the location of animals, while irregularities in color and shape suggest obstacles or 
undesirable outcomes. In this case, the ash fell off the cigarette rather quickly. Seeing this, 
Feliciano shook his head. Once he had finished most of the cigarette, he placed it carefully on a 
stone where it continued to smoke itself. This, I learned on another occasion, was so that the hirka 
could enjoy smoking the cigarette and the reason for the preference for unfiltered cigarettes. Only 
after having done this did Feliciano reveal the outcome of his divination. We would not find the 
calf. The ash had fallen quickly; a condor or a puma had likely carried off the animal.  
With this new information, the goal for the day was slightly modified. However, while the 
calf no longer took precedent, the next most important task was to account for Feliciano’s cattle, 
and since the calf was Feliciano’s, the route we would take was not significantly altered. We 
would head toward his cattle’s paraje, a Spanish word that herders used to refer to a group of 
animals’ habitual place for grazing. His animals’ paraje was on the east-facing slope of the 
tributary valley that flowed south from the Llullu Wantsan (Little Wantsan) glacier just up the 
canyon from the shelter. Feliciano suggested, however, that instead of going directly to the 
paraje, we should climb to the top of the opposite hillside. He had several reasons for this. First, 
he told me that he had gone up this hillside himself recently to do chakchapay and had been 
deeply impressed by the beauty of the spot, underlining the fact that he was playing the role of my 
guide. He also added that on his last trip there, he had seen not only his own animals but a number 
of other groups of cattle on the opposite slope. So, from the top of the far side, we would better be 
able to locate not only his animals, but also others that might be scattered across it. Once I had 




was covered with grass, hidden streams, and enormous boulders, making it virtually impossible to 
see anything from the ground and just as difficult to traverse directly.  
Going after Feliciano’s animals was also considered a sound decision because of the 
results of a divination session on the day before that had suggested they would indeed be in their 
usual spot. Shortly after arriving at the shelter on the previous morning, we had set out to look for 
animals on the hillside directly above. However, after walking uphill for about an hour and a half, 
it had begun to rain. Within a few minutes we had come on a cave formed by the negative space 
among the boulders on the edge of the forest and took shelter within. Just as we entered the cave, 
the rain turned to hail. Our good timing in coming upon this shelter was not lost on my 
companions, who suggested that it was the consequence of our previous gifts of coca, tobacco, 
and alcohol to the hirka. In other words, the hirka, on whose body we were walking, had placed 
the cave there for our benefit. This idea—that the physical shape of the hirka is volatile and 
responsive to acts of social reciprocity—was echoed in stories I was told on other occasions. For 
example, one man told me that he had once come up to the depths of Ruriq—close to where we 
now were hiding from the rain—alone on a shift where neither companion had shown up. In the 
midst of a windy snowstorm, he’d caught sight of a cave in a beautiful spot nestled high up the 
canyon’s wall. He climbed straight up to the cave and sat out the storm there. However, when the 
snow cleared, he saw that there was no longer a path back down. It seemed the shape of the rocks 
had changed, leaving nothing but a sheer cliff below the cave. At that moment he chewed coca, 
smoked, drank alcohol, and offered fruit and candies.47 Only after this did the path back down to 
                                                
47 The man’s narration indicated that the offerings were made to patsamama (“the earth mother”), 
however it is important to note that the story was shared during a celebration in a group mainly 




the valley floor reappear. I was also told a strikingly similar story about three men hunting deer in 
Ruriq before it had become part of the National Park.   
 Though there was more room in the cave than initially appeared, we were forced to squat 
above the cow dung covering the floor with our heads bowed beneath the enormous boulder 
suspended above. As I tried to wedge myself into a corner I stuck my hand into a shiñwa plant 
(stinging nettle) and let out a shout of surprise and pain. Luckily, this offered some comic relief in 
an uncomfortable situation—they laughingly assured me that it happens all the time. More 
importantly, Feliciano pointed out that since we were in a cave we ought to make homage to the 
mountain (“chakchaparillashun,” or, “we will humbly do chakchay for the benefit of the hirka”). 
The ritual unfolded more or less the same as the one described above, except that the question put 
to the cigarette was whether Feliciano’s animals would indeed be in their usual spot. This time the 
ash did not fall off the cigarette but instead dipped noticeably downward. After finishing, 
Feliciano told us that the animals would indeed be where he expected. I asked him this time what 
it was about the ash that told him this. He explained that the downward pointing ash indicated that 
the animals were just here (“kayllachaw”), and pointed down at the ground, like the ash, with his 
index finger. He elaborated that this meant the animals were indeed in their usual spot. In 
contrast, if the ash had pointed uphill (“umaman”), we would find the animals uphill from their 
usual spot, and if it had pointed downhill (“uraman”), they would be downhill.   
With the information gleaned from the two divination sessions, we started off from the 
shelter in good spirits, confident with our path despite the bad news about the new calf. We 
initially followed a gradually uphill route to the northeast. Looking at this route as recorded by the 
small GPS device stowed in my backpack, I now appreciate that the path we initially followed, if 




place. This is a remarkable fact considering there was no discernible path to follow, and that the 
entire journey of 1.6 km in fact included a number of twists and turns to navigate environmental 
obstacles. For example, after about ten minutes, we reached the marshy area where the Llullu 
Wantsan tributary filtered into Ruriq. Here we deviated to the north through a narrow area with 
the steep slope of the tributary canyon on our left and the wetlands on our right. The ascent 
became steeper as we followed the slope alongside a dense cloud forest of Quenual trees whose 
peeling, orange bark was bearded with pale green lichens and mosses, and whose gnarled 
branches and roots host the majority of the canyon’s birds and insects.  
 Less than thirty minutes into our ascent we came to a place where we could cross the 
stream and begin ascending the opposite slope. At this point, our route turned almost due north 
and simultaneously became much steeper. A half hour into this steeper ascent, we stopped to rest. 
Feliciano picked a tall plant with pink flowers that he said was medicinal (Figure 6). We fell 
silent for a moment when there was a distant, echoing sound like thunder. Feliciano pointed out 
an avalanche on the peak on the opposite side of the canyon. We took a moment to observe the 
spectacle of snow cascading nearly a kilometer down the mountain called Puma Waqanqa, 
“Where Puma Cried” (Figure 7). While the rumbling of an avalanche—“pun-run-ruuuuuun” in 
local onomatopoeia—is often described as the hirka’s voice, neither Feliciano nor Gerson offered 













Figure 7. Puma Waqanqa. 
 
We continued on up the mountain, now walking straight up the slope rather than skirting. 
The ground we were climbing was also significantly different. There were only sporadic tufts of 
grass more than a few inches in height. The ground was a composite of spongy black soil and 
small, rough stones. Once we reached the top, I would realize that it was in fact a moraine—rocks 
and sediment formed by the growth of the Llullu Wantsan glacier that has now receded, leaving 
behind a wide gravel trough between two high moraines. We were at over 4,600 meters above sea 
level, and the lack of oxygen was taking its toll on me. The next break came after what felt like an 
hour but was in fact only ten minutes. However, the purpose of this break was not to rest—
Feliciano didn’t seem at all tired, and Gerson only mildly so. We were now in fact a mere 40 
meters from the crest of the moraine. So why stop so soon before reaching the goal? As soon as 
we had found some suitable rocks to sit on, Feliciano opened his backpack and took out his coca 




smoked. We only chewed the coca and took sips of the alcohol and offered these to the hirka, this 
time with few words. We sat here for another thirty minutes, mostly in silence, watching the 
mountains around us and regaining our strength. On other trips to peaks and crests in Ruriq, I also 
found that we would stop just before reaching the top to repeat this ritual for the sake of the hirka. 
It seems that to pass over this act of humility would show an unthinkable disrespect, as if to say 
that one had reached the top with no help from the very mountain on which one had been 
walking. Sitting on the rock there, surrounded by vast, empty space, I indeed found myself 
grateful for the (momentary) solidity of the mountain beneath me.  
After several more minutes of ascent, we were at the crest of the moraine, looking at the 
great, gray trough carved out by Llullu Wantsan, probably during the Little Ice Age between the 
15th and 18th centuries (Figure 8). The glacier appeared only in bits and pieces through the 
dancing fog above, but what I could see was stained black like decaying teeth. It was not the 
brilliant white I had expected. Feliciano said that the glacier used to be pristine, but that it had 
receded significantly in the last fifteen years and grown ugly. Indeed, the minerals from exposed 
rock had leached into the ice, changing its color and contaminating local water sources with heavy 
metals, turning several streams and rivers—including Río Negro itself—a rusty orange color. 
Feliciano now walked a bit up the narrow ridge, at most a foot wide, and cracked his leather whip 
several times. The sound echoed around us. This, he explained, was both to make the hirka clear 






Figure 8. Llullu Wantsan trough. 
 
 
We settled down on some rocks and Gerson and Feliciano began to pick out animals on 
the opposite hillside. At first I could see nothing there. Then I began to notice a few black, red, 
and white specks among the boulders and grass. After a few minutes they had already begun to 
pick out individual animals of both Gerson’s and Feliciano’s, naming them and establishing their 
relations to one another. This red cow was that black one’s calf, and the two spotted one’s there 
are brother and sister.  
Feliciano began another chakchay ritual at this point. Though not identical, it was similar 
in form and content to the one at the start of the day. However, there was now a significant 
difference in the context. From our high perch, the hirka that Feliciano mentioned all were visible. 




Hatun Wantsan’s glacier disappeared into the clouds overhead. As he named the places, he looked 
and gestured toward them. Rather than the abstract, distant landmarks they had seemed in earlier 
invocations, Feliciano now addressed them as a group of individuals in whose company we were 
gathered. After the initial enumeration of hirka and the dedication of the coca and alcohol to 
them, Feliciano again marked the shift to divination with the phrase, “Now tell us!” 
(“Willakayaamay yaw!”), followed by a repetition of the list of surrounding hirka. This time he 
also added, “Tell us now, us two here, these orphan grandchildren of yours now. Grandfathers, 
you are seeing us here now” (Willakayaamay yaw, kay ishkaakunata, kay waktsa willkayki yaw. 
Awichu, kay rikaykaayaamankim).48  
 
Figure 9. Tarawra Lake. 
 
                                                
48 I recorded this particular ritual with a tripod-mounted camera wedged among the stones, and so 






The remainder of the divination was devoted to asking about what would happen the next 
day—if there would be good weather, if there would be any significant problems, if someone 
might have an accident. What stands out as particularly significant here is the way that Feliciano 
characterizes his and Gerson’s relationship with the hirka in the opening formula, which 
emphasizes the closeness and intimacy of this relationship in two ways. First, he represents 
Gerson and himself as the hirka’s “orphan grandchildren.” This phrase requires careful attention. 
Rather than simply creating denotational equivalence across languages, an “ethnographic 
translation… embedded in the contexts of use and lexical and indexical relationships” of the 
words is necessary (Mannheim 2015:205; Silverstein 2003b).  
The word waktsa, usually translated as orphan, does not merely indicate the child of 
deceased parents (Leinaweaver 2008:74). It refers more generally to anyone who cannot engage 
in reciprocal social relations (76)—in other words, a social outsider (de la Cadena 2015:44). This 
state of social isolation also differs from the occidental notion of orphan in its temporality, as one 
can be temporarily waktsa when separated from one’s reciprocal relations (Leinaweaver 2008:74), 
for example when alone in an unfamiliar place. However, this still leaves us to wonder why 
Feliciano, an experienced Ruriq herder who has often made gifts and homage to the hirka, would 
refer to himself and his companion as social outsiders. The answer lies in the hierarchical nature 
of the relationship. The underlying logic of both offerings and divination presumes that the hirka 
are territorial authorities. Thus, to do one’s work on the hirka’s territory requires some payment—
the offerings of coca, alcohol, tobacco, fruit, candies, etc. Likewise, their authority also endows 
hirka with knowledge of what goes on within their territory. Not only do the hirka see Feliciano 
and Gerson sitting there, they also see their animals’ movements, making the hirka valuable 




expressed not as what outsiders often perceive in Andean ritual as a sense of “oneness with 
nature,” but is instead marked with the strictly hierarchical form of intimacy that also 
characterizes Andean families (see also Gose 1994:224).49  
On two other occasions I also heard the more explicit request for the hirka to adopt the 
supplicant as their children [“wawatsayaamay,” lit. make us your children]. As my friend and 
teacher César Vargas Arce (who himself was raised among hirka in the hallqa of Conchucos) 
pointed out, in Andean families, men generally refer to their children as “tsuri” while women use 
“wawa.” However, as César emphasized and as I observed was common practice in Río Negro, 
men also refer to their children, or even their spouses, as “wawa” when they want to emphasize 
their roles as caregivers, as providers of nourishment and protection. In this case, then, the person 
engaging with the hirka doesn’t simply take on a submissive social role, but more specifically the 
role of the dependent “orphan,” nourished and protected by their adoptive parents. The invocation 
of such a social role is not surprising. I know several children who have “circulated” this way in 
Río Negro, and the movement of children among households as part and parcel of the 
establishment, management, and transformation of social relationships is also common in the 
southern Peruvian Andes (Leinaweaver 2008, 2007). Indeed, such practices parallel the rituals I 
describe here in that both are socially constitutive acts and, more importantly, the critical 
conditions for both are co-residence, care, and feeding (Leinaweaver 2008).  
The second important aspect of Feliciano’s characterization of the herders’ relationship 
with the hirka lies in his emphasis on their spatial, temporal, and sensual co-presence. One way he 
does this is by repeatedly using the demonstrative pronoun “kay,” which indicates not simply 
                                                
49 The word willka, translated as grandchild, also merits further attention. For example, in 
Southern Peru, the word translates as “sacred.” However, I do not elaborate any more here, as the 




proximal spatial relations in Quechua, but rather signals an act of reference grounded in the 
location and orientation of the speaker’s very body (see Chapter 4). By including this 
demonstrative in each successive clause of the utterance, Feliciano draws attention to the 
anchoring of his words not just in the place of speaking, but moreover in the midst of a 
constellation of places—hirka—each of which has already been singled out and identified several 
times in relation to the speaker’s place of speaking. At a more explicit level, Feliciano also 
focuses the utterance on co-presence with the assertion, “Grandfathers, you are seeing us here 
now.” With this phrase, he raises to the level of awareness the fact that we are in view of the hirka 
he is addressing, and simultaneously asserts the reciprocity of perspective, testifying with 
certainty (he uses the evidential enclitic “-m” on the end of the verb phrase) that not only are the 
hirka visible to us, but that we are also visible to them.50  
Guillermo Salas Carreño and Bruce Mannheim (Mannheim & Salas Carreño 2015; Salas 
Carreño 2016) described the sociality of Andean places along similar lines.51 Specifically, the 
agency of places such as hirka is the result of their social engagement in mutual nourishment. 
Because this is also the essential element in the fabric of Andean sociality, “the relationships and 
actions that Quechua people have with places are not different in kind from the interactions they 
have with each other” (Mannheim & Salas Carreño 2015:62). Likewise, Smith (2012) suggested 
that Aymara speakers’ criteria for choosing interlocutors is rooted in their sociality rather than 
                                                
50 In this sense, the sociality of hirka draws crucially on Theory of Mind (see discussion in 
Chapters 1 and 6), a point also observed by Mannheim & Salas Carreño (2015:68). 
51 Mannheim & Salas Carreño focus on the term “wak’a,” while de la Cadena’s work is focused 
on “apu.” Both terms pertain to Southern Peruvian Quechua and are not in Ancash Quechua’s 
lexicon. Nevertheless, there are numerous genetic and semantic associations among the three 
words that go beyond the scope of this work. It is sufficient to say that “apu” is roughly 
equivalent to “hirka,” while “wak’a” captures the abstract meaning of “social place,” as it can be 
applied to places that are not mountains such as waterfalls or streams. No term equivalent to 
“wak’a” is in use in Río Negro. Rather, such places are simply designated by name, and often 




their ontological status, evident in the use of an Aymara interjection to cajole alpacas, children, 
and pieces of fruit alike. While these accounts capture the particularities of Andean 
understandings of nonhumans, they abstract away from the texture of the social and linguistic 
practices that situate them. In contrast, I depart from the observation that looking to social 
practice to understand the relationship between humans and places requires attention to “practice” 
not in terms of broad, generalizable cultural patterns, but rather in terms of fine-grained local 
distinctions, such as the differences in ritual practice and communicative access to hirka between 
pastoral and agricultural contexts in Río Negro.  
 
* * * 
 
In all, we spent nearly two hours there at the foot of the Llullu Wantsan glacier passing 
coca, cigarettes, and alcohol, and spotting animals. We also spent some time simply looking at 
part of the canyon spread out before us. I do not think that Feliciano’s and Gerson’s repeated 
comments about the canyon’s aesthetic value during the trip are reducible merely to their 
knowledge of camera-toting gringos’ taste for landscape photography (their own photographic 
interests during the trip were highly focused on bovine portraiture). Feliciano was proud to have 
found this breathtaking spot—which of course also had a function in spotting animals—and 
wanted to show it not only to me, but also to his younger companion, Gerson, to impress on him 
the satisfaction of this aesthetic aspect of herding as important alongside the hard work. In fact the 
latter was still to come, for the rest of the afternoon was spent rounding up the animals we’d 




Feliciano and Gerson would skirt the moraine to cross the river higher up the tributary 
valley, cutting off the cattle and herding them back down, while I was to head straight down the 
moraine wall and cross the river, making sure the animals didn’t cross back over and head up the 
moraine. It was harder than I’d imagined. The terrain around the tributary was treacherous. The 
thick tufts of uqsha grass reached my shoulders, and the boulders were larger still. The ground 
itself was mostly invisible. The only way to move was by jumping between boulders and uqsha 
tufts, avoiding the hidden streams that filled the deep crevasses among them. The river itself was 
much deeper and wider than I had suspected, and it took some circling in order to find a good spot 
for a jump. Once on the other side, I spotted Feliciano and Gerson hopping along through the 
grass further up the canyon. They were leading the cattle toward me and shouting instructions: 
keep following the stream downhill and make sure the animals don’t try to cross.  
Eventually they caught up with me, and we continued on—Gerson above the animals, 
Feliciano behind them, and I below—for roughly a half hour, occasionally changing positions in 
response to the animals’ movements and the shape of the terrain, until we came to a flat area just 
above the canyon floor. Feliciano and Gerson agreed that it was a good place to leave the animals, 
with plenty of green grass. We took a brief rest, and in another half hour we were back at the 
shelter. It was Gerson’s turn to fetch water, and I gave Feliciano a hand peeling potatoes for soup. 
By the time we had filled our stomachs, the sun had gone town, and the darkness in the canyon 
was total. We crawled under the stiff wool blankets, cracked jokes and teased one another, passed 
around the coca, alcohol, and cigarettes, said a few words of thanks to the hirka, and drifted off to 






3. Hirka in herders’ dreams 
While the rumbling avalanche with which the hirka spoke was untranslatable in the course 
of this average day in Ruriq, such is not always the case. In dreams, apparitions, and other liminal 
experiences, individuals who have cultivated relationships with the hirka over the course of their 
daily work occasionally receive messages unmediated by divination with coca or tobacco. In 
dreams and apparitions, these messages instead are either conveyed through an associative logic 
(Mannheim 1991) or through the hirka’s use of human language. Messages from the hirka may 
also be interpreted in terms of specific contexts, such that an avalanche may be read as either a 
warning or a welcome. The hirka’s actions and movements may also be witnessed in liminal 
moments—usually during the night of a new moon. In these cases, the actions are interpreted as 
explanations of the landscape itself rather than as messages directed to their witnesses. In this 
section I give examples of dreams and visions in which hirka appear. In these examples, hirka 
only communicate directly with herders who have already formed social relationships with them 
through the rituals that accompany their daily work. When hirka appear to farmers, they may 
speak among one another, but they do not offer messages intended for their human witnesses. In 
such cases, hirka’s actions and interactions are seen as if by accident, almost as if their witness 
were eavesdropping. The covert nature of this channel of communication between hirka and 
farmer contrasts with that between herder and hirka, which is characterized by the recognition of 
mutual attention. In this sense, at the heart of the distinction between the two kinds of 
communications with hirka is a set of conditions under which persons recognize one another as 
potential participants in a social interaction. What I argue below is that the basic condition for 
such recognition is the presence of a familiar social relationship, such that only those relationships 




presence—thanks to the herder’s repeated offerings—can yield a mutual recognition and thus a 
possibility for intentional communication.52   
During the last dry season of my fieldwork in Río Negro, I spent a significant portion of 
each day walking alone to, from, and within the “zona de amordiguamiento,” or “buffer zone.” 
This is the broad border of land that is defined by the Huascaran National Park as ecologically 
influential on the “protected natural area” it surrounds.53 Unlike the area within the Park itself, 
residence is officially permitted here, albeit with some ecological condescension. Nevertheless, 
settlements are both sparse and only seasonally occupied, and so getting to know the people that 
lived there involved walking long distances, alone but for the watchful hirka above. The people I 
spoke with were elderly couples, solitary women whose husbands worked periodically in the 
town below, or younger people helping their families with punctual, seasonal tasks like making 
grass ropes, re-thatching roofs, or harvesting high-altitude potato crops.  
  At this point in my research, I had gotten to know the quotidian ritual practices of herders 
in Ruriq, so I was interested to learn more about the people who lived a bit further from the hirka 
but still maintained at least a partially pastoral livelihood. One thing I learned was that they had 
all worked as herders whose seasonal grazing routines had taken them higher in the mountains 
before the establishment of the National Park. While their economic relationship to the region had 
                                                
52 This distinction in social relationships also calls into question a basic assumptions made by 
most scholars interested in Theory of Mind. What would be recognized as the properties of 
“mind” here are not ontologically given, but rather contingent on particular interactional histories. 
In such a context, “mind” is no longer best understood as a property of individuals, but rather as a 
condition that encompasses and exceeds individuals such that they occupy different mental 
potentialities as they move across social (and spatial) situations.  
53 While Ruriq was unanimously considered hallqa, this designation was spotty in the ‘buffer 
zone.’ Whether some place was hallqa or not varied and seemed to depend on whether or not any 
crops were planted there and what kind of grasses grew. More importantly, people who lived 
there tended to consider the hallqa as beginning always just a bit further uphill, whereas people 




been substantially different—they herded animals owned by the government cooperative formed 
by the agrarian reform, or before that tended herds belonging to the hacendado—their quotidian 
routine nevertheless brought them into daily contact with the bodies of hirka. A few of them were 
wealthy enough to consolidate animals to contribute to the Committee of Usufructuaries of 
Natural Grasses organized by the National Park, and they or their children continue herding in 
Ruriq today. However, the majority of the families who reside at least partially in the “buffer 
zone” simply make do with a smaller range, seeking out other supplemental goods and incomes 
through agriculture and wage labor.  
  In dreams or visions, hirka sometimes appear in human form to the people who work in 
close contact with them. For example, a woman who had lived more than seventy years in her 
family’s manada in the hallqa region just south of Río Negro told me that the hirka once appeared 
to her as an elderly couple,54 “a poor old man in tattered clothes and a brown poncho… and an old 
woman with a crumpled hat just like this one” (allaw awkis makwalla… muru punchushqa… 
chakwas hina kaynawlla tsukush lapulla). The couple had appeared to the woman and her sister, 
at the time young girls, while they were grazing their mother’s sheep near a mist-shrouded lake at 
the upper end of a nearby canyon. The old couple had appeared out of the swirling clouds, 
milking feral cattle. Below is an excerpt from my transcript of the account: 
 
Inti inti pukutaychaw waakakunam  “mooooo mo” niyaq altanerakuna. 
                                                
54 There are few descriptions of this in the ethnography of the southern Andes. Isbell (1978) wrote 
that in Chuschi, a community in the highlands of Ayacucho, the wamanis (place-persons similar 
to hirka) appeared as finely dressed white men (59). Gose’s ethnography of a highlands 
community in Apurimac similarly mentions apus appearing as white land-owners that to steal 
women during festivities (1994:222). In the central Andes, Domínguez Condezo’s (2003) 
collection of oral Quechua texts includes a section devoted to stories in which hirka appear as 
herders. The stories I heard in Río Negro more closely matched Dominguez Condezo’s oral texts 




In intermittent sun and clouds, there were cows going “mooo mo,” haughty animals.   
 
Tsaynam (unintelligible) chaariptii rikaariyaq kayaa qapiykuraykaq awkishna. 
So (unintelligible) when we arrived we saw that an old couple was now milking them. 
 
Rikaykunaqqa qatiykuraykanaq, hiqarkunaq.  
Then what we saw, they were leading [the cows], going on up [the mountain]. 
 
Chikuteta waqaykatsiptin piña ayqiraykuraq chakwas.  
When the old woman cracked her whip, the feral animals would run along.  
 
Lichillanash kaynaw patsachaw qucharaykashqa kanaq 
And the milk had spilled out on the ground, like this.   
 
 When the girls returned home they told their mother what they had seen. She told them 
that the old couple was the hirka, and that their encounter was a good omen.  
Francisca, another woman who lives in her manada in Qaqayuq, also shared her 
encounters with hirka with me. Francisca has lived most of her adult life as a herder in Río 
Negro’s hallqa regions of Ruriq and Waraqayuq as well as to the south in Recuay’s Yanamaray 
and Qiruqucha. When I asked if she’d ever met the hirka, she told me that in her dreams she used 
to see the hirka in the form of an old woman grazing feral cows. I asked how the old lady was 
dressed, and Francisca said, “like me, in dirty clothes,” gesturing to her own clothes (though they 
were in fact quite clean), “and the old man with his pants all torn.” She further explained that in 
Ruriq, the “awkikuna” (lit., old people, in this case the hirka’s corporeal form) reveal themselves 
in dreams taking care of the feral animals. “They even call out,” she said. “The hirka call out, and 




While these encounters with hirka in the form of an old couple tending to feral animals are 
similar, their respective interpretations are distinct. The first sees the appearance as an omen, a 
sign that reveals something about the future, while the second merely purports to reflect some fact 
about the nature of hirka. These two types in fact represent the two main ways of interpreting 
encounters with hirka. The most common context for the second type is in stories about places. 
For example, a woman who had lived most of her life in a manada in Inkatsa told me the reason 
that the two enormous boulders in this place were called Tuuruqaqa (Bull Rock) and Gaalluqaqa 
(Rooster Rock). The story originated with her aunt, who had also lived at Inkatsa. As a young girl, 
the aunt and her sister had been alone there and had seen a rooster and a bull emerge from the lake 
on the slopes high above. The two animals had stood perched a moment on the edge of the hill, 
then rushed down the mountain toward the manada. Once they arrived at Inkatsa, they turned to 
stone and released a great cloud of smoke. These two boulders are now considered extensions of 
the hirka that dominates Inkatsa’s pastures, and offering to that hirka are made to them as proxies. 
Likewise, another story I heard from residents of Huaripampa on two separate occasions told me 
that the mountain at the western edge of town, called Qitsqay Hirka, had a rivalry with the 
mountain on the other side of the Río Santa, on top of which was the town of Qullawasi. On the 
nights of new moons, the story goes, two bulls would emerge from the two mountains and begin 
to taunt one another, and ultimately fight ferociously.55  
When encounters with hirka are taken as messages, they are sometimes described as 
having a voice that is interpretable in human language. However, this is not critical to the ability 
to interpret specific messages received from hirka. Donato told me the story of a man who lived 
near a cross that Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo had planted in the hallqa pastures at the foot of 
                                                
55 Domínguez Condezo (2003) provides a rich corpus of oral texts in Quechua that include 




Shaksha Hirka.56 The mountain itself told the man in a dream that the cross was falling into the 
river, and that if it fell, everyone would die. When he warned the villages of Olleros, Huaripampa, 
and Canray Grande, they organized among themselves in order to move the cross to the more 
stable position where it is currently located, at the confluence of Río Arzobispo and Río Santa. In 
this narrative, the hirka does not physically appear, but makes its message known in terms of 
human language. However, I only heard accounts such as this, in which the hirka’s message was 
given in literal terms, in stories that were already several degrees removed from their original 
sources. The man in the story may originally have received a message conveyed through a 
combination of images whose meaning emerged in relation to a particular context, which was 
then translated into a text that could be quoted in the course of narrating the story. For instance, 
he may have received the message in a dream.  
Dreams are one of the most common ways of receiving non-verbal messages from a hirka. 
Messages that arrive by this route do not rely on linguistic forms as signs, but rather are the result 
of the interpretation of oneiric images as indexical signs that point toward the intended message. 
Don Clemente, a man who has lived his life in a manada in Qutukancha—a hallqa region south of 
Río Negro in Recuay—explained to me that the hirka has often given him information in his 
dreams that shape the day’s activities. One night, he told me, he dreamed that he found bones in a 
tree. When he awoke, the first thing he did was go to look around in the scrubby trees near the 
manada, where he immediately found a deer whose leg had become tangled there. The hirka did 
not mean to tell him he would find bones, he explained, but rather that he would have meat that 
day, and where he should go to find it. The bone here signifies meat by means of the indexical 
                                                
56 Mogrovejo was a Catholic priest who became the archbishop of Lima in 1581, and was later 
canonized by the Vatican in 1679 for the remarkable trail of miracles left by his visitas throughout 




relationship between the sign (bone) and a contiguous object (meat), a semiotic dynamic 
documented in dream interpretation in the Andes since the seventeenth century (Mannheim 
2015:31). An early seventeenth century extirpator of idolatry reported the existence in Recuay 
(the parish to which Río Negro belonged at the time) of ritual ministers of “idols” who specialized 
in dreaming and dream interpretation (Hernández Príncipe 1923 [1622]:28). The use of dream 
interpretation for planning daily activities is also common among agricultural communities both 
in Ancash and in the south of Peru as well (Mannheim 2015:11). Likewise, throughout Peru, the 
images encountered in dreams are understood not as coming from the dreamer’s innermost self, as 
is common in many Western contexts, but rather from outside (9). However, dreams and their 
possible interpretations can also vary in principled ways within populations. In Río Negro, for 
example, individuals who have cultivated relationships with particular hirka—namely herders—
have dreams and interpretations that are unique in that they understand the contents as originating 
in the hirka with whom they have social bonds. This distinction also offers a parallel to my 
previous observation that the messages that herders receive through ritual divination are seen as 
originating in the hirka, while those of farmers is seen as simply emanating from the coca leaves 
or cigarettes themselves. 
The difference between herders’ and farmers’ encounters with hirka in dreams and 
apparitions corresponds to their patterns of engagement with their environments. However, it also 
corresponds with a distinction in the kinds of hirka in the hallqa and farmland environments with 
which herders and farmers respectively engage. In Francisca’s interpretation of her dream, she 
emphasized the fact that the hirka, in the form of an old couple, were caring for the “feral” 
animals that lived on their slopes. In Quechua, the word she uses is “chukaru.” This word is used 




interchangeable with “piña,” Quechua for “angry.” The word “chukaru” itself is also commonly 
used to describe not only animals but places as well. It is furthermore used to describe the state of 
a person’s spirit or essence, their haani,57 after it has become frightened in a chukaru place or by a 
chukaru entity and has abandoned the body, leaving the person in the state of illness known as 
“susto” or “manchay.” For this reason, the close relationship between hirka and the condition of 
chukaru is critical to understanding the acquisition of the intervention of hirka—and herders by 
extension—in healing rituals in the towns far below the hallqa regions (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Ricard Lanata 2007). The distinction between chukaru and tame hirka also helps 
to answer the question of why farmers and herders treat the hirka on whose slopes they work in 
such different ways. For example, consider Qitsqay Hirka, the round promontory at the western 
edge of Huaripampa. One of the stories above involve Qitsqay, a mountain that is not in the hallqa 
region, and is in fact covered almost entirely in farmland. Indeed, the word hirka also refers to the 
physical form of a mountain and, as such, agricultural towns in the Andes like Huaripampa sit on 
top of and among hirka. However, these hirka are different from those in the hallqa high above, as 
they are not chukaru—they are domesticated hirka.58 While the hirka in the hallqa can have 
potentially violent reactions to herders who pass over their slopes without making numerous 
offerings of homage, those whose flanks are dressed in parcels of cultivated land do not have the 
same temperament. When herders talk about their offerings to hirka, they often speak of this as 
“mansay,” a verb derived from the Spanish word, “mansar,” which is equivalent to the English, 
“to tame.”  
                                                
57 A more precise translation of haani is that part of a person that engages in social relationships 
and to which the effects of the latter accrue. Ricard Lanata (2007) analyzes the word’s southern 
cognate, sami, at length.  
58 Quechua speakers borrow the Spanish word “manso,” or “tame” in English, to characterize 




None of the other hirka in the territory of Huaripampa—for example Mitu Hirka, Don 
Juan Hirka, and Challwa Hirka—are considered chukaru, and farmers continuously pass over 
their slopes every day without making any special actions of respect.59 One possible explanation 
of the differential treatment of hirka in the high pastures and the farmlands below is that traditions 
have eroded in agricultural contexts. However, two important facts call such an interpretation into 
question. First of all, farmers are fully aware that hirka in the hallqa region are chukaru compared 
to the tame ones that surround them. By the same token, herders accustomed to ritual payment of 
respect to hirka in the hallqa do not carry out these rituals when leading animals over the tame 
hirka below, for example when bringing calves to town to protect them from the dangers of Ruriq. 
The second reason why eroded tradition is not a good explanation is that farmers in Huaripampa 
consider the chukaru hirka high above to have efficacy in healing certain illnesses and in 
providing answers to certain difficult questions. The following section recounts just such a case.  
 
4. Herders as intermediaries for hirka 
 Gerson’s father, Pascual, was one of the first people I met in Huaripampa. He and his wife 
Mari lent me a spare bedroom in their house complex. Roughly five months into my fieldwork, I 
returned late one evening to Huaripampa after several frustrating but ultimately successful days in 
the capital trying (again) to acquire a student visa. On arriving, I learned that Paolo, Gerson’s 
four-year-old brother, was very ill. He had been throwing up for the last few days, Gerson told 
me, and unable to keep any food down. Mari had just taken him to a neighbor who was a 
curandero (a local healer) to ask for advice. While we waited for their return, I purchased goods 
                                                
59 It is also worth mentioning that this cross, along with numerous others belonging to families, is 
carried to the church in the plaza of the district capital, Olleros, each February, during carnaval, 




from Gerson’s younger sister, Fiorela, who was attending the family’s small shop. The next 
morning I planned to accompany Gerson along with two other CUP members on a shift to Ruriq 
for the first time. I packed my bag with the goods and my recording equipment, then joined 
Pascual and Gerson at the table in their modern-style living room where they were watching 
Mexican soap operas. Both father and son were uncharacteristically laconic.  
Suddenly, Mari entered the store with a frantic air, carrying Paolo in her arms. The 
curandero had told her that Paolo had “no pulse,” and that she should take him to the state 
hospital in Huaraz. There are a number of reasons why this was far from an ideal option. First, it 
was night, and there was no longer any transportation to Huaraz. Getting to the hospital would 
involve asking a favor from one of the two local residents who ran van lines between Huaripampa 
and Huaraz (the others had moved to Huaraz with the capital gathered from this business). I 
myself would have been unable to return, as I lacked the social capital required for such an 
imposition. Second, taking Paolo to the state hospital in Huaraz entailed its own risks, as the 
hospital was notorious for its poor facilities and management.60 Third, despite the public care 
offered at the hospital, the family would no doubt incur unexpected expenses.  
Mari and Pascual stepped aside and spoke quietly and intensely for a few moments. 
Pascual then called Gerson and gave him a brusque command that was too fast for my ears to 
discern. Gerson nodded and dashed out the door. Several minutes later he returned with a thin 
man I had seen but did not yet know. It was in fact the same Feliciano who I would eventually 
accompany on a shift in Ruriq. At the moment I could only watch, impressing everything on my 
memory in order to record the episode in my notebook later.  
                                                
60 For example, the hospital had been partially evacuated due to leaks and structural instability 




Feliciano took a seat at the small table in the store. Mari gave him a bag of coca, a couple 
of cigarettes, and a plastic bottle containing a small amount of alcohol. He took some of the coca 
leaves, spoke to them, chewed them one by one, then passed a cigarette before his face, speaking 
once again. The ritual should be familiar by now—he was doing chakchay. I recognized the name 
of the mountain, Wantsan Hirka, but made out little else of his incantations. After blowing on the 
cigarette, he lit it and carefully observed its ashes, occasionally muttering a few words of dismay. 
Once the first cigarette was done he told Mari and Pascual that Paolo was in very bad shape. He 
then spoke to and lit the second cigarette. This time he watched the ash burn with a bit less 
concern, and finally informed Mari and Pascual that the child would be fine in the end if they took 
him to the hospital in Huaraz. Considering Feliciano’s interpretation of the two cigarettes’ ashes, 
the second was clearly used to ask the specific question of whether Paolo needed to go to the 
hospital in Huaraz in order to get better. Because the first message was so general—Paolo was in 
bad shape—it is unclear whether Feliciano had used the cigarette to ask about Paolo’s condition, 
or simply offered it to the hirka and then interpreted the ash as a general assessment of the 
situation. Whatever the specific questions asked, the results were clear, and led to prompt action. 
Within ten minutes, they had made the necessary negotiations and arrangements to have a 
neighbor drive Mari and Paolo to Huaraz in his van. They would stay the night, and return on the 
first van in the morning. By the time they arrived, Gerson and I would already be within Ruriq.   
Why did the family seek out Feliciano rather than simply doing the ritual themselves or 
choosing one of the other neighbors that frequented their store? What was the pragmatic criterion 
that informed their decision then? I shared this story and the dilemma it presented with my friend 
and teacher, César Vargas Arce, who was raised in the hallqa of Pichiw, in the mountain range 




to me indirect and metaphorical. His father, he told me, had a mule. This mule did everything his 
father asked of it with great obedience and strength. However, if César or anyone else other than 
his father tried to get it to respond, it merely dug in its heels and stayed stubbornly in place. When 
I didn’t perceive the relevance, he offered another story. His father had told him when he was 
young that his taklla (hand plow), which he had fashioned himself, only responded to his effort 
and no one else’s.61 The two stories then seemed to suggest an analogy, which I verified with 
César. The mule only responded to his father due to the strength of their relationship, specifically 
to the constant care he had dedicated to the animal; his taklla, the product and implement of his 
labor, also responded proprietarily to him. Likewise, Mari and Pashku deemed it best to seek out 
someone like Feliciano who had a working relationship with the hirka from whom they sought 
assistance. Because there is no conventional structure for ritual status or authority in Río Negro, 
the logic of the choice is ultimately pragmatic in nature. Pascual, for example, may have done 
coca divination himself, but he did not have as strong a relationship with hirka like Wantsan 
because he spends most of his time on farming and wage labor. 
But is analogy the right way of analytically linking the relations between people and 
mules, plows, and hirka? I believe there is a principled reason why César did not present these 
stories as analogies to me, but rather as explanations of the events’ causality. As analogies, they 
only point out the similarity between the events, limiting any underlying causal relations. In other 
words, in an analogic interpretation, the dynamics by which a farmer tames a mule and a herder 
cultivates a relationship with hirka are linked only on the basis of their formal similarities; there is 
no corollary implication that the same underlying processes are involved. Instead, the connection 
                                                
61 The preoccupation with the place of quotidian instruments in social hierarchies has a long 
history in Andean cultures. A Moche vessel depicts scenes in which weapons and eating utensils 




between the two phenomena is a subjective one that exists only in the mind of the person who 
makes the analogical association. Thus, the analogy that links human relationships with mules, 
plows, and mountains ascribes the connection to the domain of belief. To put it in another way, 
this account places the relationship between herder and hirka not in a field of social relations, but 
rather in the arbitrary, shared structure of cultural meaning that Lévi-Strauss envisioned along the 
lines of Saussure’s semiology (Lévi-Strauss 1955). Here, we may find an explanation for 
something like a cosmological “belief in hirka.” Yet this explanation also treats the social 
relations that make such “belief” discernible as arbitrary, eliding the way such practices are not 
only symbolic but also causal at both material and social levels. 
  What happens if I take seriously the fact that César did not present these stories as terms 
in an analogy? In order to see what kind of causality might be involved, it’s necessary to first 
think carefully about the entities. As I mentioned above, the hirka with which Feliciano has 
cultivated a relationship are considered “chukaru,” which I translated as “feral,” whereas those in 
the agricultural area of Huaripampa are considered tame. At first, I struggled to understand the 
concept of chukaru. Friends often referred to particular animals as chukaru. For example, cattle 
that had grown up in Ruriq without ever having contact with humans were considered chukaru. 
This is what initially led me to translate the term as “feral,” defined as an individual member of a 
domestic animal species raised in the wild. However, the word was also used in other contexts 
that didn’t quite fit this definition. For example, Gerson used the word to describe a horse I 
attempted to ride to Ruriq, and which nearly threw both of us to the ground in our successive 
attempts to mount it. Yet, I later saw that the horse’s owner could ride it easily. Feral animals do 
not have preferential relationships with humans; they are merely domestic animals raised in the 




appellation points out the fact that the state of chukaru does not translate directly to feral, or even 
to wild. Descola’s sense of bearing no recognizable trace of human sociality (2013a:33). Let me 
reconsider the case of cattle that have matured without human intervention in the hallqa. These 
animals are considered chukaru, but are not “wild” in the sense of having no social relationships 
of mutual respect. Rather, they are considered to be the hirka’s own herds. Likewise, in Río 
Negro “naturally wild” fauna such as foxes, pumas, and vicuñas are considered to be the hirka’s 
domesticates. A similar understanding has been described in southern Peru, (Allen 2002:28; 
Flores Ochoa 1974:256; Gose 1994:222; Isbell 1978:153; Martinez 1983:88;62 Ricard Lanata 
2007:64; Salas Carreño 2016:17), however, the observation has usually been explained in terms 
of ownership of all animals, or of particular species, rather than in terms of the social logic of 
domestication I describe here.  
Careful consideration of the state of chukaru indeed reveals a process shared in the cases 
of feral cattle, tame mules, and Feliciano’s relationship with the hirka. When cattle become 
chukaru in Río Negro, they necessarily do so by living on the hirka’s slopes. They are thus 
nurtured and raised not by human owners but by the hirka, and by virtue of this fact they are 
responsive to the whims of the hirka, not of human owners. Likewise, a mule who has been 
nurtured and raised by one man is responsive to that man, and not to others. And, finally, when 
herders make offerings to hirka, they attain the hirka’s responsiveness. Of course, a hirka is much 
harder to tame than a mule or a wooden plow, and in fact herders are more often in the position of 
the mule than in that of its master with respect to the hirka (in the same way Andean children are 
productive members of households). This fact itself is directly related to the greater authority 
attributed hirka in the hallqa compared to those in agricultural areas, and helps explain for 
                                                




example why Mari and Pascual didn’t merely consult the agricultural hirka close by, the 
patsamama more generally, or simply the coca itself. In other words, it seems likely that the 
dominion of hirka in the hallqa over so much territory and over so many beings—human and 
animal alike—is a key component in their cultural evaluation as ultimate local authorities, sought 
out in critical situations such as Mari’s and Pascual’s.63  
This state of affairs parallels Descola’s description of the jungle surrounding the ordered 
clearing that constitutes an Achuar settlement. What appears to the outsider as a wild space, 
socially vacuous, and clearly separated from the domestic, is in truth “a subject in a social 
relationship…. an extension of the world of the homestead… domesticated even in its most 
inaccessible reaches” (2013a:6). Descola’s solution to these radically different interpretations of 
what is ostensibly the same world is to encompass them in a typology of ontologies. This 
theoretical contraption provides an excellent alibi for the ethnographer’s initial “doubts 
concerning what he had previously taken for granted” as well as a suitable means for later taking 
these doubts and “analyzing them in a systematic fashion” (4-5). Descola also notes that the 
analogs of wild and domestic across cultural contexts are not equivalent to its modern, occidental 
manifestation, whose roots he traces to the Roman Empire (55). The differences, he argues, are 
due to the distinct ways in which cultural groups recognize human influence in their environment 
(33), and evaluate this influence in aesthetic and moral terms (55). In the modern western context, 
he argues, starting with the agricultural exclusivity of the rural landscape of the Roman Empire 
where hunting was merely a form of policing cultivated land (53), and despite a history 
complicated by interactions with the heroics of the Germanic hunt and medieval social 
                                                
63 This case, like the explanatory examples César provided of his father’s relationships with his 
hand-plow and donkey, suggests interesting parallels to the category of master or owner found 




reorganizations, human influence has disappeared from the cultural perception of the 
environment. It was not the case, however, that “nature” in fact became more “wild” because of 
its physical separation from human practices, but rather because there were no relevant 
relationships that connected people to the “wild” places in the terms of human sociality.  
Descola’s observations ultimately suggest that as long as some group of people are bound 
to an environment in terms of human sociality (however recognized locally), then that 
environment bears the mark of human intervention to all who can recognize this sociality in it, 
whether through its names, associated stories, or physical forms. However, while Descola moves 
from this observation toward a typology of ontologies assembled from a basic set of 
fundamentally incompatible categorical distinctions (and much like the typologization of spatial 
Frames of Reference, for that matter), in this chapter I redirect my analysis back toward the social 
relations that constitute environments as other-than-nature. From this perspective, the essential 
characteristic of the western distinction between wild and domestic nature that Descola describes 
is not its systematization of oppositions that are irreducibly symbolic even when historically 
constituted, but rather its exclusion of the possibility of social relations with places and things as 
social and semiotic—if not linguistic—subjects, even if they sometimes embody characteristic 
features of personhood. If nature and culture or wild and domestic are inherent parts of the 
concomitant ontology, it is simply because the social interactions out of which such ontologies 
can emerge at the level of intersubjective meaning do not include members of both sides as 
participants. Domestication in this context then consists of bringing something across a boundary 
(either by moving the thing or the boundary) that is inherently ontological—that is, it divides two 
fundamentally different categories of being. In contrast, the kind of domestication Descola 




maintenance of hierarchies among subjects capable of human social relations.64 The boundaries 
that are thereby created do not entail an ontological distinction between socially incommensurable 
categories of being. Rather, they distinguish categories of sociality that, while different, are 
different in the same way that other human social categories are different.65  
I have shown that the shared evaluation of hirka in Río Negro cannot be reduced to terms 
of belief or faith (de la Cadena 2015:165). While something like belief—or more specifically 
presuppositions about the world in which certain propositions could achieve their ends or 
statements could be true—is a necessary and ubiquitous aspect of cultural patterns of behavior, 
this does not explain how such beliefs or presuppositions emerge in a social reality characterized 
by differentiation and heterogeneity. I have also offered an empirically grounded argument that it 
would be fruitless to explain the social agency of places like hirka as the product of the animistic 
or perspectival ontologies proposed by Descola, as these fail to explain why some but not all 
places are social actors. Part of the solution can be found in understanding the power of places 
like hirka as the result of basic elements of sociality: nourishment and co-presence (Mannheim & 
Salas-Carreño 2015:59; Salas Carreño 2016). This analysis makes the important observation that 
the sociality of hirka is essentially the same as that of persons, as it is constituted through the 
same processes. However, because the question it seeks to answer is about the ontological status66 
of such “places-persons,” it does not offer a direct answer to the question I ask in this chapter: 
what accounts for the fact that only a subset of humans communicates with hirka?  
                                                
64 It is worth noting that this profound distinction also resonates at multiple levels in the contrast 
between the masking of social hierarchy that emerged together with what Descola calls naturalism 
and the overt enactments and reproductions of hierarchy that characterizes Amazonian and 
Andean societies. 
65 This distinction—between ontologically and socially constituted difference—emphasizes the 
importance in both the Andes and Amazonia of the ongoing creation and maintenance of social 
relations over hierarchies taken for granted as part of shared symbolic structures. 




For example, Mannheim and Salas Carreño attribute the difference in importance among 
hirka to an association between “power and sphere of influence” in the Andes, which they suggest 
is coterminous with altitude, so that higher mountains have larger spheres of influence and are 
thus more powerful (63).67 Here, altitude becomes a conventional symbol of status, ironically 
making the social processes responsible for the evaluation of hirka as persons in the first place 
irrelevant in the evaluation of their individual characteristics. In other words, it yields an account 
of the relative statuses of hirka, but one that separates the logic at work in evaluating hirka from 
the logic at work in the social interactions where hirka are participants. This move to define hirka 
in terms of processes of human sociality is crucial, but it must then go beyond the objectifying 
operation of definition in order to locate hirka within the interactions by which they are socially 
positioned. Because these processes occur at the level of individual interaction, they can best be 
understood by staying close to individual practices. In this chapter, following the everyday work 
of herders led to the conclusion that their quotidian ritual practices play a causal role in shaping 
the structure of local culture, and not the other way around. For example, the greater status of the 
glacial hirka compared to those of the farmlands is not simply a consequence of their symbolic or 
physical attributes, but rather one of the their causal role in social life. If hirka and humans 
animate and are animated by the same sociality, then just as distinctions in power among humans 
is neither a purely symbolic nor material quality, but moreover a property of their position in a 
social situation, distinctions in power among hirka is also neither a symbolic nor material quality, 
but emerges like humans’ from their social position. The quotidian practices of herders in the 
hallqa unfold simultaneously as social relationships with individual hirka, and by associating in 
this way with hirka, the herders’ social position is changed. It is not that rituals reconfigure 
                                                




herders’ sociality through the hirka as a “symbolic medium,” to use the term Douglas applied to 
the role of the body (1966:128), but rather merely by virtue of their inherent sociality, in the same 
way that regularly harvesting a neighbor’s field changes one’s social relationship with the 
neighbor.  
Writing about Southern Peru, Peter Gose observed that “the political rank of the apus is 
determined by the offerings that people give, and is not an intrinsic feature of the mountain itself, 
like its height” (Gose 1994:215). This observation stands in contrast to most ethnographic 
descriptions of mountains in the Andes as it highlights the social mutuality (not to say symmetry) 
of human-mountain relations. While it is indeed a step toward treating mountains analytically as 
persons by positioning them in social rather than purely symbolic relations, it still restricts the 
direction of influence from human to mountain. In Río Negro, I contend, it is impossible to retain 
this view of human-mountain sociality. First, the differences in social position among hirka are 
not due simply to the type or quantity of offerings made. Rather, hirka in agricultural areas differ 
from those of the hallqa pastures in that they have been tamed by collective interactions and thus 
their proprietary relationships are the exact reverse of those in the hallqa. In contrast to the 
familiar nature-culture or wild-domestic divide of the modern West, in which nature entails the 
absence of reciprocal human sociality, the wild hirka of the hallqa and the tame hirka of the 
chakra are distinguished by the kind of sociality involved, and not by its mere presence or 
absence. The tameness of chakra hirka, whether generalized as “patsamama” or specified as 
particular parcels of cultivated land in all their historical specifics, is constituted as a social 
relationship in which farming families function as patrons, managing the potential unruliness of 
hirka sociality through periodic, collective ritual and continuous, intensive work. In contrast, the 




patrons, taking on herders as adoptive children. Hirka in the hallqa, as socially dominant, also 
have a dominant cultural authority. This authority lies in the causal role they play in humans’ 
lives, just as a mule’s obedience or a farming implement’s effectiveness lie not in belief or in a 
cultural symbol, but are instead the causal effects of particular individuals’ habitual relationships 
with them.68 These relationships are of course themselves partially constituted by patterns of 
presuppositions and practices, and could thus be argued to reduce what I suggest are their fruits—
social differentiation among hirka—instead to a simple consequence of convergent cultural 
norms. However, the fact remains that individual relationships between people and hirka are 
indeed only partially constituted by generalizable presuppositions and practices—in addition, 
these relationships are also shaped by the contingencies inherent in the landscape, human lives, 
historical processes, economic pressures, etc. It is in the midst of this chaotic, unstable system that 
we find emergent cultural orders of intertwined social, linguistic, and material differences, and it 
seems to me unsatisfying and fruitless to ignore the traces and potential influence of this messy 
reality in the patterns it engenders. It is possible—and indeed often useful—to abstract Feliciano’s 
interactions with Huantsan Hirka away from their situation in his life and among the places where 
it unfolds, rendering them cumulatively as a token of animistic ontology, nonhuman agency, 
Andean religion, etc. Doing so, however, also drains these interactions of most of their moral, 
aesthetic and affective potential. If anthropology is only interested in understanding the 
relationship between what humans experience as meaningful or in the empirical characteristics of 
the human lives that situate such experiences of meaning, but not in their causal entanglement, 
                                                
68 Mules and farming implements (sickles for example) of course figure in cultural beliefs or 
symbols as well, but it’s hard to imagine this being the case in contexts where their engagement 
with humans in habitual practices was not widely known. In semiotic terms, symbols are built up 
out of iconic and indexical processes, and are thus the product of work rather than its raw 
materials. If structural anthropology takes symbols as the substance of culture, it does so because 




then it threatens to become either a voice for what others could best say themselves or a means of 
understanding humanity by excising human understanding.      
I also want to emphasize the fact that focusing on the causal relationship between human 
engagements with the landscape and the understanding of hirka as social subjects in Rio Negro is 
of consequence not merely to the definition of analytical perspectives in anthropological theory. If 
hirka in the hallqa are chukaru because of their relative lack of interaction with humans, and not 
because of cultural beliefs or symbols, then things like nature reserves must be seen in a different 
light. By limiting human presence, Huascaran National Park does not preserve a wild area, but in 
fact produces wilderness not simply in Cronon’s sense of cultural construction, but more 
concretely in the sense that isolation from humans makes the hirka within the Park more chukaru.  
 
5. Divination as a frame for social action 
In the previous section, I argued that Mari’s and Pascual’s decision to seek out Feliciano 
can best be understood as the result of the latter’s cumulative social engagements with hirka such 
as Wantsan. However, one part of the question remains unanswered (or rather, one part of the 
answer remains unquestioned). Why did the family seek the counsel of outside help at all, rather 
than relying simply on their own rational judgment? While the instigation to seek counsel in the 
first place comes from the reasons I gave above—the economic and health risks associated with 
the trip to the hospital—this does not explain the role of the hirka itself as an authority. One 
possible answer is that hirka like Wantsan are the ultimate cultural authority in Río Negro. There 
may certainly be truth in this answer, but it is unsatisfactory in two ways. First, explaining the 
appeal to the hirka by means of the their cultural importance again replaces a social fact with one 




place. Second, explaining the decision in this way also neglects the existence of a common frame 
that casts hirka as the chief symbol of a culture belonging to backwards Indians, and as part of a 
culture that must be abandoned for the sake of economic and social development. This latter 
evaluation pertains to a distinct social field that does not include hirka as participants in action, 
but which undeniably informs many aspects of social life, such as the decline in the use of coca 
and the prestigious value of the Spanish language. It is from within this social field that Park 
officials justify the move toward excluding Río Negro residents from their territory. And finally, 
it was this perspective that Río Negro residents evoked during my early interviews when they 
commented on the absence of traditional practices and values in Huaripampa while presupposing 
the sociality of hirka as recipients of respect.   
If appealing to cultural symbolism fails to explain the relevance of the hirka in the 
family’s moment of crisis, it does so in part because it erases the underlying tension among 
competing frames for action, and thereby defines the question of why Mari and Pascual sought 
help from a hirka (with Feliciano as an intermediary) in terms of symbolic structure rather than 
contingent social interactions. A focus on divination as a frame for action instead redefines their 
choice. To take their son to the hospital in Huaraz would effectively concede that Río Negro did 
not have the necessary resources to ensure their well-being. This in itself reinforces the frame that 
would ground their action within a social field wherein highland communities are underdeveloped 
and powerless. However, by relinquishing their agency in this decision to the hirka—as mediated 
by Feliciano’s divination—Mari and Pascual reframed the very same action that was solidly 
rooted in the local landscape, making the trip to the hospital a locally mandated acquisition of 




This subtle reframing of action thus did more than simply facilitate a difficult decision. It 
also made it possible for Pascual and Mari to inhabit a social space that is not nested in a 
hierarchy that places the greatest value and authority in the urban areas at lower elevations 
associated with the national government. Instead, they were able to make the appropriate decision 
in a potentially life-threatening situation in the terms of a hierarchy grounded in the local 
landscape, which then frames an action that might otherwise be framed as an act of cultural, 
social, and economic submission. This does not constitute an act of isolation, but rather a specific 
way of engaging with an entity—e.g., the state hospital—that is not socially familiar. Respecting 
the hirka in this case is not merely a culturally symbolic act, but rather a terminal point or 
concatenation of locally meaningful social relationships. At the same time, it can be seen as 
constituting an act of resistance69 to interpellation in the social field that assures Río Negro’s 
domination in part by framing this very act of respect for hirka as merely of symbolic value. 
Finally, because the hirka are critical to this reframing, if families like Pascual and Mari’s are to 
continue to inhabit this social space of resistance, they will also depend on access to people like 
Feliciano who are dedicated to cultivating relationships with the hirka.  
 
                                                
69 Abercrombie (1998) pointed out that ethnographies in the 70’s and 80’s (e.g., Bastien 1978, 
Isbell 1978, Allen 1988) emphasized traditional practices at the expense of contiguous modern 
practices they portray in contrast as a superficial overlay of Christianity. He further critiqued the 
concomitant claims that this amounts to cultural resistance for their poignantly ironic 
reproduction of colonial missionaries’ own obsession with hidden idolatry. Instead, Abercrombie 
suggests Andean communities have seriously engaged with colonial, Christian, and national 
culture, albeit on their own terms, to such an extent that to ignore their resulting transformations 
cannot but yield a substantially distorted representation. While a narrow focus on what the 
anthropologist perceives as cultural survivals indeed amounts to a form of political exclusion, it 
would be equally narrow not to heed the salience of the tension between local and external social 
fields in Río Negro and, I suspect, other Andean communities. The means I found to avoid both 
pitfalls was to locate the power of these social fields in interactionally substantiated frames for 





Underlying many studies of Andean “religion” is a symbolic-structuralist tendency to 
privilege the question of why people think about and interact with the world in the ways they do. 
For example, ethnographies have drawn out the underlying beliefs, presuppositions, or structures 
implicit in practice, or even simply in Andean people’s reflexive explanations of their own 
culture. In contrast, my principal goal here has not been to answer the question of why hirka are 
so crucial to social life in Río Negro. Rather, I came to this as a secondary question, whose 
answer was fundamentally contingent on the organization of social relations among persons, 
defined locally to include entities such as hirka that would otherwise fall into categories such as 
nonhuman, nature, environment, place, or landscape. The question I addressed, then, was the 
following: Given that residents of Río Negro share an evaluation and understanding of hirka as 
social persons with distinct kinds of power and authority, and that all residents may make 
offerings to hirka as acts of respect, what accounts for the fact that only a subset of individuals—
namely herders—communicate directly with them through divination? 
One possible answer would be given by the existence of a political structure that 
legitimates the authority to communicate with hirka through divination. Such a structure has in 
fact been described elsewhere in the Andes, where legitimation is reportedly conferred by 
supernatural events (e.g., being touched by hail or lightning; Ricard Lanta 2007:149), 
apprenticeship (de la Cadena 2015:48; Ricard Lanata 2007:145), kinship (Hérnandez Príncipe 
1617:27), or personal ceremonies (Altamirano Rua 2014:148). The presumption of ritual authority 
plays a fundamental role in analyses of the role of mountains in Andean religious life. In John 
Topic’s analysis of the cult of Catequil (2008)—a mountain in Huamachuco (in the region north 




hegemony—he attributes ritual communication with mountains to political authority. As in 
Topic’s account, while people in Río Negro evaluate mountains similarly as knowledgeable, 
powerful social beings, the particular ways they engage with them are varied. In this context, 
Topic places belief at the center of his account, suggesting that the beliefs about the oracle of 
Catequil shared by both community elites and commoners led to a solidary and reciprocal form of 
power rather than a hierarchical and exploitative one (79). In Río Negro, there are no a priori 
sources of ritual authority because structured political roles are limited to those such as mayor or 
positions within the Peasant Community committee, and are thus authorized by external political 
structures rather than ritual interactions with hirka. For this reason, it is not possible to take the 
division between those who can and cannot speak with mountains for granted as a political 
structure.70 Instead, as I argue, this distinction emerges simply from patterns in individuals’ 
diverse social relationships with mountains, themselves conditioned by the different ways herders 
and farmers habitually engage socially and spatially with the environment. Regardless of the 
nature of their beliefs, and regardless of the extent to which they are shared or not, I have shown 
that herders and farmers develop different social relationships with the mountains around them, 
and that by virtue of these relationships their social positions with respect to hirka change. 
Furthermore, because the social relationships between mountains and people share the same 
characteristics of hierarchy and mutual obligation (not exactly reciprocity) as those among people, 
there is no need to determine whether the community is solidary and reciprocal or hierarchical 
                                                
70 There are of course political factors involved. However herders do not constitute a politically 
defined group. For example, herds are either inherited or purchased, and these have very different 
politics. On the other hand, the HNP’s restrictions on access to the highest pastures such as Ruriq 
and their corresponding control by CUPs does introduce a sort of political filter. However, this is 
clearly not a cause of herder’s relationships with hirka, as can be appreciate in the case of herders 




and exploitative. In fact, it seems that this distinction is not well suited to an analysis of the social 
field of Río Negro. 
Another possible explanation is that herders acquire their privileged access to hirka by 
virtue of a symbolic association with the latter, such that herders are linked to hirka by a cultural 
rule or convention. This can only explain herders’ relationships with hirka by substituting a 
symbolic fact for the social fact that it is herders rather than some other social or cultural category 
that fill this role, and leaves this fact itself unexplored. Nevertheless, this is a dominant mode of 
explanation in Andean ethnography. The distinction between the high pastures and the cultivated 
chakra, for example, has been treated in terms of structural or symbolic associations with other 
distinctions between the wild and the domestic (Harris 1980:84), incestuous and normal sexual 
relations (Isbell 1978), and even nature and culture (Platt 1978). These accounts share a basis in 
the generalities of structured associations rather than in the idiosyncrasies of contextualized 
practice, and as a consequence confine their explanation to the analogic terms of structural 
analysis. Instead of locating the practices they describe within the social relationships they both 
emerge from and shape, they are destined to represent them as surface variations of an underlying, 
universal structure, or as Harris writes, as “an interesting example of the enormous variety of 
ways that the themes we associate with nature and culture can be represented” (71).  
As universalizing and relativizing accounts, symbolic-structural analyses fall short of 
offering insight into what it means for herders to inhabit their particular position in Río Negro. 
Likewise, they offer no account of a mechanism by which symbolic associations or underlying 
structures actually come to bear on social life. In contrast, if herders’ social positions—and any 
symbolic associations they carry—are understood as the accretion of actual practices and 




with hirka is then primarily contextual and pragmatic rather than symbolic and conventional. 
Further, the causal factor in this pragmatics is nothing more than the herders’ quotidian and 
habitual practices,71 as this perforce entails the cultivation of a social relationship with hirka.  
Compared to symbolic structures, this pragmatics—based merely on habitual patterns of 
practice and sociality—is capable of explaining much more easily why what appears as a shared 
structure of beliefs or presuppositions yields social heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. In 
concrete terms, while both herders and farmers share a similar evaluation of hirka, this evaluation 
comes to bear on their lives in distinct ways not because of its internal logic, nor because of 
cognitive universals, but rather because of parallel social and spatial distinctions in practice. 
Because herders are frequently in proximity to the hirka—they literally work on the surfaces of 
the hirka’s bodies—they are compelled to engage in social relationships with them by means of 
offerings of coca, cigarettes, and alcohol. In contrast, farmers use these media of sociality 
primarily to forge and reinforce social bonds among one another in the course of collaborative 
agricultural labor. As a result, in the agricultural context of Río Negro’s towns, herders are the 
preferred intermediaries for communicating with hirka from a distance—they alone have the 
necessary, strong social bonds with hirka. Herders’ privileged relationship with hirka is thus a 
causal result of their habitual interactions with hirka, itself a result of the spatial extension of their 
quotidian labor. By the same token, the spatiality of herders’ daily work can also be understood as 
a condition for framing interactions with unfamiliar actors with respect to the landscape of Río 
                                                
71 These practices include language and thought. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 explore the ways linguistic 




Negro, providing a means of acting and thinking outside of the dominant, racist social field that 
frames residents as underdeveloped and powerless.72  
 In this chapter, I have answered why herders alone can communicate through divination 
with hirka by means of following the idiosyncrasies of spatial and social relations among the 
relevant persons involved: herders and hirka. This approach was only possible after yielding to 
the local definition of hirka as social persons. Without initially opening the analysis to local terms 
in this way, it would have only been possible to look at interactions among herders and farmers, 
leaving hirka as either material or ideal, but not socially real. In this case, the characteristics of 
hirka would have been defined either in terms of material science, or in terms of belief, 
symbolism, or arbitrary cultural rules. Instead, by allowing hirka to be defined methodologically 
as persons, the analysis offers not only a socially, materially, and experientially grounded account 
of hirka, but also distinguishes their role as participants in a social relationship that transforms the 
lives of herders and provides others in Río Negro access to a locally anchored social field.    
 As in the following chapters, this chapter demonstrates how the particular relationship 
between people and their environments plays a causal role in shaping one aspect of human life. 
Here, I’ve shown how this relationship constitutes some of the conditions of sociality in Río 
Negro. In Chapter 3, I show how it shapes the use of the Quechua language to describe spatial 
relationships by virtue of speakers’ embodiment of their orientation and position within the 
landscape. In Chapter 4, I turn to deixis, a domain of language that is fundamentally social, 
                                                
72 Stein made a similar, if negatively framed, observation in his ethnography of of Hualcán 
(located north of Río Negro in the Río Santa watershed), when he wrote about rituals carried out 
by patrons of local glaciers, rocks, and waterfalls, “witchcraft beliefs form an effective barrier to 
social relations outside the community and supplement the class cleavages which already exist 
between Indians and non-Indians. Communication and social action are thereby limited” 
(1961:331). I argue rather that such practices (not beliefs) serve to constitute locally and 




arguing that Río Negro Quechua speakers’ use of demonstrative pronouns is anchored not only in 
the dynamics of social interaction, but also in the sense of space they come to embody through 
their interactions with hirka. In Chapter 5, I present the results of an experimental study of 
nonverbal spatial thought that offers evidence that while Quechua speakers generally prefer to 
represent spatial relationships with respect to the surrounding environment, herders are 




















Chapter 3: The sense of space: Ancash Quechua spatial 
language and Frames of Reference (FoRs) 
 
1. Introduction: Speaking with the landscape 
Angélica sat between the woven sticks fencing in the corral and the waist-high door to the 
kitchen, a brown tabby cat dozing in her lap as she humored my questions with a patient smile.  
“And do mountains speak?”73 
“Ah, sure, they speak. Sure, they speak. Sure, they live. The mountains live. Ah, it’s said 
they live.”  
“How do they speak, the mountains?” 
“They call to one another….” 
“Who do they speak with?” 
“Mountains among mountains…. For example, they say Collawasi Mountain and this 
mountain call to one another…. And they say that a long time ago these Waraakuy Bulls would 
come out during the new moon. From across yonder from across here, they say, they would be out 
fighting during the new moon. The grandmothers would watch. But now it’s not seen. By any 
chance someone has gone out at night during the new moon?” 
Back then, she explained, the women would spend all night up in the fields, watching over 
the animals left penned there to manure them. Under the new moon they would hear Qitsqay, the 
                                                




round hill at the western end of Huaripampa, call out to its twin, Collawasi, perched on the 
opposite side of the Santa River, crashing along far below. The two mountains would insult and 
challenge one another, even come to blows. The Waraakuy Bulls, the mountains’ avatars, would 
emerge and fight one another. But now no one needs to spend nights up in the fields; they are 
fertilized with nitrogen instead of manure and the grandmothers sleep in houses in the town. Who 
could testify to the clash of mountains beneath the new moon?   
At first glance, this looks like a typical story about the loss of tradition in a rapidly 
modernizing agrarian community. But Angélica’s story is not about typical places and their 
generalizability, but rather about particular places with proper names, histories, and social 
positions. The role of these places in her narration therefore merits an analysis of the interactions 
relevant to these people and places, rather than one that presupposes a “macro” scale of 
generalizable geopolitics (Carr & Lempert 2016). To start, consider how the specific mountains, 
Qitsqay and Collawasi, articulate intertwined sociological, ecological, and personal facts.74 They 
are the representative landmarks of two communities—Huaripampa and Collawasi. These 
communities belong in turn to two different mountain ranges: the Cordillera Blanca and the 
Cordillera Negra, on the western side of Río Santa.75 Second, at a more personal level, Angélica’s 
daughter married a man from Collawasi, tying their family economically to the opposing 
community. From the crest of Qitsqay—where the family plants potatoes and ties up its 
donkeys—they can see the entire town of Collawasi across the valley, even watch a funeral 
procession or a wedding, and hear the accompanying music. The tense conversation between 
these mountains echoes the connection that people in Huaripampa feel to Collawasi through their 
senses, their families, and their economic needs and aspirations.  
                                                
74 The relationship between Quechua narrative and its social context is frequently overlooked by scholars, 
despite being a central aspect of its production of meaning (Mannhein & Van Vleet 1998).  




My goal in this chapter is to show that this social and geographical connection is 
constantly presupposed by Huaripampinos’ linguistic and bodily engagement with spatial 
relations. Huaripampinos, along with residents of other parts of the Río Negro watershed, 
maintain a constant awareness of their position and orientation with respect to an extensive 
territory. This grounds their use of language and gesture—indeed it is a prerequisite for even the 
most basic verbal interchanges in Huaripampa. In fact, a closer look at the very way Angélica 
imparted her ideas illustrates this ubiquitous, internalized sense of place and orientation with 
respect to the surrounding landscape. For example, while speaking, she gestured in the air around 
her. As she said that the Waarakuy Bulls would come out from “across yonder” and “across 
here,” her hands momentarily became the bulls, darting toward her body first from the left, then 
from the right. But in fact, the labels “left” and “right” are inappropriate, a fact I could appreciate 
only after studying a video-recording of the narration and comparing it with satellite images from 
Google earth. Despite the fact that we had been sitting in a small area surrounded by high, adobe 
walls and overhanging roofs, the movements of Angélica’s hands perfectly aligned with the actual 
paths that the Bulls would have followed to meet halfway between Qitsqay and Collawasi.  
Angélica tells a story about mountains that speak to one another, but in doing so, her 
narration is dependent on the semantics of words, the position and movement of her body itself, 
and the physical characteristics of the surrounding landscape. In fact, her actions contradict what 
might seem to be the overt point of her story—that traditional knowledge of the landscape is lost. 
Instead, another message emerges. Language, landscape, and bodies are intimately connected in 
Río Negro. In the narrated events of Angélica’s story, it is the mountains that speak to one 
another, but in the narration’s enactment, the mountains’ speech and actions are manifest through 




body’s orientation and placement in the landscape. While it is framed within a discourse about the 
collapse of tradition—a very common one in Negro—the narrative also conveys Angélica’s sense 
that the intimate engagement of humans with the landscape is of critical cultural importance. In 
this chapter and the next, I delve analytically into Angélica’s intimation, arguing that the 
embodied sense of space that Río Negro residents glean from their environmental experience is 
presupposed in the structure of everyday communication. Likewise, in the penultimate chapter, I 
argue that environmental experience also directly bears on habits of thought. In this sense, 
Angélica’s concern with the loss of tradition can be understood in a new light, for there is a real 
threat that the loss of a practical connection with it will resound in the very conditions of speech 
and thought—both for people and mountains.  
This connection between body and landscape is linked to characteristics of spatial 
description in Quechua. In this chapter, I introduce the argument that Quechua speakers in Río 
Negro have a corporeal sense of space—an awareness of the body’s placement and orientation in 
a landscape not necessarily accessible to other senses—that incorporates the physical landscape 
they have come to know through their engagements with it. Thus, alongside presumably innate 
cognitive aspects of language like linguistic competence, speakers’ socialization into this 
corporeal knowledge of the landscape plays a critical role in Quechua verbal interaction. 
Furthermore, Quechua speakers’ sense of space entails a particular way of being in the world in 
which shared experience of an extensive territory forms a presupposed contextual common 
ground. This way of being in the world introduces a break from the phenomenological tradition 
that includes Merleau-Ponty, Benveniste, Schutz, and Bühler, as it suggests that the perceiving 
body is already oriented to a physical world that extends far beyond the limits of the senses rather 





1.1. Spatial Frames of Reference (FoRs) and the corporeal sense of space 
This chapter describes the characteristics of spatial reference in the Quechua language 
spoken in the Río Negro watershed. The description of the arrangement, location, orientation, and 
movement of objects in space in any language presupposes certain attributes of the speaker’s 
body. For example, “the cup is on the left side of the table” presupposes that the lateral halves of a 
person’s body project out into the space around them, whereas “the cup is in my left hand” does 
not. The characteristics of spatial description in Quechua described in this chapter provide a more 
striking example, presupposing a sense of space distinct from that in English and most European 
languages. Specifically, Quechua speakers habitually prefer descriptions such as “the cup is on 
the Mt. Shaksha side of the table,” which presuppose participants’ awareness of their bodily 
orientation with respect to a fixed landscape usually inaccessible to the senses. In contrast, the 
equivalent English expression, “the cup is on the left side of the table,” presupposes participants’ 
body’s own orientation as the fixed element.   
In what follows, I provide evidence that Quechua spatial orientation, in actual practice, 
draws on an interactional field shared among participants and grounded not only in the social 
context of verbal interaction, but also in participants’ corporeal sense of space. That is, it is 
grounded in their awareness of their orientation and position in a surrounding, if not immediately 
perceptible, environment. Hanks (1990) argued that the use of language for the most basic forms 
of indexical reference was “sociocentric,” and that indexical forms made reference not by means 
of inherent semantics, but rather by a number of embedding fields, including primarily a 
“corporeal field” and a “social field” (2005). The analysis in this chapter concludes that Quechua 




but also between persons and parts of their environments. In other words, Quechua speakers in 
Río Negro have a corporeal sense of space that can be best understood as incorporating both 
speakers’ bodies as well as their sense of orientation and place in a contextually construed 
landscape of named places extending far beyond the immediate surroundings. Considering that 
named places are social persons in Río Negro (Chapter 2), it should not be surprising that 
relations among persons and relations among persons and places are simultaneously evoked. I 
elaborate more on this simultaneity in Chapter 4. 
The analyses I use to explore the importance of the landscape in spatial language draw on 
structured elicitations and interactions that constitute two separate studies of spatial description. 
The results of both studies emphasize elements of spatial orientation that remain in the 
background of previous research on spatial language and cognition (e.g., Danziger 2010; 
Levinson 2003; Majid et al 2004; Pederson et al 1998). I then identify a basic type of spatial 
description in Quechua, illustrated with an example from a video recording of a verbal interaction 
among speakers engaged in a typical pastoral activity. The Absolute frame of reference (FoR) 
described in research so far has focused on the characteristic of absolute coordinates fixed in the 
landscape, but glosses over the difference between the use of a speech-participant or an external 
object as a secondary reference point. To address this neglected distinction, I propose a new 
FoR—the Embodied Absolute FoR—that has not previously been described. It uses fixed, 
geocentric coordinates, but is grounded in the speaker’s body. I begin by reviewing two 
typologies that have been proposed to analyze spatial orientation (Levinson 2003; Danziger 2010) 






2. FoRs in spatial orientation  
FoRs are the underlying systems that orient spatial representations in language and 
thought, providing a means of interpreting otherwise ambiguous descriptions such as “in front of 
the car,” “on the left side of the desk,” or “down from the school.” They do so by specifying the 
assignment of the Ground, Anchor, and coordinate system. For example, a Relative FoR uses the 
speaker’s own body as an anchor for coordinates (front, back, left, and right), and projects this 
onto a linguistically specified ground from which to search for the referent. Thus, “On the left 
side of the desk” specifies a search area projected from the desk with an egocentric coordinate 
system. In contrast, an Absolute FoR uses a fixed coordinate system anchored in some aspect of 
the physical world such as river flow or cardinal directions, which is projected onto a 
linguistically specified ground. In this FoR, “down from the school” can specify a search area 
projected from the school according to a coordinate system either abstracted from the overall 
slope of the landscape or fixed to local topography (Palmer 2015).76 This kind of frame is in fact 
the standard way of describing spatial relations in a number of languages, including Quechua.77  
 These descriptions correspond to two of the three types of FoRs in the typology described 
by Levinson (2003). Levinson’s three-part typology (see Section 2.1) is the result of articulating a 
number of related and overlapping distinctions observed in different disciplines (26). The most 
                                                
76 Terrill and Burenhult (2008) suggest that the latter in fact involves no FoR, and is rather what they call 
an “orientational strategy” to solve the problem of spatial description. Palmer (2015), however, shows that 
there is no operational difference between local, ad hoc coordinates and those that are abstract and 
generalized. Another possible classification drawing on typological observations of Mesoamerican 
languages makes finer distinctions between Geomorphic, Landmark-based, and Absolute FoRs (O’Meara 
& Pérez Báez 2011). For the purposes of this study, I follow Palmer (2015) in using an inclusive definition 
of the absolute FoR. Chapter 5 includes a more complete discussion of this issue. 
77 For example, Arrernte speakers use terms corresponding to four cardinal directions (Wilkins 2006:54), 
Tzeltal speakers use uphill and downhill (Brown 2006:263), and Yélî Dnye speakers use a combination of 




important of these to the analysis of Quechua are “relative vs. absolute” and “egocentric vs. 
allocentric.”  
Levinson traces the relative/absolute distinction to Newton’s definition of space as a three 
dimensional grid with a fixed origo in the center. Newton himself contrasted this to the “relative” 
concept of space he considered natural to human thought. The legacy of this separation of human 
intuition from scientific insight can be traced further back to the renaissance and Descartes’ 
philosophy.78 Henceforth, relative conceptions of space have often been understood to be part of 
humans’ natural, universal, and innate knowledge, while absolute conceptions are the result of 
analytic thought, measurement, and scientific developments (Wassmann 1994). The concern of 
the spatial language and cognition research program of scholars like Wassmann and Levinson was 
to combat this assumption, as it contradicted recent linguistic and psychological findings showing 
that many languages described spatial relations in absolute terms where European languages 
would have used relative terms.  
The egocentric/allocentric distinction, on the other hand, is most prominent in the brain 
sciences and the psychology of conceptual development. O’Keefe and Nadel’s (1978) work used 
the distinction to explain how rats developed cognitive maps, and was taken up by the Mosers in 
their Nobel prize winning work (Moser et al 2008) that identified neural mechanisms for 
cognitive maps. Their work suggested that rats develop allocentric maps—that is, maps framed 
without reference to the body—by means of integrating egocentric images or measurements. 
Likewise psychologists have commonly understood egocentrism as an innate predisposition in 
humans, such that it is only through later conceptual development that allocentric perspectives 
                                                




arise.79 This construal of the egocentric/allocentric distinction most closely follows Kant’s 
philosophy, defining absolute space as a form of innate knowledge nevertheless grounded in the 
relative space accessible to experience (1991). As in the Cartesian-Newtonian split, relative 
frames retain primacy, casting languages that lack or avoid relative frames as deficient or even 
impossible.  
While within these intellectual trajectories the primacy of one side or another of their 
respective dichotomies are actively debated, the distinctions themselves remain intact. Absolute 
and relative remain polar opposites, as do egocentric and allocentric. However, a closer look at 
linguistic findings demonstrates a much more complicated range of possibilities for spatial 
representation (Terrill & Burenhult 2008; Bennardo 2009). As I show in this chapter, drawing on 
Danziger’s specification of the distinct criteria involved in the classification of FoRs (2010), some 
allocentrically anchored FoRs are tied both to speakers’ bodies and the external world. The 
importance of these hybrid FoRs has been obscured by the persistent dichotomization of 
egocentrism and allocentricism. The split is not merely conceptual, but also corresponds to the 
formulation of research questions and methods.  
At their core, these dichotomies relate to the split between subjectivity and objectivity, a 
problem deeply embedded both in anthropological critique and the study of language.80 As Irvine 
(1989) pointed out, the Saussurean tradition has taken the separation of signs and their objects for 
granted. Keane (2003:410) underlined the importance of the shift toward a Peircean semiotics, 
observing that the Saussurean trajectory entailed an a priori separation of subject and object and 
obscured the connections between semiotic and historical processes. While the Peircean approach 
                                                
79 For more on this, see Piaget (1928; 1954:104), Piaget & Inhelder (1948), Miller & Johnson-Laird 
(1976), and discussion in Levinson (2003:29). 
80 See Shore (2012:112) for a closely related discussion of the allocentric-egocentric distinction in 




to signification has been valuable to social critiques for its ability to overcome the subject/object 
distinctions embodied in hegemonic power relations and the texts they produce (e.g., Daniel 
1996; Inoue 2003), its opening of semiotic processes onto the world is of equal value to an 
inquiry into linguistic and cultural articulations of language, body, and landscape.  
 Along these lines, the analysis of Quechua I present here highlights the fact that the “ego” 
of the egocentric frame refers to particular bodies, just as the allocentric frame ultimately requires 
reference to a particular environment. This underscores an important side of most discussion of 
the egocentric-allocentric distinction: it is treated essentially as a subjective-objective 
distinction.81 As Levinson (2003) writes, “the egocentric frame of reference would then bind 
together various body-centered coordinate systems with an agentive subjective being, complete 
with body-schema and distinct zones of spatial interaction” (29). While this aspect of orientation 
falls outside the scope of Levinson and his colleagues’ agenda, it is critical in drawing out the 
sociological relevance of spatial orientation. The conflation of egocentric orientation and 
subjectivity is also arguably at the root of the absence of attention previous research has paid to 
the role of the geocentrically oriented body and its subjective affordances in previous research on 
orientation. Because the work has been concerned with distinguishing allocentric and egocentric 
types, and because the egocentric was seen as the subjective type, there was no analytic room for 
a subject—and therefore for a body—in the allocentric. Ironically, this non-corporeal, non-
subjective point of view (or Frame of Reference) is precisely the scientific perspective that 
                                                
81 As will become clear below, this is in large part because the FoR typology has attended 
primarily to the role of the Anchor. While egocentric and allocentric FoRs are indeed 
distinguished by the presence of the Anchor in or outside of a speech participant, respectively, the 
variable location of the Ground—especially in the Absolute FoR—complicates any neat division 




emerged in the renaissance (Latour 1999) along with the very ideas the research program intended 
to obviate.  
The remainder of this section describes the fundamentals of spatial orientation in 
language—drawing primarily from Levinson’s and Danziger’s frameworks—in order to frame the 
data I’ve gathered among Quechua speakers, and in order to draw out its linguistic and 
sociological significance. 
 
2.1. Classifying FoRs 
 Levinson’s typology suggests that the FoRs used in the languages of the world can all be 
classified as one of three types—Absolute, Intrinsic and Relative (2003:53)—which I define 
below. Levinson draws on a number of attributes of spatial descriptions in order to distinguish 
these three FoRs: systems of labeled angles (e.g., right, south, back, etc.), coordinates, points 
(figure, observer viewpoint, landmark, etc.), and anchoring systems (e.g., slope, landmarks, 
coastline, sunrise, etc.) (40). He describes each of the three FoRs qualitatively and in terms of the 
logical relations among these attributes, focusing particularly on points. His typology nonetheless 
collapses some important distinctions, some of which Danziger (2010) incorporated into a revised 
typology (see section 2.4). In order to make these distinctions apparent, I will explain Levinson’s 
typology in relation to the three components of spatial descriptions shared with Danziger’s 
typology. 
The three components of spatial descriptions are Figure, Ground, and Anchor. Using the 
following utterance as an example, I define them below: 
 




Figure: The referent of the utterance (the tree) 
Ground: The object/place in relation to which the figure is located (the cow) 
Anchor: The origo of the coordinate system that orients the description (the speaker) 
  
The Intrinsic, Absolute, and Relative FoRs, as defined by Levinson, each involve a 
particular arrangement of Figure, Ground, and Anchor (see Figure 10). The distinction between 
egocentric (Relative) and allocentric (Intrinsic and Absolute) FoRs is defined particularly in 
relation to the Anchor: descriptions with coordinate systems anchored outside the speaker are 
“allocentric.” For example, in an Intrinsic interpretation of the description, “the tree is behind the 
cow,” the Figure (the tree) is located in reference to the cow’s inherent shape, and is thus framed 
in reference to a coordinate system whose Anchor is located outside the speaker—in the cow 
itself. Likewise, in an Absolute interpretation of the description, “the tree is on the mountain side 
of the cow,” the figure is located in reference to a landscape feature, and is thus also framed in 
reference to a coordinate system with an Anchor outside the speaker, this time the mountain. In 
both cases, the tree is located by projecting the respective coordinate systems out from the cow, 
which is therefore the Ground. The difference between Intrinsic and Absolute thus boils down to 
the location of the Anchor in the referent object itself or elsewhere. What they have in common is 
the lack of reference to the speaker—thus the shared label “allocentric.”  
 The Relative FoR, in contrast, uses a coordinate system anchored in the speaker, and is 
thus considered an “egocentric” frame. In the Relative description, “the tree is to the left of the 
cow,” the figure is related to the speaker’s inherent sides, thus the coordinate system has its 
Anchor in the speaker. The cow then serves as the Ground from which to project the direction 




 In sum, Levinson’s typology defines three FoRs, each distinguished by the location of the 
coordinate system’s Anchor (Danziger 2010: 169). The Intrinsic FoR has its Anchor in the 
Ground object, the Relative FoR has its Anchor in the speaker, and the Absolute FoR has its 
Anchor outside the Figure-Ground-Speaker relation.  
 
 
Figure 10. Figure, Anchor and Ground in three FoRs. 
Note:  
A = Anchor. G = Ground.  
Example descriptions: 
Relative: The tree is to the left of the cow 
Intrinsic: The tree is behind the cow 







2.2. Anchor, Ground, rotation sensitivity, and the Direct FoR 
 While the location of the Anchor is central to Levinson’s typology, it remains simply as 
one element among many, and is not further analyzed. Danziger (2010), however, demonstrates 
that the rotation of the Anchor alone consistently falsifies descriptions in all three FoRs (Table 3) 
and identifies two parameters in relation to its use in spatial descriptions. It is either located in a 
speech-situation participant or not (egocentric vs. allocentric), and it is either part of the Ground 
or not (binary vs. ternary). Danziger shows that when Levinson’s three FoRs are placed in relation 
to these parameters, a structural gap appears (Table 4). 
 
 
Table 3. Rotation sensitivities of the three FoRs 
 
 
Table 4. Danziger’s typology of the three FoRs. 
 
The structural gap is due to the fact that there is no category for a FoR in which the 
Anchor is simultaneously in the Ground and in a speech participant. This is the case in a 
statement such as: “the milk is in front of me,” where the coordinate system is indeed anchored in 
the speaker, but where the speaker also serves as the Ground object. Levinson’s Intrinsic FoR 




is a speech participant or not. At the same time, it also defines any description with the Anchor in 
the speaker as Relative. For this reason, descriptions like “the milk is in front of me” are 
ambivalent between Relative and Intrinsic. Danziger’s typology makes this explicit, and labels the 
case in which a speech participant is both Ground and Anchor as the “Direct” FoR: 
 
 
Table 5. Danziger’s typology including the Direct FoR.  
  
The Direct FoR also has its own type of rotation sensitivity: it is falsified if either the 
speech participant or Ground is rotated (since they are one and the same). For example, take: “the 
milk is in front of me.” If I rotate, the milk is no longer in front of me. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will draw on this four-term typology for the sake of clarity in analyzing the use of FoRs 
in Quechua spatial descriptions. Though she doesn’t explicitly do so, Danziger’s typology makes 
it possible to emphasize the role of the Ground. Because she introduces a FoR in which the 
Ground is located in a speech-participant, it is worthwhile to consider if there might be other such 
FoRs, grounded in speech-participants, but with Anchors located elsewhere. The following two 
sections explore this possibility in Ancash Quechua. First, Section 3 demonstrates the prevalence 
of FoRs with allocentric anchors in Quechua. Section 4 then illustrates the simultaneous use of an 
egocentric Ground in a single FoR. Thus, just as a closer inspection of the Anchor revealed 






3. FoR preferences in Quechua  
Quechua speakers have an overwhelming preference for the use of allocentric FoRs—that 
is, FoRs with allocentric Anchors—in spatial description. I provide evidence of this with the 
results from two studies (Sections 3.1. and 3.2.). I make two main observations drawing on this 
evidence. First (Section 3.3.), speakers always use allocentric FoRs (including both Intrinsic and 
Absolute FoRs) to describe the relationship between two objects in space, and almost exclusively 
the Absolute FoR to describe relationships involving large distances, or of the orientation of 
individual objects in tabletop space. Second (Section 3.4.), spatial descriptions that have a 
possible egocentric interpretation, such as “left,” “right,” “front,” and “back,” were only used in 
this way by participants under 14. “Left” and “right” terms were extremely rare in general, and 
were only used among adults to describe the intrinsic left and right sides of objects with a 
canonical horizontal direction of movement (e.g., animals or vehicles).  
 
3.1. Study 1 – “The Cow and Tree Game”82 
This study involved structured interactions between pairs of Quechua speakers (N = 24, 
Mage = 38, SD = 20, 12 female, 12 male, age range = 9-72), all of whom were residents of the 
neighboring communities of Huaripampa and Canray Grande. 
The goal of the study was to facilitate functional spatial descriptions designed by and for 
native speakers. Participants sat side by side before a table. Each participant had one model tree 
and one model cow on the surface before them (see Figure 11). An opaque divider (plastic or 
textile) was placed so as to block each participant’s view of the other’s face, hands, and models. 
The facilitator (myself) arranged the model cow and tree in a particular configuration in front of 
                                                
82 This task is an adaptation of the “Man and Tree Game” developed at the Max Planck Institute for 





one of the participants. This participant was then directed to explain this arrangement to the 
partner so that the other would be able to recreate the same arrangement with his or her own 
models. The other was allowed to ask a question for clarification. Each participant took eight to 
twelve turns directing in this way, and then the two participants switched roles for the next eight 
to twelve turns.  
 
Figure 11. “The Cow and Tree Game.” 
 
All sessions were video-recorded and subsequently transcribed and coded. In order for 
participants to provide sufficient information to their partners, they had to describe at least two 
aspects of the arrangement: the orientation of the cow itself, and its relation with respect to the 
tree (or vice versa). Consequently, each description was coded according to the FoR used to 




tree (or vice versa).83 Finally, each description was coded according to whether it led the other 
participant to an accurate arrangement or not.  
 
3.2. Study 2 – “Spatial Algebra” 
This study consisted of structured elicitations of spatial descriptions. The study was 
conducted with 18 participants (Mage = 44, SD = 18, ten female, eight male, age range = 14-79). 
Elicitation sessions were on average between eight and nine minutes, and were video recorded, 
totaling just over 2.5 hours. During each elicitation, I asked an average of 25 questions. The total 
number of questions was 478. The recordings were made over the course of two years, and thus 
reflected my own growing knowledge of local place-names and my ability to pose question that 
would draw out finer spatial distinctions. 
The elicitation consisted of two kinds of questions. Below I provide the template for these 
questions in Quechua and English. In them, I use G to indicate the Ground, or the place from 
which a direction is calculated, F to indicate the Figure, or place to which a direction is calculated, 
and W to indicate the particular word used to characterize the direction. 
Question Type 1 constitutes 196 of the total number of questions, while Question Type 2 
constitutes the other 282.  
 
Question Type 1:  G-pita maymantaq aywankiman F-man chaanaykipaq. 
Which way (toward where) would you go from G in order to arrive to F? 
Question Type 2: G-pita W-man aywar, maymantaq chankiman. 
Going W (lit., toward W) from G, to where would you arrive?  
                                                
83 I only coded for the three FoRs of Levinson’s typology; there were a negligible number of descriptions 





The words used for W in Type 2 consisted of the following set, glossed roughly here: 
 
rara   up, high 
hana   up, above 
uma   up, top 
witsay   uphill 
ura   down, below 
uray   downhill 
hawa   down, root 
ruri   down, inside 
tsimpa  front, facing 
frenti   front, facing 
kinray   skirting 
washa   side 
qipa   behind  
waqta   beyond 
derecha  right 
izquierda  left 
 
The set of words used by participants to describe the direction elicited by Question Type 1 
varied only in that /qipa/ was never used. It should also be noted that /derecha/ was used only 





3.3. Preference for allocentric FoR 
 The results of Studies 1 and 2 show an overwhelming preference for the use of allocentric 
FoR’s to describe the spatial orientation and arrangement of a Figure. Specifically, out of the 
descriptions made by participants in Study 2, only 4 utterances utilized an egocentric FoR (2%). 
Of these four, three were made by the same participant. Likewise, in study 1, among the 16 
participants84 over 14 years of age,85 only two participants ever used an egocentric FoR.86 The 
following two sections provide detailed descriptions of each study’s results with respect to FoR 
preference. 
 
3.3.1. FoR preference in Study 1 
 Study 1 was composed of a total of 188 trials spread among 11 pairs of participants (n = 
22). For each participant, each description made to guide their partner was divided into parts 
pertaining to the orientation of the model cow, and to its relation with respect to the model tree. 
Each of these parts was counted as Absolute, egocentric, or Intrinsic with the value of 1. In some 
cases, the part contained two frames (but never three), in which case the value for each was 0.5. 
Because the number of descriptions and parts made by each participant varied, two scores were 
devised to standardize the results. The first score was created so as to contrast allocentric 
                                                
84 The results of two of the 18 participants over 14 years of age were not included due to wind noise, 
several interruptions, and because only six descriptions were made during the session. 
85 I use 14 years as a cutoff for age only because the next oldest participants after 14 were 22 and then 30 
years old. 
86 The first of these participants only used an egocentric FoR in one out of eight descriptions, while the 
second used it more consistently. A possible explanation for this exception is that these came from the only 
two sessions in which an adult’s partner was not over 14 years old. The adult participants may thus have 
thought to design their descriptions in the way preferred by their partners. Some support from this 
interpretation comes from the observation that the participant who used egocentric FoRs more consistently 




(Absolute or Intrinsic) with egocentric FoR’s, while the second score was created to evaluate the 
frequency of Intrinsic FoR’s alone. Each score was calculated for both parts of each participants’ 
descriptions as well as in total, leading to the following six scores assigned to each participant: 
 
Allocentric scores (0-1: 1 = allocentric, 0 = egocentric): 
Allo  Average allocentric score across all descriptions 
Allo.O  Average allocentric score on parts describing orientation of model cow 
Allo.R  Average allocentric score on parts relating model cow and tree 
 
Intrinsic scores (0-1: 1 = Intrinsic, 0 = not Intrinsic): 
Int  Average intrinsic score across all descriptions 
Int.O   Average intrinsic score on parts describing orientation of model cow 
Int.R  Average intrinsic score on parts relating model cow and tree 
 
 Table 6 presents the averages for each score across all participants: 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Allo 22 .91 .14 
Allo.O 22 .92 .17 
Allo.R 22 .90 .20 
Int 22 .32 .20 
Int.O 22 .09 .17 
Int.R 22 .58 .41 





 It is already clear from this descriptive analysis that there is a strong overall preference for 
allocentric FoR’s (Allo-total = .91), and that this preference does not vary with respect to the parts 
of descriptions focusing on the cow’s orientation or the relation between the cow and tree.  
However, the use of the intrinsic FoR is much more frequent in the part of descriptions 
that refers to the relation between cow and tree. This is because of the common use of intrinsic 
parts of the cow to locate the tree, as in descriptions like (3): 
 
(3) Qipanchawnam monti shaaraykan.   
  ‘And the tree is standing behind [the cow]’ 
 
 In this utterance, the orientation of the cow itself has just been described and the cow is 
thus focal, and implied as the ground. The arrangement of the speaker, cow, and tree and the 
designation of Figure (F), Anchor (A), and Ground (G) are illustrated below (arrows indicate the 
directions that speaker and cow are facing):  
 
SPEAKERà  TREE   COWà       
             F                    A/G 
 
 Note that here the description “behind” can lead to two possible interpretations. In an 
intrinsic interpretation, “behind” identifies the rear part of the Ground itself—namely the cow’s 
tail end—so that the tree would be in the area project outward from there. This interpretation 
corresponds with the arrangement the speaker was describing, as well as the arrangement her 




A relative interpretation, in contrast, would locate “behind” in the area occluded by the 
Ground—in this case the area on the far side of the cow from the speaker. This would yield a 
different arrangement: 
 
SPEAKERà  COWà TREE   
       A                             G                      F 
 
 But Intrinsic descriptions do not account for all such cases. Absolute FoR’s were often 
used when the tree stood at one of the cow’s sides, rather than its head or tail, as there were no 
relevant intrinsic characteristics.87 These strategies are illustrated in examples (4) and (5): 
  
(4)  Montipa hawanchaw. 
  ‘[The cow is] beneath the tree.’ 
    [DOWNHILL/WEST] 
       A 
  
           ßCOW 
                                                   F 
 
Speakerà  TREE      
                           G 
 
(5) Montinam kaykan colegio laadunchaw. 
‘And the tree is on the school side [of the cow].’ 
  [SCHOOL] Speakerà TREE  COWê 
        A                       F      G   
 
                                                
87 Some participants identified the left/right sides of the cow, but always in an intrinsic FoR. This is 




 In examples (4), and (5), knowledge of the surrounding landscape is used to identify 
which side the tree or cow is on. In (4), the speaker is facing north, putting the cow on the west 
side of the tree. Though the table is flat, and the street where the building is located runs uphill to 
the west, this direction is canonically associated with DOWN, which provided the speaker a 
means of characterizing the side of the tree where the cow stood, and led his partner to the correct 
arrangement. In (5), it is the presence of a prominent landmark, the local school, which indeed 
was on the side of the cow where the tree stood, though obscured by walls at the moment. These 
two descriptions both involve instantiations of an Absolute FoR. The rotation test demonstrates 
this: if the speaker or the ground is rotated, the statements remain true, whereas if the figure-
ground scene (cow and tree) are rotated as one (equivalent to rotating the landscape itself, which 
serves as the Anchor in an Absolute interpretation), the statement is falsified.  
 Age also played a significant role in the preference for FoRs in this study. Table 7 presents 
the scores of participants 14 years of age and younger and of those over 14, showing a near total 








                                                
88 The table also shows that the difference in the use of the Intrinsic FoR for parts of descriptions 
pertaining to the cow’s orientation as opposed to the relation between the cow and tree is only present 




  N Mean Std. Deviation 
14 and under Allo 6 .72 .11 
Allo.O 6 .77 .26 
Allo.R 6 .67 .26 
Int 6 .24 .23 
Int.O 6 .22 .21 
Int.R 6 .25 .32 
Over 14 Allo 16 .98 .05 
Allo.O 16 .98 .06 
Allo.R 16 .99 .03 
Int 16 .34 .18 
Int.O 16 .04 .13 
Int.R 16 .70 .38 
Table 7. Study 1 – Scores of participants by age. 
  
 Dividing the results by age makes it possible to appreciate the near total preference for 
allocentric FoRs among adults. It also shows that the difference in the use of the intrinsic FoR for 
parts of descriptions pertaining to the cow’s orientation as opposed to the relation between the 
cow and tree is only present among adults. The relevance of the results regarding the intrinsic 
frame will be explored more in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 Table 8 shows the results of an independent samples t-test to test the statistical 
significance of the effects of age on the use of allocentric FoR’s in this study: 
  
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference 
Allo  7.90 20.00 .00 .26 .03 
Allo.O  3.00 20.00 .01 .20 .07 
Allo.R  5.21 20.00 .00 .33 .06 





The difference in the use of allocentric FoR’s among participants above 14 years of age (N 
= 16)  and below 14 years of age (N = 6), across both parts of descriptions, is highly significant, 
t(20) = 7.90, p = <.01. This result varies little for the parts of descriptions referring to the cow’s 
orientation t(20) = 3.00, p = .01 and the relation between the cow and tree t(20) = 5.21, p = <.01.  
 In sum, Study 1 provides evidence for a strong preference for allocentric FoR’s in spatial 
descriptions. Furthermore it shows that this preference is nearly categorical among adults. Finally, 
it shows that of the two allocentric FoR’s, the Intrinsic FoR is frequently used to describe the 
relation between adjacent objects in tabletop space, while the Absolute FoR is strongly preferred 
for describing the orientation of individual objects in tabletop space. 
 
3.3.2  FoR preference in Study 2 
The results of Study 2 come from 18 participants’ responses to a total of 454 questions,89 
and demonstrate a strong preference for the absolute FoR. As detailed in section 3.2 above, 
Question 1 asked participants for a spatial description to characterize the relationship between two 
given places (Figure and Ground), while Question 2 asked participants to name some place 
(Figure) that fits a given spatial relationship to a given place (Ground). Analysis of the relation 
between the places on a topographic map of the region made it possible to determine the sense in 
which the given spatial relationship was interpreted, and thus the FoR used in that interpretation. 
The Absolute FoR characterized 98% of the 194 responses to Question 1 and 93% of the 224 
responses to Question 2.  
Below is a typical example of an instance of Question 1 and a response using the absolute 
FoR: 
                                                
89 24 responses were not included in the analysis because they either were not interpretable or referenced 





(6)  Q: Sawan Ruri tsakapita maymantaq aywankiman Wanchaman chaanaykipaq. 
   ‘Which way would you go from Sawan Ruri bridge in order to arrive to Wancha?’ 
  
 R: Uraypam kutimunki Sawan Ruripitaqa.  
‘You come back down from Sawan Ruri.’  
    Uraypam kutimunki Wantsaman chaanaykipaq. 
 ‘You come back down in order to arrive to Wancha.’ 
 
The word “uray,” meaning “downhill” or “to go downhill,” is used twice in this response 
to identify the direction of the path from Sawan Ruri to Wantsa. Wantsa is the highest 
neighborhood in the community of Huaripampa, and Sawan Ruri is a river valley separating the 
community from the neighboring Canray Grande. To travel from one community to the other, as 
many residents do on a daily basis, it is necessary to follow a steep path down about 100 meters to 
a bridge over the river, then climb another 100 meters or so back up to the other side. Thus the 
path from Sawan Ruri to Wantsa is a steep climb, and anything but “downhill.” This illustrates 
the fact that uphill and downhill constitute a generalized absolute coordinate system for Quechua 
speakers in this area, according to which Wantsa can be described as “downhill” from Sawan 
Ruri. 
The four egocentric responses to Question 1 included two uses of “waqta” (beyond) and 
two uses of “izquierda” (left). The fourteen egocentric responses to Question 2 responded to six 
questions with the word  “waqta,” four with “qipa” (behind), three with “izquierda,” and one with 




speaker in Question 1, as I provided the word characterizing the spatial relation for Question 2. I 
will go into further detail on the use of “izquierda” and “derecha” (left and right terms borrowed 
from Spanish) in section 3.4 below.  
Do the relative responses to my questions that contained “waqta” and “qipa” constitute 
evidence of the use of a Relative FoR in Quechua? “Waqta,” is a word with a significant deictic 
element. It means most closely “behind,” in the Relative sense of “beyond.” However, while 
taking a speech participant’s location as the origo (and thus the anchor), it also can only be used 
to refer to a Figure outside of the deictic field relevant to the interaction. For example, “waqta” 
was never used by participants in Study 1, as the Figures described (the model cow and tree) were 
always within the deictic field of the interaction. In this sense, it differs from English “behind” 
and “beyond” in that it cannot be used to locate objects in tabletop space.  
While participants actively used “waqta” to classify certain spatial relations in Study 2, 
subsequent analysis revealed that they never used “qipa.” In Study 1, however, “qipa” was used to 
indicate the rear end of the model cow. This indicates that “qipa” has only an intrinsic use in 
Quechua—that is, it can only be used to label parts of an animate body. I included “qipa” in 16 
elicitation questions. 12 of the responses to these questions could not be interpreted as either 
allocentric or egocentric and thus were excluded from analysis.90 However, four responses were 
classified as egocentric because they corresponded to the use of “waqta.” It seems that some 
participants were charitable enough with me to analogize “qipa” to “waqta” when presented with 
what must have been to them an anomalous question. 
In sum, Study 2 provides further evidence that an absolute FoR is preferred to speak about 
relations in space. While Study 1 addresses relationships close at hand to participants, Study 2 
                                                
90 Recordings also demonstrate longer pauses and looks of confusion in response to questions that applied 




addresses relationships between places at great distances, and most often inaccessible to 
participants’ senses.   
 
3.4. Limitations and restrictions of the use of “left”/”right” terms 
 Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the strong preference for the Absolute FoR among Quechua 
speakers in Río Negro. How can we then understand the use of words meaning “left” and “right?” 
In Study 1, several participants used the Spanish loans “izquierda” and “derecha.” Yet, only 
participants 14 years old and under used these in an egocentric FoR. Adults, in contrast, only used 
the terms to indicate the Intrinsic left and right sides of animate bodies (or models of them in this 
case). Example (7) illustrates this usage, while Example (8) illustrates the distinct arrangement 
that would correspond to a Relative interpretation of the same utterance:  
 
(7) Laadu izquierdachaw montin. 
  ‘The tree is on the left side [of the cow].’  
           ßCOW 
     G/A 
 
Speakerà  TREE      
      F 
(8) Laadu izquierdachaw montin. 
  ‘The tree is on the left side [of the speaker].’  
            TREE 
       F  
 
Speakerà  COW91      
     A     G  
                                                





In Study 2, one participant used the term “izquierda” twice. Both instances were in 
response to questions in which the plaza in the departmental capital, Huaraz (one hour away by 
minibus), was the Ground. The description “left” can only be deemed accurate if the origo is 
located in the speaker once he has arrived at the Ground. In this sense, this is a Relative FoR, as 
rotation of the speaker would render the statement false. However, while this appears to draw on 
the Relative FoR, the orientation of the relative coordinate’s Anchor (the projected speaker) is 
given by his movement along a fixed path, and is thus subsumed in a fixed coordinate system. 
Furthermore, the use of “left” is common in Spanish and thus fits the social context, as one would 
normally go to the plaza of Huaraz to take care of legal or administrative paperwork in Spanish, 
not Quechua.  
In sum, left and right terms in Quechua are limited to use in the Intrinsic FoR among 
adults except in very rare cases. Among children 14 years or younger, the use of these terms in an 
egocentric FoR is more common.92  
 
4. Spatial descriptions in situated interaction 
The results of the analyses of structured elicitations underscore the prevalence of 
allocentric FoRs, and the Absolute FoR in particular, for Quechua spatial descriptions. However, 
they cannot be taken as a complete picture without considering how spatial language is used in 
everyday interactions. In such situations, a large amount of information is taken for granted. The 
place where a conversation occurs and the particular individuals involved determine much of 
what needs to and needs not be said. For this reason, I frequently found the evaluation of spatial 
language confounding during my first months of fieldwork (see Chapter 4, Section 1). For 
                                                




example, when two neighbors who have known each other all their lives converse over a beer on 
the corner, a barely noticeable eye-movement or flick of the head can be equivalent to an entire 
spatial description, complete with a Figure, Ground, and Anchor. But without the necessary 
background information, it is impossible to evaluate the spatial frame involved. Nevertheless, 
situated spatial descriptions, however condensed, are ultimately the phenomena that must be 
explained, and not the idealized contexts modeled through experimental studies.  
Luckily, there are archetypal instances in which background information has a 
circumscribed role, such as collaborative searching. This is a common activity among herders in 
Río Negro, who often find themselves in the position of having to identify individual animals 
among shrubs and boulders from a great distance.93 Language is an indispensable tool for this 
task, as are pointing gestures and the landscape itself. By coordinating words and gestures to 
surrounding places, a nearly impossible task becomes manageable. Of course, different languages 
have distinct ways of doing this, and so it is crucial to look at a specific instance in Quechua. As 
the analysis of the example below shows, in such instances Quechua speakers in fact use a FoR 
that is not included in Levinson’s or Danziger’s typologies, and which combines an egocentric 
Ground with an allocentric Anchor.  
The speaker of the utterance in (9) is sitting beside a companion on a glacial moraine ridge 
looking at an opposing mountainside. He and his interlocutor are engaged in the common activity 
of accounting for cattle in Ruriq canyon. Figure 12 below depicts the landscape the speaker refers 
to in order to give an idea of the difficulty of the task of identifying individual animals in a distant 
field of rocks, boulders, and scrub. The utterance in (9) is also accompanied by a prominent 
                                                




index-finger point (Figure 13) toward the facing slope, which reaches its held position by the 
underlined syllable in the transcript below, and is held for the remainder of the utterance. 
  
(9)  Kay   hawan hirkan-chaw puka hina ka-n. 
 This  below  slope  -LOC red    like  be-3. 
 ‘There is a reddish [cow] here on the slope below.’ 
 
 






Figure 13. Pointing gesture. 
 
To begin with, we need to identify the Figure, Ground, Anchor, and coordinate system 
used in this utterance. The Figure is the reddish cow (the “cow” here is indicated by its color, as 
Quechua noun phrases can take adjectives as heads). The Figure is located in relation to the 
prepositional phrase, “hirkanchaw,” (on the slope), so we could technically consider the Figure to 
be “the reddish [cow] on the slope.” However, this clearly does little to locate the cow in 
question. In order to locate it, it must be related to another object or speech-participant—a 
Ground—using some coordinate system. In this case, the word “hawan” (below) invokes the 
vertical slope of the landscape as a coordinate system that has its Anchor in the topography of the 
surrounding environment.  
Now, if this were a typical Absolute description, we would expect some other object, and 
not a speech-participant, to serve as the Ground. This would be the case if the speaker had instead 




Rather, the Ground from which the coordinate system is projected is in fact simply the speaker’s 
body, which provides the reference point from which to project the direction “below.” Because 
the Ground is in a speech-participant, this is not an instance of the Absolute FoR in either 
Levinson’s or Danziger’s typology. According to Danziger’s typology, the location of the Ground 
in a speech participant characterizes the Direct FoR. Yet, if the example here had involved a 
Direct FoR, the Anchor also would have been located in a speech participant. Such an utterance 
would be more like “There is a reddish cow on the slope in front of me.” The crucial difference in 
such a description is the absence of reference to the surrounding landscape. 
The FoR used in (9) thus seems to elude classification. The following section explains the 
necessity for the addition of a fifth FoR to account for this type of utterance. This FoR is 
characterized by its combination of an egocentric Ground with an allocentric Anchor. Thus, while 
the coordinate system is given by something outside the Figure-Ground-Speaker relation, it is 
nevertheless projected out from a speaker. In this sense it serves as a more true opposite to the 
Relative FoR than does the Absolute; while the Relative FoR externalizes the speaker’s bodily 
coordinates (left/right/front/back) onto another object, this fifth FoR incorporates external 
coordinates. For this reason, I have called it the “Embodied Absolute FoR.”  
 
4.1. The “Embodied Absolute” FoR 
The Embodied Absolute FoR has a clear place in FoR typologies when these take into 
account differences in the Ground, and not only the Anchor. Such differences have important 
consequences for spatial orientation, but are not explicitly elaborated in Levinson’s or Danziger’s 
typologies. Specifically, when the Ground is egocentric—that is, when it is located in a speech-




With respect to the Anchor and Ground, only the following is clear from Danziger’s 
typology:  
 
1. If the Anchor is egocentric (as in the Direct and Relative FoRs), then the 
rotation of the Ground also constitutes rotation of the Anchor, and thus alters the 
description’s truth conditions.  
2. If the Anchor is allocentric (as in the absolute and intrinsic FoRs), then the 
rotation of the Ground has no effect on the description’s truth conditions.  
 
However, there is a difference between the Intrinsic and Absolute FoRs that is obscured in 
this account. Because the Intrinsic FoR is binary, the Anchor is always in the Ground, and 
because the Intrinsic FoR’s Anchor is by definition allocentric, its Ground must also be 
allocentric. This is not the case in the Absolute FoR. Because this FoR is defined as ternary and as 
having an allocentric Anchor, the Ground may be either egocentric or allocentric. Thus, there is in 
fact a structural space for two types of Absolute FoRs—one with an egocentric Ground and one 
with an allocentric Ground. I will refer to these from now on as “Absolute” and “Embodied 
Absolute.” Their properties are illustrated in Table 9 below:   
 
 ANCHOR GROUND 
                 ABSOLUTE Allocentric Allocentric 
EMBODIED ABSOLUTE Allocentric Egocentric 





 Figure 14 below provides a graphic depiction of where the Embodied Absolute FoR fits in 
Danziger’s typology. Example descriptions are given in (8-12). 
 
  
Figure 14. Figure, Anchor and Ground in five FoRs, including the Embodied Absolute FoR. 
 
 (10) DIRECT: “The tree is in front of me.” 
 (11) RELATIVE: “The tree is to the left of the cow.” 
 (12) INTRINSIC: “The tree is behind the cow.” 
 (13) ABSOLUTE: “The tree is on the mountain side of the cow.” 





The important distinction here is that if the Ground (speaker) in an Embodied Absolute 
description like (14) rotates, there is no effect on the description’s truth-value, whereas in a Direct 
description like (10), the statement is no longer true. This difference can be reformulated in terms 
of the Deictic Origo—the anchor for the interactional “here-now-I” (Bühler 1990:117). While 
both kinds of descriptions depend on the indication of a Deictic Origo, they differ in its 
constitution. The Deictic Origo in a Direct FoR is coterminous with a coordinate system that 
rotates and changes position along with the Origo itself, since the coordinate system is anchored 
in it. In contrast, the Deictic Origo in an Embodied Absolute FoR is merely a position, and its 
relationship to its coordinate system must be constantly calculated. In this sense, we can say that 
the Direct FoR’s Origo is itself egocentric whereas the Embodied Absolute FoR’s Origo is 
allocentric, despite having an egocentric Ground.  
   Another way to think about the Deictic Origo of a FoR is as the speaker’s bodily sense of 
space. Speakers using egocentric (either Direct or Relative) FoR’s must conceive the Figure they 
describe in relation to their own bodies’ position and orientation. However, there is no need to be 
aware of that position or orientation with respect to anything else in the world. In contrast, 
speakers using an Embodied Absolute FoR must be aware of their position with respect to a 
landscape composed of relevant cues such as the position of the sun, slope, wind direction, and 
salient, fixed landmarks like mountains, towns, and buildings.  
   Considering the example of the Embodied Absolute FoR above (9), Quechua speakers, at 
least in the Río Negro watershed, have a bodily and linguistic sense of space that is (at least at 
times) both sociocentric and geocentric. It is sociocentric because, as Hanks (1990, 2005) argues, 




speaker’s social milieu.94 However, I contend it is also geocentric, as Quechua speakers use a 
FoR that grounds their awareness of a landscape of fixed paths and places in their bodies. This 
stands in total contrast to the sense of space involved in the use of the Relative FoR, where 
speakers maintain an awareness of the inherent orientation of their own bodies—without respect 
to the surrounding world—in order to transpose it onto that world.  
 The directionality of the coordinate system’s transposition in the Embodied Absolute FoR 
constitutes another striking difference from the other FoRs. The Embodied Absolute involves a 
transposition from world to body, whereas in other FoRs, it is onto some object in the world—
either from a body or from the world itself. Some FoRs involve no transposition. The Anchors 
and Grounds of Intrinsic and Direct FoRs are identical. These FoRs require merely a speaker and 
a Figure, hence Danziger’s label, “secondary.” Transposition occurs only in the FoRs that 
Danziger refers to as “tertiary” FoRs—the Relative and Absolute. These involve the transposition 
of the coordinate system onto a third object, the Ground. In the Relative FoR, the coordinates of 
the body are transposed onto some Ground object—for example a tree in relation to which the 
Figure of a cow is located. Likewise, in the Absolute FoR, geocentric coordinates such as north 
and south are transposed to a Ground object. In both cases, the Ground object is something in the 
world. The Relative FoR involves a transposition from the body out to the world; the Absolute 
involves transposition—or more accurately a transduction—from generalized geocentric 
coordinates onto some object in the environment. In contrast, the Embodied Absolute transposes 
environmentally anchored coordinate onto the Ground of the speaker’s body; in other words, it 
involves a transposition from world to body. This idiosyncrasy provides a concrete example of 
linguistically mediated embodiment. It also presents a challenge to the phenomenological 
                                                





privileging of the body as a primordial site of knowledge and experience. If the body that grounds 
the subjectivity speakers bring even to simple acts of referential communication has already taken 
on characteristics of the world—for example through orientation and location—then there is no 




Quechua speakers’ situated use of spatial language makes use of both their extensive 
knowledge of the surrounding world and their awareness of their bodies’ positions within it. The 
common use of a spatial FoR that includes both allocentric and egocentric elements (its Anchor 
and Ground, respectively). I suggested that this “Embodied Absolute FoR” had been left out of 
current typologies of spatial orientation because of a tendency to conflate egocentric orientation 
with subjectivity, and by corollary conflate allocentric orientation with objectivity. In this view, 
body-centered orientation such as that used by English speakers corresponds to a subjective, 
embodied perspective, while environment-centered orientation such as Quechua’s is associated 
with an objective, non-corporeal perspective. The impracticality of this approach is evident; 
clearly speakers of all languages have bodies. At the same time—and as I explore at length in the 
next chapter—bodies ground human experience in diverse ways. The existence of a form of 
orientation that is anchored in the landscape, transposed to the body, and then projected back out 
onto the environment reveals a concrete example of how bodies come to ground human 
experiences of and interactions with their environments. Moreover, it shows how language serves 




 Because of its incorporation of both the human body and its environment, the particular 
characteristics of the Embodied Absolute FoRs reveal some of the broader sociological 
implications of spatial orientation. Like all FoRs, it entails a particular way of orienting to the 
world for the people that habitually speak, think, and move with it. Previous research on spatial 
language and cognition has shown how speakers who habitually use Absolute FoRs must 
maintain a constant awareness of their bearings in an absolute coordinate system. However, the 
use of the Embodied Absolute FoR in particular also entails a sense of one’s own body that 
incorporates that environmental awareness. This can be seen, for example, in Quechua speakers’ 
common use of gestures that not only use the body to represent parts of the landscape, but also 
align with their actual locations, as in this chapter’s opening example (see Chapter 4, also Shapero 
2014:1203). Social interactions among Quechua speakers thus involve a constant play of semiotic 
connections among their gesturing bodies, speaking selves, and the surrounding world. For this 
reason, participating in fluent conversation with Quechua speakers in Río Negro requires more 
than just linguistic competence—it also requires socialization into an embodied knowledge of an 
expansive and meaningful landscape.  
These aspects of Quechua spatial language seem to echo Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion that 
the perceived object is not distinct from the perceiving body, but rather linked to it through the 
perceptive movement outward from body to object (1968:114). However, the nature of this kind 
of spatial representation also illuminates two important breaks from this phenomenological 
tradition that also includes Benveniste, Schutz and Bühler. First, perception of the world 
originates in a body that may already be oriented within it. Hanks (1990) already made the point 
that Merleau-Ponty’s “corporeal schema” must be modified to include not just individuals but the 




perception does not move outward to connect the object to the ego of an individual body, or even 
a “sociocentric” body, but rather originates in a body that is already articulated with and oriented 
to the surrounding world. Second, the examples in this chapter and the next show that the parts of 
the world taken for granted by Quechua speakers as sensually present are not limited to lines of 
sight or touch, but can extend far beyond enclosing walls. The articulation of language, body, and 
landscape that underlies simple spatial reference creates a habitual, intersubjective world in which 
distant places are treated as phenomenally present. This fact is also illustrated in the use of gesture 
and demonstrative reference described in the next chapter. 
 The corporeal sense of space underlying Quechua orientation also serves as a bridge 
connecting linguistic descriptions of the Quechua language with observations of cultural patterns 
in the Andes. For example, Andean settlements and monumental architecture tend to be oriented 
toward important parts of the landscape, such as mountain deities or cardinal directions (Bauer 
1998, 1995; Herrera 2005, 2003; Davis 2011; Núñez and Cornejo 2012). Andean anthropology 
has also frequently noted the landscape’s social and political importance. For example, in his 
account of religious pilgrimage, Sallnow writes that “power in the Andes was always spatial, 
mapped out across the variegated natural environment and thus appearing to issue from the 
landscape itself” (1987:97). As early as the sixteenth century, extirpators of idolatry like Jose de 
Arriaga targeted sacred mountains and bodies of water (51). This connection between sociality 
and the landscape has political implications as well. For example, Poole argued that the territorial 
associations of and within Andean communities are defined not in terms of permanent ownership, 
but rather in relation to a given social group’s activities (1984:149). Moreover, in contemporary 
Peru, indigenous people’s claims to territorial sovereignty are staked in their ability to instantiate 




understandings of their relationship to glaciers and lakes plays an important but often overlooked 
role in environmental conflicts, such as Duke Energy’s control of the glacial meltwater in Lake 
Parón (Carey et al 2012), and the state’s management of high pastureland within the Huascaran 
National Park/UNESCO Biosphere (see Chapter 2).  
 The fact that Quechua speakers’ representations of space make reference simultaneously 
to their own bodies and to the world around them helps to understand how speakers like Angélica 
bring an expansive landscape to life not only through narrated events, but also through gestures 
that treat this landscape as immediate and sensually present. The analyses here show how the 
intimacy between the speaking body and the landscape is mediated by habits of language use; it is 
also clearly something experienced by speakers. Angélica’s use of language and gesture 
instantiates the phenomenon, but she also poignantly addresses it when she expresses her concern 
for the fate of that very same environmental intimacy. She asks, “Who now has ever been out at 
night during the new moon,” implying that without this experience, the vociferous battle between 
Qitsqay and Collawasi is relegated to mere hearsay.95  
In Chapter 2, we saw that this concern is also central to herders’ ritual practices. At the 
beginning and end of the interaction from which example (9) was taken, the speaker addressed the 
surrounding landscape in second person while offering coca, cigarettes and alcohol. He refers to 
the three participants as the orphan grandchildren of a nearby awichu, or “grandfather”—a 
mummified ancestor that has turned to stone—and asks for its care. Likewise, another woman, in 
a high pastureland on the other side of the watershed, spoke of how she would offer tuqush96 
pudding to the glacier, asking it to adopt her as its grandchild, when leading her sheep into the 
                                                
95 The observation that the story is hearsay is also grounded in the narrator’s systematic use of the 
reportative evidential enclitic –sh(i). 
96 Tuqush is a preparation of potato in which it is left for a long period to ferment in a spring, ultimately 




highest pastures at the glacier’s foot. These people’s words and actions express a perception of 
their intimate relation to the landscape—described in terms of adoptive familiarity—as critical to 
their physical safety and success as herders.97 In the next chapter, I show how this treatment of the 
landscape as an immediate presence is routinized in simple pointing gestures and demonstrative 
reference. In Chapter 5, I show that Río Negro herders with extensive experience in the highest 
pastures are more likely to remember objects within arm’s reach in terms of coordinates fixed in 
the landscape than agriculturalists with less environmental experience. Angélica’s concerns with 
the fate of environmental intimacy in Río Negro are well founded indeed—without the continued 
engagement with the landscape, part of the context that grounds their communicative practices 












                                                
97 Indeed, the ritual performance of fosterage described in Chapter 2 parallels actual practices of 
child circulation in the Andes, as both are means of establishing and transforming social 






Chapter 4: The distant here: Spatial common ground in 
Quechua demonstrative reference 
 
1. Introduction 
 When I began to study the use of spatial Frames of Reference in everyday conversations in 
Río Negro, I came up against an immediate obstacle. In the vast majority of cases, people seemed 
to communicate locations and directions following a principle of least effort. On countless 
occasions, a quick eyebrow flash, a tiny glance, and the demonstrative pronoun “kay”—which 
could be roughly translated as “this”—was all it took to convey the relevant spatial information. 
Consider, for example, two farmers sitting in the grass, resting after harvesting a small plot of 
potatoes. One asks the other, “Where are you going now?” The other quickly glances east, raises 
his eyebrows, and replies, kayman—“toward here.” His interrogator nods in comprehension—his 
friend is headed to his cousin’s field on the other side of Don Juan Mountain to help out with their 
harvest.  
 A verbal interchange like the one above is only possible because the participants know 
one another well. The possible answers to the question “where are you going now?” are not 
limitless, but rather pertain to a small set defined by habits and routines that both know, and know 
the other knows. Yet the success of this interchange also depends on a similarly shared and 




as using “uphill” and “downhill” appropriately to refer to east and west requires a constant sense 
of orientation and position in the Río Negro landscape, this minute pointing gesture also can only 
manage to distinguish among the possible destinations if both interlocutors know where they are 
in relation to them. But why use the so-called “proximal” demonstrative pronoun, “kay?” It struck 
me as odd that speakers consistently used a word roughly equivalent to English “here” or “this” 
when signaling distant places that were often invisible from their current position. It called to 
mind pointing out my home on a map—“I live here”—but was not at all how I would point out 
my home without a map, much less from somewhere far away. Clearly the concept of distance, 
presupposed by the traditional “proximal” and “distal” labels for Quechua demonstrative 
pronouns, was not a decisive factor in this conversation. 
 Indeed, a consensus has emerged among linguistic anthropologists and anthropologically-
minded linguists that demonstratives do not categorically indicate the distance between 
participants and referents. First, drawing on an ethnographic and linguistic study of Yucatec 
Mayan referential practice, Hanks’ (1990) foundational critique of the distance-based account 
(which he called the “spatialist” account) proposed instead that demonstratives indicate or project 
their referents’ accessibility.98 In subsequent work, Hanks further developed an account of how 
deictic reference is embedded in social fields (2005, 2016). Enfield (2003) similarly argued 
against a “spatialist interpretation.” Through an analysis of the situated use of demonstratives in 
video-recorded verbal interactions among Lao speakers, he suggested that they do not contrast in 
categorial spatial terms (proximal vs. distal), but rather form an “informativeness scale”99 in 
                                                
98 Hanks’ (1990) approach to demonstratives, and to deixis more generally, goes far beyond this 
point to make a more fundamental argument that deixis is sociocentric rather than egocentric. I 
will return to this point later in this chapter.   




which “proximal” and “distal” meanings of demonstratives result from the pragmatic enrichment 
of their relatively strong or weak (respectively) semantic specificity (87).  
 This approach to demonstratives, and to deixis more generally, emphasizes the fact that 
demonstrative reference often has little to do with selecting a referent—indeed, “they provide 
virtually no identifying information as to the objects picked out” (Hanks 2005:195). Rather, the 
specificity of indication is the result of enrichment by other aspects of interaction and its 
embedding context (e.g., Enfield 2003:83), as in the example of the two farmers above. While the 
categorial semantic properties of demonstratives do not constitute their indicating capacity, such 
semantic properties instead qualify the very acts of reference in which they occur, allowing 
participants to position themselves and their interlocutors with relation to the their referents and to 
one another (Hanks 2005:211; Du Bois 2007:148). To use demonstratives, then, is perforce to 
engage in social actions and to participate in social relations. The de-emphasis of space as a 
constituent of the categorial, semantic role of demonstratives, then, is concomitant with a 
heightened emphasis on subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and is thus consonant with the 
pragmaticist tradition stemming from Peirce’s approach to meaning.  
 But are these two parallel trends that de-emphasize space and emphasize sociality mutual 
and necessary conditions to one another? While the emergent consensus is that distance—
undeniably a spatial concept—does not provide the source of demonstrative distinctions, this does 
not preclude forms of spatiality other than distance, nor does it preclude a role for space other 
than as a categorial “text default” (Agha 2007). Nevertheless, the development of research on 
demonstratives has led to an implicit dichotomy between subjectivity and space. This dichotomy 
itself is seemingly ratified by the fact that research on spatial language has also—for distinct 




investigation and debate thus constitute a division of scholarly labor in which demonstrative 
reference and spatial orientation become distinct domains for studying the roles of sociality and 
spatiality, respectively, in language.100  
 In the course of my research on spatial language in Ancash Quechua, I quickly came up 
against this dichotomy. While my focus was on spatial language, I found that descriptions of 
location and direction frequently included demonstrative pronouns. In fact, much of the everyday 
usage of spatial communication that I observed consisted of nothing more than demonstrative 
pronouns and/or gestures, as illustrated in the opening vignette. Because my overriding interest 
was not in spatial language itself, but rather in its foundation in habitual patterns of practice and 
experience, I saw no reason to exclude the use of demonstrative pronouns, especially considering 
their frequent use as acts of reference to parts of the local landscape. Indeed, the patterns of usage 
that I observed could not be explained in terms of relative distance. Yet, considering that Quechua 
speakers habitually use the landscape to orient spatial descriptions, I became interested in the role 
of space in a fundamentally social domain of language like demonstrative reference.  
 In this chapter I treat spatiality not as a categorial semantic property that distinguishes 
demonstrative forms, but rather as part of the common ground—that is, the knowledge 
participants reciprocally presuppose as shared in an interaction—with respect to which speakers 
select among demonstrative forms with minimal semantics (Enfield 2003). In doing so, I follow 
the work of linguistic anthropologists and cognitive psychologists who have argued that 
                                                
100 Burenhult (2008) provides evidence from Jahai of demonstratives that encode angular, spatial 
distinctions that are categorial and pragmatically inviolable. While he proposes that this evidence 
stands in contrast to the tendency to de-emphasize the role of space in studies of demonstratives 
(100), his study leaves this de-emphasis unquestioned for demonstrative systems that do not 
involve such categorically spatial richness. Nevertheless, his study underlines the important fact 
that the kinds of spatial orientation involved in demonstrative use is variable and cannot be taken 




demonstrative forms are semantically minimal (Hanks 2005; Enfield 2003, 2009; Sidnell and 
Enfield 2016) and establish reference by means of other phenomena that accompany the act of 
reference such as gesture (Enfield 2009; Piwek et al 2008; Cooperrider 2015), common ground 
(Clark et al 1983), and the embedding social field (Hanks 2016). At the same time, I bridge the 
scholarly division of labor between spatiality and sociality by demonstrating that Quechua 
speakers’ spatial awareness of their position and orientation in the local landscape constitutes a 
crucial domain of the socially constituted common ground101—one which includes mountains as 
social beings—that informs the alternation of demonstrative forms in verbal interactions. Put 
simply, and in the terms used in the previous chapter, I overcome the spatial-subjective 
dichotomy by analytically acknowledging that subjective acts of reference take place in 
intersubjective environments—that is, in a physical world apprehended by speakers as a 
meaningful environment in relation to intersubjective social actions (see Chapter 1). 
  The first part of this chapter analyzes Quechua demonstrative pronouns, drawing on an 
interactional analysis of their situated use in two conversations about the local landscape. The 
resulting analyses show that relative distance does not offer analytic purchase on the selection of 
demonstratives, supporting the view that their semantics are minimal. The spatial interpretations 
of demonstratives are not primary here, but rather emerge together with social interpretations 
through contextual enrichment (Enfield 2003) and their embedding in a social situation and field 
(Hanks 2005, 2016). In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the co-occurrence of 
demonstrative pronouns and pointing gestures, drawing on statistical analyses of nearly 400 
                                                
101 Rather than defining common ground merely as speakers’ shared knowledge and 
presuppositions (e.g., Clark 1983, 1996; Hanks 2005; Enfield 2009; Sidnell & Enfield 2016), I 
define it more strictly along the lines of Theory of Mind—that is, not all that speakers share, but 
only that which they are mutually aware of sharing. In this sense, common ground is itself already 




instances of demonstrative reference drawn from a corpus of elicited and conversational speech. 
The analysis gives evidence that so-called “proximal” and “distal” demonstratives pattern 
significantly with the presence or absence, respectively, of pointing gestures. Furthermore, the so-
called “proximal” demonstrative, “kay” is often used to refer to distant referents not visible from 
the gesturer’s location.  
 In a recent study, Cooperrider (2015) examined the use of English demonstratives in an 
experimental task in which pairs of participants helped one another to identify novel objects on 
screens at varying distances. Some pairs were given laser pointers to aid their descriptions, while 
others used manual gestures. The results demonstrated two significant correlations. First, when 
pointing—whether with hands or laser pointers—participants were more likely to also use 
demonstratives. Second, participants were more likely to use “proximal” demonstratives when 
pointing with the laser rather than their hands, irrespective of the distance of the indicated 
referent. Cooperrider interprets these findings to suggest that ambiguity plays a critical role in the 
way speakers select demonstrative forms, so that “proximal” forms are used to indicate that an act 
of reference is unambiguous, while “distal” forms indicate the opposite. Ambiguity is of course a 
relative notion, and perhaps an artifact of the minimal common ground involved in lab 
experiments. In fact, it is precisely the role of common ground that I find compelling about 
Cooperrider’s findings. If we compare the English-speaking college students in the unfamiliar 
setting of a lab to the two Río Negro farmers in the opening example, the crucial different is the 
common ground they share with respect to the interaction they are engaged in. Now, considering 
the fact that the Quechua “proximal” demonstrative is used frequently with pointing gestures to 
distant, invisible places, I suggest that the source of unambiguity, or alternatively of accessibility 




Río Negro Quechua speakers are aware of their location and orientation with respect to an 
expansive constellation of named places—and presuppose that their interlocutors both share this 
awareness and presuppose the same of them—the way in which they select demonstrative forms 
in terms of their indication of contrasts in accessibility or relative ambiguity is substantially 
different from the way that English speakers would, as the latter do not share such a rich spatial 
common ground.    
 
2. What is the role of space in Ancash Quechua demonstrative reference?   
2.1. The Ancash Quechua demonstrative paradigm 
 Demonstratives in Ancash Quechua do not differ substantially from those in other 
Quechua languages. There are three forms, one of which has two pronunciations: “kay,” 
“tsay/hay,” and taqay.” Due to a regional process of monophthongization, the diphthongs in all 
forms are pronounced instead as a long “e,” so that the forms are pronounced as [kɛ:], [tsɛ:]/[hɛ:], 
and [taqɛ:]. The two variants “tsay” and “hay” are, to the best of my knowledge, in free variation. 
There may be some underlying distinction, but I have not conducted a focused analysis on this 
question, and no obvious criterion presents itself in the cases analyzed here. Because individual 
speakers do use both forms, in Río Negro they do not seem to be regional variants, as some 
dictionaries suggest (e.g., Parker 1976).  
 The three demonstratives are substantives—they can function either nominally as 




morphological markings, including case markers and enclitics. When the demonstrative pronouns 
are affixed with case markers, they generally take on a locative meaning (Table 10).102  
 
Case Kay Tsay/Hay Taqay 
 -pa kaypa tsaypa taqaypa 
Genitive/perlative "By/around here" "By/around there" "By/around yonder" 
-chaw kaychaw tsaychaw taqaychaw* 
Locative "(In/at) here" “(In/at) there” ø 
-ta kayta tsayta taqayta* 
Accusative “To here” "To there" ø 
-man kayman tsayman taqayman* 
Allative "Toward here" "Toward there" ø 
-pita/-piq kaypita/kaypiq tsaypita/tsaypiq taqaypiq 
Ablative “From here” "From there; and then" "From yonder" 
-yaq kayyaq tsayyaq taqayyaq* 
Limitative "Until here" "Until there" ø 
-wan kaywan tsaywan taqaywan* 
Comitative "With this" "With that" ø 
-naw kaynaw tsaynaw taqaynaw* 
Similitude "Like this" "Like that; and then" ø 
 
Table 10. Demonstratives with case markers.  
Note: Items marked with * were not attested.  
 
 While the pronoun “hay” often refers to a location when affixed with case markers, it 
contrasts with “kay” in that it takes on a discursive function instead in sentence-initial position. 
For example, marked with the ablative case /-pita/, “haypita” (“from there”) is used like English 
“and then” to signal temporal sequence in narrative. “Hay” also can take a number of other 
                                                
102 A more complete study of morphological conditions in contexts where demonstratives serve as 
modifiers rather than pronouns is beyond the scope of this chapter, but initial observation suggests 
that the morphological restriction of “taqay” is limited to its occurrence as a pronoun. That is, 
when used as an adjective, the noun that “taqay” modifies may take case suffixes that “taqay” 




suffixes for a similar narrative effect. In addition, the evidential suffixes “-m(i)” and “-sh(i)” are 
frequently added—either alone or in conjunction with case markers—to distinguish hearsay from 
direct experience.  
For the most part, previous descriptions of Quechua languages, including Ancash 
Quechua, simply gloss these three forms with the Spanish demonstratives “este,” “ese,” and 
“aquel” (see Table 11). These uncritical glosses tacitly describe the demonstrative pronouns in the 
“spatialist” terms of proximity to participants.  
 
Quechua Common Spanish gloss English translation of gloss 
Kay Este, esto, esta This (close to speaker) 
Tsay/hay Ese, eso, esa That (close to addressee) 
Taqay Aquél, aquello, aquella That (close to neither participant) 
Table 11. Common glosses for Quechua demonstratives in Spanish and English. 
 
 Some linguists have elaborated on the similarity more explicitly. Yábar-Dextre, for 
example, claims that the three demonstrative pronouns in Ancash Quechua are parallel to the 
personal pronouns, so that “kay” indicates a referent close to the speaker, “hay” indicates a 
referent close to the addressee, and “taqay” indicates a referent close to neither (1985:71). This is 
consistent with the traditional account of demonstrative reference in Spanish. Weber gives a 
slightly different account of Huánuco Quechua’s demonstrative pronouns (the same as Ancash 
Quechua’s), suggesting that they indicate referents that are respectively “close,” “intermediate 
distance,” and “distant” from the speaker (1996:77). This view is also shared by Manley et al’s 




Yet another account holds that “kay” is proximal while “chay” is non-proximal (Adelaar 
1997:137). To my knowledge, no description of any variety of Quechua has departed significantly 
from the spatialist account.  
 
2.2. Critiques of spatialist accounts of demonstrative reference 
The “spatialist” picture that pervades linguistic descriptions of demonstrative reference in 
Quechua (Parker 1976; Weber 1996:77; Cerrón-Palomino 1987; Adelaar 1997; Yábar-Dextre 
1985:71) tacitly anchors deictic reference in the speaker, thereby asserting that Quechua 
demonstrative deixis has an egocentric frame of reference. Yet considering the importance of 
allocentric frames elsewhere in Quechua spatial language (e.g., as described in Chapter 3) as well 
as other critiques of the “spatialist” account (e.g., Hanks 2005; Enfield 2003), demonstrative 
reference merits a more thorough analysis. In this chapter I present a description of Quechua 
demonstrative deixis and its relation to spatial gesture through micro-analyses of video-recorded, 
real-time verbal interaction and a quantitative study of a corpus of demonstrative usage, also 
video-recorded. The results indeed contradict the “spatialist” account.  
My analysis follows other work in linguistic anthropology (e.g., Hanks 1990, 2005, 2016; 
Enfield 2003; Sidnell & Enfield 2016) in departing from the traditional characterization of 
demonstrative pronouns like “this” and “that” in terms of spatial meanings (proximal and distal). 
This “spatialist” interpretation takes a scheme of indexical relations to speaker and sometimes 
addressee for granted.103 Instead of taking demonstratives as categorically indexing spatial 
relations to speech participants, and thereby tacitly accepting a rather complex spatial semantics, I 
                                                
103 A similar tendency to assume a particular indexical relationship to speech participants at the 
expense of the specific grammatical characteristics of the forms themselves led to a 




consider their relationship to the embedding context, including co-occurring gestures, the physical 
location of referents, the ongoing interactional text in which they are situated, the propositional 
content emergent from that text, and the social and cultural values of that propositional content. 
The analyses that follow reveal a number of striking regularities in these relationships, supporting 
Hanks’ claim that one consequence of semantically minimal theory of deixis is a highly regular 
covariation of deictic signs with particular interactional contexts (2005:195). The analyses in this 
chapter further extend the domain of covariation from interactional context to the physical 
environment and its embodiment in the gesturing speaker’s body.      
The results of my analyses corroborate the move away from space, as they suggest that the 
semantics of Quechua demonstrative pronouns are minimal, and do not include a conceptually 
complex spatial scheme such as participant-indexical proximity. Instead, I consider the capacity 
of demonstrative pronouns to refer to spatial proximity a secondary, emergent meaning, albeit 
sometimes conventionalized as a “rule of thumb” (Hanks 2005). On the other hand, it is critical to 
recognize that demonstrative pronouns’ referential capacity is not fully dependent on their 
semantics, but also relies on their articulation with the location and orientation of participants’ 
bodies (including gestures) on the one hand, and on the other, contextual dynamics in the ongoing 
interactional text and social situation (Hanks 2005, Silverstein 2003a, Levinson 2004, Agha 
2007). While Enfield argues that the spatial characteristics of the deictic “here” are secondary to 
the “dynamics of human interaction” (2009:33), this chapter suggests that participants’ sense of 
orientation to and location in physical space can play a productive role in such dynamics. In this 
sense, space plays a primary role in demonstrative deixis, not as a categorial semantic 





 The following two sections present analyses of deixis and gesture in situated interactions. 
Both were video-recorded interactions involving native Quechua speakers from Huaripampa. For 
both examples I provide transcriptions of the original Quechua text as well as translations to 
English.  
 
2.3. Spatial meaning as the result of the pragmatic enrichment of demonstratives 
Angélica and Donato are an older couple that live in the northwest corner of Huaripampa 
with their daughter and three grandchildren. They are one of the first two families I met in 
Huaripampa on my initial visit in 2010, and have always welcomed me warmly into their home. 
Donato is the finest Quechua storyteller I have met. As a child he accompanied his father 
travelling broadly to sell and trade goods in the Cordillera Blanca and the Cordillera Negra, and 
continued to do so as a young man. Angélica holds forth as adamantly and eloquently about ritual 
interactions with the surrounding mountains as she does about the younger generations’ lack of 
interest in such things. She also prepares the most delicious picante de cuy I’ve had the fortune to 
taste. In the current conversation, we’re sitting in a small patio used for entertaining guests, 
grinding chiles, and washing and drying laundry. The patio is surrounded by the kitchen to the 







Figure 15. House layout. 
 





In the part of the conversation from which the following examples are drawn, I have been 
asking Angélica about her household’s animals. We have already spoken of cows and donkeys, 
and I’ve just asked her about sheep (Quechua demonstratives and their English equivalents are 
marked in bold):104 
 
Angélica 1 Uushan taqay Pararachaw kaykan The sheep are in yonder Parara.  
Joshua 2 Parara  Parara. 
 
Joshua 3 Ayka uushakunata  How many sheep [are tied up]? 
 
Angélica 4 Chusku haychaw wataraykan. 
<Kaychaw kaq1wan> pitsqa. 
 
 Four are tied there. Five with the 
one1 here.  
1: Index finger point with left hand 
over left shoulder, palm up, toward 
corral.  
 
 In line 1, Angélica explains that the sheep are in a place called Parara, roughly 500 meters 
uphill to the west of the current location (see Figure 16). I continue to inquire about the number of 
sheep, and in line 4, Angélica indicates that there are five. Four are tied up, haychaw, or “there,” 
and one kaychaw, or “here.” Angélica uses haychaw anaphorically to refer to Parara, while 
kaychaw indicates the corral across the road from the house, approximately 50 meters downhill to 
the south of the current location (see Figure 16), with the aid of a pointing gesture. Looking only 
at lines 1-4, it is possible to gloss the distinction between “hay” and “kay” in terms of proximity, 
as the corral is much closer than Parara. However, this account becomes less useful considering 
the rest of the transcript: 
 
                                                
104 In transcripts, superscript numbers indicate the timing of the gesture with relation to the text. 
Arrow brackets indicate the timing of the beginning and end of the associated movement. If the 







Joshua 5 Huk sitiyuman mitsikunki 
uushakunata 
Do you graze the sheep to another 
place? 
 
Angélica  6 A, uushakuna aywan huk laaduchaw 
huk laaduchaw wataraayar pastuchaw 
ari 
 
Yeah, the sheep go to and fro while 
tied up in the pasture, sure. 
 
Joshua 7 Shakshatapis 
 
To Shaksha also? 
Angélica 8 Mana haykunata apaatsu. Mana 
comunidad kar apaatsu 
I don't take them to those [places]. 
Not being [of] the community, I don't 
take them. 
 
Angélica 9 Mana comunidadtsu kayaa We're not [of] the community. 
 
Angélica 10 A, comunidadllam hallqataq mitsiyan Yeah, only the community grazes the 
hallqa. 
 
Angélica 11 Chikikuyan sinuqa, manam 
consintikuyantsu 
They'll be jealous otherwise, they 
won't allow it. 
 
Angélica 12 Mana comuneerutaqa Not to one who's not a comunero. 
 
Angélica 13 Kayllachaw nuqa mitsikuu. I only graze here. 
 
In line 7, I ask Angélica if she also takes her sheep to Shaksha, which refers both to a 
prominent glaciated peak and to the area of the hallqa pastureland beneath it, between 6 and 11 
km northeast from the current location. Angélica responds in line 8 that she doesn’t graze her 
sheep there, using again the demonstrative pronoun “hay.” She continues to explain in lines 8-12 
that the reason is because these pastures are for the community (Comunidad Campesino Canray 
Grande), of which she and her husband are not members. Thus, in line 13, she tells me that she 




Examining the use of “kay” and “hay” in this interaction, there is clearly no absolute 
scheme of proximity and distance that informs their use. In line 4, “hay” designates Parara while 
“kay” designates the corral across the street. However, in lines 8 and 13, “hay” is used to refer to 
distant Shaksha while “kay” refers not only to the corral, but now to Parara as well. If we assume 
for the moment that proximity and distance do in fact inform the use of “kay” and “hay” (whether 
in their semantics or as pragmatic rules of thumb), then we must also accept that this usage is 
dependent on an underlying context or frame that sets the appropriate expectations for a relevant 
scale for judging relative distances.  
With this consideration in mind, it becomes clear that there is a change in the relevant 
scale in this interaction, as referents of the two deictic forms shift over its course. In the first part 
of the interaction, the frame is related to the ongoing text and the participants’ bodily orientation 
and location in space, as “kay” and “hay” are opposed not only through their reference to distance 
and proximity, but also by their reliance on anaphora and gesture, respectively. The first use of 
“hay,” referring to Parara in line 4, is not accompanied by any gesture or other clue that could be 
used to determine its referent. Thus, if we accept for now that “hay” makes reference by means of 
indicating relative distance, we are still a long way from having determined a specific location. 
However, once we include discourse as well as the physical world in the realm of possible 
referents, Parara is immediately singled out.105  
Regardless of their ability to single out referents, demonstrative pronouns—as deictic 
forms—serve the parallel purpose of accomplishing social action in interactions. They do so 
primarily by providing a semiotic structure for aligning participants, propositional content, and 
co-occurring linguistic sings. For example, the use of demonstrative pronouns in the second part 
                                                
105 It should be noted that the reliance of demonstrative reference on context is by no means an 




of the interaction relies on anaphora as well as the social distinction of community membership 
emergent in the propositional content, that is, in the “features of utterance significance that are 
abstractable from matters of interactional anchoring” (Agha 2007:4). One way of thinking about 
the social meanings of deictic terms is thus as metaphors that extend from the basic spatial 
implications involved in their way of selecting referents with to their proximity to speakers and/or 
addressees. In this example, the greater physical and social distances associated with the Shaksha 
pastures are indeed parallel. However, the social distinction emerges as propositional content 
before the deictic form “hay” is used to indicate Shaksha. In this context, it would be hard to 
argue that the social significance is a figurative “trope” (Silverstein 2003a:208) on spatial 
meaning encoded in the demonstrative pronouns. Rather, I would argue that the opposite is the 
case. This coincides with the observation that the informative function of demonstratives is often 
overemphasized, and that they more frequently serve to align speakers with respect to referents 
and to one another (Hanks 2005:211; Du Bois 2007:148).  
This is a subtle point, as even critiques of the spatialist interpretation of deixis still give 
precedence to its role in selecting between potential referents (e.g., Enfield 2003:87). However, it 
is crucial to keep in mind that the way speakers position themselves through deictic reference is 
not isolated, but rather part of a number of parallel semiotic patterns in the interactional text—that 
is, the real-time, structured “doing things with words” (Silverstein 1992, 1996) that constitutes 
language as social action, as opposed to its decontextualizable denotational content. These parallel 
patterns themselves inform deictic reference in this interaction, as they provide a schematic 
necessary for determining the relevant spatial scale in which “kay” and “hay” can come to 
distinguish relative distance at all. Rather than denoting specific places, as the demonstratives did 




refers to “there were they are.” While this is a potential and perhaps normative use of the deictic 
forms, it relies on the contribution of co-occurring signs in the interaction.  
For example, consider the patterning of personal reference throughout the interaction. In 
lines 1-7, Angélica uses only third person in verbs, and no personal pronouns. While in line 5, I 
use the second person with the verb “mitsiy” when I ask Angélica if she grazes her sheep 
elsewhere, Angélica response remains focused on the sheep, employing third person once more to 
do so. However, a change occurs at line 8 after I ask whether she grazes her sheep at Shaksha. 
The response switches to first person to indicate that she does not graze them hay, or “there.” She 
reiterates this in the second part of line 8, while explaining that this is because she is not a 
member of the Community. Then, in line 9 she includes her husband as well, using the plural first 
person, while in lines 10 and 11, she refers to the Community, using the plural third person. All of 
this has the effect of focalizing a distinction in person not previously present in the interaction.  
 In sum, a spatial semantics of distance offers little help in interpreting the use of 
demonstrative forms in this segment of conversation. In the first four lines of the conversation, 
such an interpretation is plausible, but runs into the problem of the shifting scope within which 
“proximal” and “distal” may be distinguished. In the rest of the conversation, however, the 
demonstrative forms pattern with other signs in the interactional text such as person markers as 
well as with meanings emergent in the text’s propositional content in order to accomplish more 
complex communicative work. Namely, Angélica ultimately uses “kay” to refer both to her corral 
across the street as well as Parara—a hillside half a kilometer away—in order to emphasize the 






2.4. Spatial interpretations of demonstratives depend on interactional spatial frames 
The analysis above showed that Quechua demonstrative pronouns are not primarily used 
to refer to the distance between their speakers and referents. Rather, they are semantically 
minimal signs that align with oppositions in the ongoing interactional text (Silverstein 2003a) and 
in the propositional content emergent in the verbal interaction. The following example provides 
further support for this observation, and moreover shows the importance of this semantic 
flexibility in providing participants a collaborative means of signaling shifts in the interactional 
frames in relation to which signs are used and interpreted as referring to direction, orientation, and 
location, which I will refer to as spatial footing. Agha (2005:55) pointed out that Goffman’s 
concept of footing—the alignments through which participants (and referents) of different types 
(speaker, writer, audience, eavesdropper, etc.) are included and/or excluded from an interaction 
(1981)—is not limited only to the alignment of speakers in the interaction, but also of larger 
social types and categories. The notion of “spatial footing” signals the proposition that 
participants also align themselves in relation to the surrounding physical world using words and 
gestures. The previous segment of conversation demonstrates this fact, as social meaning and 
spatial scale emerge together and by means of the same interactional moves. In my analysis of the 
following conversation, I show how the oppositions among demonstrative forms themselves 
provide basic means of signaling shifts in spatial footing.  
In this example, Angélica’s husband, Donato, is sitting between parcels of land at Parara 
(see Figure 17). Just before this segment of the recording, Donato had spoken of an enchanted, 
“chukaru” (wild) lake, and I had asked what he knew about the lake at Pamparahu, the glacial 




produces fish. In the segment analyzed below,106 Donato is explaining how fish that come down 
the river from Pamparahu Lake are killed when the river joins another that is contaminated (see 
Figure 18).107  
 
Figure 17. Looking east by northeast across Huaripampa from the speaker’s point of view. 
 
 
                                                
106 For the sake of clarity, I have excluded several gestures that mark emphasis. I have also 
included photographic illustrations of each transcribed gesture in Appendix II, as they are more 
complex than the previous example, and can also serve to illustrate their precise nature and, by the 
same token, the depth of the speakers’ embodied sense of space.     
107 The speaker describes the contamination as a kind of poison, but this is a frequent way of 
describing a recent form of natural water pollution caused by glacial melting’s exposure of heavy 






1 Haychawqa usuariokuna hay 
waakayuqkunanam MinisteRío 
Agriculturapita ari semillata apaykur 
Pescaduta muruyashqa 
There [Pamparahu], the usuarios, 
those who already have cattle, have 
brought seeds from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and sown fish.  
 
Donato 2 Haychawqa trucha kanmi There are trout there.  
 
Donato 3 <Haymi kay1a kay1b kay1a riopaqa1c 
mitad rio2<pitaqa shamun pesca3<dito 
kay ruriman4 
Then this… this… by this river, 
from halfway down the river, the 
little fish come this way 
downstream….  
 
1: Index finger point back and forth 
between two positions (1a to 1b), 
with small circle traced with finger 
on last point (1c).  
 
2: Index finger shifts slightly 
downward (from position at 1d to 
position at 2) then back up again. 
 
3: Flat hand, palm down, slowly 
moves down and to the west. 
 
4: Index finger point moving 
downward 
 
Donato 4 <Pero5 <taqay Canray Chicopa kaqnam 
tsayqa6> 
But yonder where it’s already part of 
Canray Chico, that [place]…  
 
5: Index finger point 
 
6: Index finger point 
 
Donato 5 Alcaparosta continin tsaynam pescadupa  
malnin wanutsin, <sino kay Olleros 
uraychaw kan7>man pes[cado truchita] 
Contains poison, so fish disease kills 
[them], otherwise there would be 
fish, little trout, below in Olleros 
here. 
 
7: Index finger point, whole arm 
moving from point at river 
confluence down and westward 
 






Donato 7 Aha, <haynam taqay tinku8a 
encuentruchawna8b> wanutsillan <pobre 
llullu pescaditokunata 
So, once in yonder meeting [of two 
rivers], it just kills the poor, tender 
little fish.  
 
8: Index finger point (8a), arm nearly 
fully extended, then middle finger 
added to represent river confluence 
(8b). 
 
Donato 8 Entonces kannatsu urachaw9> So, there are no longer any below. 
 
9: Flat hand, palm moves quickly 
down and to the west, whole arm 
extended.  
 
To begin with, a cursory examination of the use of the three demonstrative forms to 
indicate referents at various distances in this segment of conversation clearly demonstrates the 
forms’ semantic flexibility in terms of spatial meaning. However, a closer inspection of their 
sequence in the interaction reveals that this flexibility in referential capacity allows participants a 
convenient way of shifting the spatial footing. In line 3, Donato refers to the river confluence  
(though at this point he only characterizes it as “halfway down the river”), 7 km away from the 
place of interaction (see Figure 18), with “kay” four times in a row, while in Line 4 he switches to 
refer to the same referent (the river confluence) with “taqay.” Subsequently, he uses “kay” in line 
5 to refer not to the tinku, but instead to the adjacent town, Olleros, less than a kilometer away. In 
the proximity-based “spatialist” interpretation, “kay,” “hay,” and “taqay” form either a cline from 
closest to furthest or align with speaker, addressee, and non-participant. However, as in the 
previous example, these interpretations are clearly not present here. To illustrate, the furthest 
referent in the segment, Tarawra Lake (19 km away), is designated with “hay,” and while the 




(7 km away), is indicated first with “kay,” and then with “taqay.” Clearly proximity has a very 
inconsistent relationship to demonstrative reference here.  
 
Figure 18. Map of places mentioned in transcript.  
Note: 
A: Location of recording: Parara (Huaripampa, District of Olleros, Province of Huaraz) 
B: Tarawra Lake (Pamparahu, Ruriq Canyon, District of Olleros, Province of Huaraz). 
C: Tinku, or river confluence (District of Canray Chico, Province of Recuay) 
D: Olleros (Seat of Olleros District, Province of Huaraz) 
 
 
However, the use of two different demonstrative forms to refer to a single referent makes 
sense if we consider that the availability of three positions in the demonstrative paradigm 
provides a means of signaling shifts in spatial footing. For example, Donato uses “taqay” in Line 
4 to indicate the river confluence, while he used “kay” in the previous utterance (Line 3). By 




essentially resets the frame, so that he can use “kay” to refer to a new referent. In this case, in the 
subsequent utterance (Line 5) he uses “kay” to indicate “below Olleros.” Here it’s useful to ask 
why Donato might have wanted to reset the frame in this way. As the corpus study below will 
show, “kay” is the preferred demonstrative when indicating referents with pointing gestures, so in 
order to point out “below Olleros” in Line 5, it was useful to Donato to reset the frame in this 
way.   
However, it turns out that “taqay” is also used frequently with pointing gestures. Why then 
didn’t Donato simply use “taqay” in line 5 rather than using it in line 4 to reset the frame? Or, 
alternatively, why did he use “taqay” rather than “hay” in Line 4 to signal a shift in spatial 
footing? Consider the surrounding text. In the same utterance with which Donato indicates the 
river confluence with “taqay” (Line 4), he also characterizes it as part of Canray Chico. Canray 
Chico itself belongs to the neighboring province of Recuay and was involved in a violent 
territorial conflict with Huaripampa and Canray Grande after the disintegration of the SAIS 
(Social Interest Agrarian Society) Atusparia cooperative, formed during the agrarian reform (I 
later learned that Donato remembers this incident vividly). In contrast, in Line 5, the new referent 
indicated by “kay” is Olleros, the seat of the district of the same name, also the district to which 
Huaripampa and Canray Grande belong. Once again, propositions entailing social distinctions 
emerge together with deictic ones.  
Considering these details, it becomes clear why “taqay” is chosen to signal the shift in 
footing rather than “hay,” as the former indicates a referent that is outside of the relevant place 
defined as the location of the deictic origo, while the latter refers specifically in relation to the 
ongoing interactional text. While the river confluence was indeed already part of the ongoing text, 




the kind of boundary-crossing distinction that seems to be encoded in the distinction between 
“kay” and “taqay.” Thus, this segment of conversation shows how switching the positioning of a 
referent in the demonstrative paradigm simultaneously frees its prior position and signals a 
corresponding shift in perspective. Furthermore, the specific positions used depend not on 
distance but rather on the emergent context, that is, the temporally unfolding “real time utterance 
production and interaction” (Hanks 2015:3), including linguistic signs, gestures, and propositional 
content.  
 The two analyses in this section suggest that a semantically minimal account of Quechua 
demonstrative pronouns—in other words, a pragmaticist that links their meanings to the semiotic 
dynamics of their embedding contexts—provides a better description of their use in verbal 
interaction than a spatialist account. However, the absence of a fixed referential domain is not a 
negative phenomenon, but rather affords a versatile system of oppositions well suited to verbal 
interaction. In the first example, I showed how demonstrative forms patterned with interactional 
text and to align the spatial distribution of referents with social distinctions in the propositional 
content. In the second example, I showed how the system of oppositions constituted by the 
Quechua demonstrative system allows speakers to signal changes in footing not just with respect 
to alignment among participants, but also between participants and the surrounding world. In the 
second example, the co-occurrence of gestures and demonstrative forms played an important role 
in motivating shifts in spatial footing. Indeed, aside from the use of spatial Frames of Reference 
to orient spoken spatial descriptions—discussed in detail in Chapter 3—pointing gestures serve as 
a primary way with which speakers align to the world around them. The following section turns to 





3. The co-occurrence of demonstrative pronouns and gestures  
The previous analyses of verbal interaction demonstrated several characteristics of 
Quechua deixis and gesture. Importantly, the traditional “spatialist” approach to Quechua 
demonstratives—defining demonstrative reference in terms of proximity to participants—fell 
short of accounting for their use in interaction. In contrast, it appeared that the distinctions among 
the three basic forms “kay,” “hay,” and “taqay” formed a semantically minimal demonstrative 
paradigm that made no reference to proximity. As interactions unfold, the use of demonstrative 
forms begins to pattern with the use of person reference (also deictic in nature), other linguistic 
cues, and the interaction’s propositional content.108 As this occurs, it becomes increasingly more 
difficult to isolate the contribution of demonstrative forms as categorial linguistic elements from 
the progressive changes of the social and verbal interaction that provide their context (Agha 
2007).  
Considering the complications of apprehending the categorial affordances of 
demonstratives in situ, one way of enriching my Quechua demonstrative reference is to determine 
whether the patterns I observed in individual interactions are consistent across a greater number 
of instances. This presents a problem, however, as deictic forms are particularly resistant to 
decontextualization. Therefore, a corpus analysis only considering the relation between deictic 
forms and their referents would yield little useful information. For example, what would be the 
appropriate way of choosing a scale with which to judge whether proximity was a significant 
factor in the use of deictic demonstratives? There is no good answer to this question, as the scale 
is defined in relation to signs in the text and situation other than deictic forms themselves most of 
the time—or even, I would argue along with Hanks (2005:210), all the time. However, if gestures 
                                                
108 The latter intersection is what Hanks (2005) refers to as the deictic field’s embedding in the 




are included in the analysis, they provide a constant anchored in specific parts of the context—
namely participants’ bodies and the physical world. Moreover pointing gestures and 
demonstratives are co-organized and arguably constitute a coherent whole (McNeill 1992; 
Kendon 2004; Enfield 2009; Cooperrider 2015).  
With these considerations in mind, I analyzed a corpus of speech totaling 61 minutes, 
involving verbal interactions with three participants: Donato (Trial A), Anita (Trial B), and 
Paulina (Trial C).109 These interactions consisted of a combination of open-prompt interviews and 
naturalistic conversation. My analysis looked specifically at the co-occurrence of manual gesture 
with the deictic demonstratives “kay,” “hay,” and “taqay.” The corpus includes a total of 383 
deictic expressions, 130 of which co-occurred with manual gestures. The analysis addresses the 
questions presented in Section 3.1 below.  
 
3.1. Is there a patterned relationship between Quechua deixis and gesture? 
The analyses in this section address several questions about the relationship between 
Quechua deixis and manual gestures. First, is there a significant tendency to use manual gestures 
with one or another of the three demonstratives? A traditional analysis of deictic demonstratives 
along the lines of proximity does not suggest any such correlation, as gestures can be used just as 
easily to indicate nearby as well as distant referents. Furthermore, we have already seen that 
Quechua speakers frequently use pointing gestures to indicate distant locations. Considering the 
above analyses of the use of deixis in verbal interaction, I hypothesized that the categorial 
distinction between “kay” and “hay” is not one of distance. Considering the patterns of co-
                                                
109 All speakers spoke Quechua as a first language. Donato and Anita learned Spanish later in life, 
while Paulina is Quechua monolingual. Donato lives in Huaripampa; Anita lives during part of 
the year in Huaripampa, and part of the year at a manada above Canray Grande; Paulina lives in a 




occurrence between demonstrative forms and pointing gestures, I argue that while reference to 
distance is not a semantic characteristic of Quechua demonstratives, speakers’ sense of space—
their location and orientation within their environment—does indeed play a substantial role in 
their alternation.  
First, the findings below show that “kay” facilitates reference to an object in relation to 
one or more speech participants’ bodies. Thus, “kay” can be used just as well to mark referents 
with quite different spatial relations to the speaker. For example, “kay” occurs frequently both 
when signaling distant locations with a pointing gesture and when referring to the participants’ 
actual location without pointing gestures. It is thereby used specifically for exophoric reference—
that is, to indicate referents outside the text. In contrast, “hay” facilitates reference to an object not 
in relation to a speech participant’s body, but rather in reference to the ongoing text (i.e., 
endophoric reference). It can thus be used for anaphora or cataphora.110 Finally, I suggest that 
“taqay” is similar to “kay” in that it facilitates reference to objects in reference to the body, but 
with the additional implication that the referent is beyond the bounds of the speaker’s location, as 
defined elsewhere in the interactional text (or, alternatively, the pairing of “taqay” and its referent 
can itself presuppose the appropriate boundaries).  
Second, I look more specifically at the co-occurrence of geographically accurate spatial 
gestures with demonstratives. I do so in order to control for metaphoric gestures that refer to the 
text as if it were extended in the world, like counting items on a list on the finger’s of the hand or 
pointing to different propositions as if they were arrayed in space. In order to examine this 
scenario, I conducted a separate analysis within the set of demonstratives co-occurring with 
                                                
110 It is important to recognized that anaphora or cataphora can be used creatively, implying that a 





gestures to determine whether there was a tendency for spatial gestures in particular to co-occur 
with one or another of the three demonstratives.111 As above, and for the same reasons, a 
traditional analysis of demonstratives along the lines of relative proximity does not suggest any 
such correlation. Thus, my finding of a correlation here lends support to my description of 
Quechua demonstratives.  
I conducted a third and final analysis in order to eliminate the possibility of a grammatical 
confound. To do so, I examined whether the morphological context of the deictic demonstratives 
analyzed had any bearing on the results, focusing specifically on the longest recording. I first 
considered cases in which demonstratives were used without any morphology, analyzing the 
results in terms of co-occurrence with gesture in general, and then with spatial gesture. If some 
grammatical marking were in fact at the root of any association between gesture and 
demonstrative type observed in the first two analyses, then the association should disappear in an 
analysis of only cases without gesture. However, it could be argued that it is specifically in the 
unmarked cases (those un-accompanied by gestures) where the morphological association 
appears, and so I also examined demonstratives suffixed with the locative case marker –
CHAW.112 I chose the locative case, as it is where I would most expect to see some influence on 
                                                
111 Interestingly, all of the spatial gestures in the corpus were geographically accurate—that is to 
say, there were neither relative nor transposed absolute gestures. In contrast, non-spatial gestures 
did not for the most part refer to actual locations, but to propositions and referents in the text. 
There were no spatial gestures made to non-existent places, such as locations in a text. These 
“textual gestures” instead took the form of fist-to-palm gestures, counting on fingers, and 
mimicking (iconic) gestures. In fact, in the majority of cases in which “kay” was used with non-
spatial gestures, it was both marked with the comparative suffix “-naw” and accompanied by 
mimicking (iconic) gestures (e.g., “kaynaw pukllayaa,” “we play like this.”).  
112 There were not sufficient numbers to allow for robust analyses of all possible morphological 
combinations. Sub-classifications also raised too many questions to provide useful variables 
because of the complexities of combinations of nominal case-markers and enclitics, several of 




the use of gesture, and spatial gesture in particular. If this were in fact true, the results should 
indicate a lack of association between demonstrative types and gesture in this case.  
 
3.2. Do gestures co-occur more frequently with particular demonstrative types? 
In order to test the first prediction—that gestures occur more frequently with “kay” and 
“taqay” than with “hay”—I contrasted the percentages of instances of each of the three 
demonstratives that were and were not accompanied by manual gestures. Tables 12-14 show the 
frequency of each demonstrative and the percentages of instances that were or were not 
accompanied by gestures in Trials A-C, respectively. Table 15 shows the combined percentages 
across all three trials. I conducted Pearson chi-square tests to determine if the proportion of 
demonstratives accompanied by gestures varied significantly across the three types. For Trial A, 
the results suggested that demonstrative type was a significant factor in the co-occurrence of 
gesture, c2(1, N = 247) = 52.28, p = < .01. Likewise, in Trial B demonstrative type was also a 
significant factor, c2(1, N = 50) = 14.63, p = < .01. Trial C also yielded similar results, c2(1, N = 
81) = 24.76, p = < .01. Finally, a Pearson chi-square also confirmed a significant association 
between gesture and demonstrative type across all three trials, c2(1, N = 378) = 92.09, p = < .01.  
 
 Trial A  
 N Gesture No Gesture 
Kay 47 62% 38% 
Hay 184 17% 83% 
Taqay 16 75% 25% 
Total 247 30% 70% 
 








 Trial B  
 N Gesture No Gesture 
Kay 10 90% 10% 
Hay 38 29% 71% 
Taqay 2 100% 0% 
Total 50 44% 56% 
Table 13. Co-occurrence of demonstrative forms with gestures on Trial B. 
 
 Trial C  
 N Gesture No Gesture 
Kay 42 69% 31% 
Hay 37 14% 86% 
Taqay 2 50% 50% 
Total 81 43% 57% 
 
Table 14. Co-occurrence of demonstrative forms with gestures on Trial C. 
 
 Trials A-C  
 N Gesture No Gesture 
Kay 99 68% 32% 
Hay 259 19% 81% 
Taqay 20 75% 25% 
Total 378 34% 66% 
 
Table 15. Co-occurrence of demonstrative forms with gestures across Trials A-C. 
 
 
3.3. Do spatial gestures co-occur more frequently with one or more demonstrative types? 
In order to test the second prediction—pertaining to spatial gestures113 in particular—I 
contrasted the percentages of instances of each of the three demonstratives that were accompanied 
by specifically spatial gestures with those accompanied by non-spatial gestures. These tests thus 
involved a subset of the sample tested in the previous section, namely instances of demonstratives 
                                                
113 I use “spatial gestures” to refer to those gestures involve some spatial relation in their mode of 
signification. This encompasses all pointing gestures used to indicate the location of referents 
located in the physical world regardless of hand-shape. Nearly all such gestures in the current 
study were made with one of three hand shapes: 1) index finger extended to point, with remaining 
fingers retracted toward palm, 2) tip of thumb used to point, with hand closed in fist, and 3) all 




co-occurring with gestures. Tables 16-18 show the frequency of each demonstrative in this subset 
and the percentages of instances that were or were not accompanied by specifically spatial 
gestures in Trials A-C, respectively. Table 19 shows the combined percentages across all three 
trials. I conducted Pearson chi-square tests to determine if the proportion of demonstratives 
accompanied by spatial gestures varied significantly across the three types. For Trial A, the 
results suggested that demonstrative type was a significant factor in the use of spatial as opposed 
to non-spatial gestures, c2(1, N = 73) = 40.89, p = < .01. Likewise, in Trial B demonstrative type 
was also a significant factor, c2(1, N = 22) = 12.06, p = < .01. Trial C differed from trials A and B, 
as the results indicated that demonstrative type was not significantly associated with the co-
occurrence of spatial as opposed to non-spatial gestures, c2(1, N = 35) = 1.49, p =  .47. Finally, a 
Pearson chi-square also confirmed a significant association between demonstrative type and the 
co-occurrence of spatial and non-spatial gestures across all three trials, c2(1, N = 130) = 51.95, p = 
< .01. 
 
 Trial A  




Kay 29 76% 24% 
Hay 32 9% 91% 
Taqay 12 100% 0% 
Total 73 51% 49% 
 














 Trial B  




Kay 9 78% 22% 
Hay 11 9% 91% 
Taqay 2 100% 0% 
Total 22 45% 55% 
 
Table 17. Co-occurrence of demonstrative forms with spatial gestures on Trial B. 
 
 
 Trial C  




Kay 29 79% 21% 
Hay 5 100% 0% 
Taqay 1 100% 0% 
Total 35 83% 17% 
 
Table 18. Co-occurrence of demonstrative forms with spatial gestures on Trial C. 
 
 
 Trials A-C  




Kay 67 78% 22% 
Hay 48 19% 81% 
Taqay 15 100% 0% 
Total 130 58% 42% 
 




3.4. Morphological factors 
I conducted a Pearson’s chi-square test for an association between demonstrative type and the 
co-occurrence of gesture in the subset of instances with no morphological markings, drawn from 
all three trials. The results indicated that a significant association persisted in this subset, c2(1, N = 
202) = 37.82, p = < .01. I then tested the association between demonstrative types with the use of 




Likewise, the results indicated a persistently significant association, c2(1, N = 76) = 31.25, p = < 
.01. 
Next, I tested the set of demonstratives affixed with the locative case marker, -CHAW. The 
results indicated a significant association between demonstrative type and the co-occurrence of 
gesture, c2(1, N = 56) = 12.70, p = < .01, as well as the use of spatial as opposed to non-spatial 
gestures, c2(1, N = 22) = 15.17, p = < .01. 
 
3.5. “Kay” co-occurs significantly more with manual gestures than “hay.” 
 The first analysis tested for significant associations between the three deictic 
demonstratives and the co-occurrence of manual gestures. For each of the three recordings 
analyzed, I found a significant association (in all cases, p = < .01), and this of course was also the 
case in the aggregated test of all three recordings (p = < .01). There were, however, some 
differences among the recordings. In the first two recordings, for example, there were many more 
instances of “hay” than of the other two demonstratives, while in the third recording they were 
similar. It is also important to point out that the second and third recordings each included only 
two instances of “taqay.” It is therefore hard to make any strong conclusions about its relationship 
to gesture. However, the discrepancy in the co-occurrence of gestures with “kay” and “hay” is 
clear from the percentages alone—the aggregate study shows that overall, 68% of all instances of 
“kay” were accompanied by manual gestures, in contrast to only 19% of instances of “hay.” In 
sum, the first analysis clearly demonstrated a significant association between the use of the 
demonstrative “kay” and co-occurring manual gestures. However, it was also necessary to 




gestures, as many manual gestures that accompany demonstrative reference do not indicate the 
location of the corresponding referent. 
 To this end, the second analysis tested for a significant association between demonstrative 
type and the co-occurrence of spatial gestures in particular. The test was conducted on a subset of 
the cases previously analyzed: cases involving demonstratives accompanied by manual gestures. 
This made it possible to contrast spatial with non-spatial gestures, avoiding the ambiguity that 
would arise from treating the absence of any gesture as equivalent to the presence of a non-
spatial gesture. In contrast to the first analysis, the proportion of instances of “kay” and “hay” 
was similar in the first two recordings. Furthermore, in these two recordings, the percentage of 
instances of “kay” accompanied by spatial gestures was higher (76% and 78%), and that of “hay” 
was lower (9% in both recordings). In both cases, the association proved significant (p =  < .01). 
The third recording, however, yielded distinct results. While the percentage of instances of “kay” 
accompanied by spatial gesture was high (79%), “hay” always occurred with spatial gestures. It 
should be noted here that, in contrast to the other two recordings, there were very few uses of 
“hay” co-occurring with gestures at all—only five such instances, as opposed 29 instances of 
“kay.” Because of this disproportion, the results of the test for this recording did not yield a 
significant association (p = .47). Nevertheless, when aggregated with the other two recordings, the 
overall results did yield a significant association (p = < .01). Specifically, 78% of the gestures 
with which “kay” co-occurred were spatial, whereas spatial gestures accounted for only 19% of 
those co-occurring with “hay.” Furthermore, while there were few instances of “taqay,” (20 in the 
entire sample) all of the gestures that co-occurred with this demonstrative (15) were spatial.    
 The consistency in the results of the first two analyses indicates a clear association in the 




the demonstrative “kay,” but not with “hay.” Though relatively infrequent, “taqay” was similar to 
“kay” as it also tended to co-occur with spatial gestures. One further question remained, however. 
Did the morphology modifying the deictic forms have any role in this association? In order to 
take this possibility into account, I conducted several further analyses for each recording. First, I 
looked at the subset of demonstratives without any morphological affixation (a little more than 
half the total sample). The association between demonstrative type and gestures in general, as 
well as specifically spatial ones, was still significant (p = < .01), suggesting that even in the 
absence of morphological marking, the same relationship persisted. Furthermore, I tested the 
same associations for those demonstratives marked with the locative suffix –CHAW, and derived 
the same results (p = < .01) for both gestures and specifically spatial gestures. Therefore, even 
when “hay” was marked with the locative suffix, it still was not significantly associated with the 
use of gestures indicating its referent’s location.  
  
3.6. What difference do co-occurring pointing gestures make in the use of “kay?” 
While there is a significant correlation between the use of “kay” and the co-occurrence of 
gestures, spatial or otherwise, it is not a categorical pattern. There were a number of instances in 
which “kay” was unaccompanied by gesture. Due to the contrastive nature of the tests, the studies 
above do not make much of this fact, however, the use of “kay” in actual interactions like those 
analyzed in the previous section as well as those from which the corpus was drawn makes sense 
of this distribution. Namely, the gesturally unmarked use of “kay” relies on the location of the 
body of one or more participants to locate the exophoric referent; in contrast, co-occurring 








Referent  Distance from speaker Visible to speaker? 
1:4 Yes Corral  Across the street No 
1:13 No Area that includes place 











<1 km  
No 
No 
     
Table 20. Referents of kay with and without pointing gestures. 
  
In the conversations from which the data for Trials A-C were drawn, the same pattern was 
present (see Table 21). Specifically, out of 62 instances in which the demonstrative “kay” did not 
co-occur with pointing gestures, 50 of these referred specifically to an area that contained the 
speakers’ current location. For example, some of these referred to a dwelling, a manada (pastoral 
compound), a named sector such as Puqu, a hill such as Qitsqay, or a town such as Huaripampa, 
in or on which the conversation took place. However, of these, 22 co-occurred with some manual 
gesture that did not qualify as pointing. For example, ten were accompanied by a punctual, 
downward motion of the hand close to the speaker’s body, six were accompanied back-and-forth 
or circular gestures of the hand in the air around or before the speaker’s body, five were 
accompanied by gestures of emphasis such as hitting the fist against the knee or palm or counting 









# of tokens % of referents 
contiguous with 
place of interaction 
% of referents 
visible from place 
of interaction 
Distance from 
place of interaction 
mean median 
No 62 81% 71% 0km 0km 
Yes 33 21% 30% 2.7km 1km 
Table 21. Co-occurrence of kay with pointing gestures. 
 
Furthermore, the 12 instances that did not refer directly to the speakers’ location were all 
in some way parasitic on the current location in time or space. For example, six of these instances 
referred specifically to an action indicated by an iconic gesture, such as weaving pieces of straw, 
and were marked with the suffix –naw, which indicates similarity. Three of these instances 
referred to the conversation itself as an object, two referred to the present time (e.g., “these 
days”), and one referred to some qualities of the current situation, objectifying them as “poverty.” 
These last three cases all make reference in relation to qualities accessible to the speakers because 
of their spatial or temporal location.  
 Critically, none of the above cases are oriented in any strict sense. While they are all 
precisely located, the actions, qualities, and events they refer to, as well as the bodily movements 
they sometimes recruit in the process, are all orientation-free. In contrast, of the 33 instances in 
                                                
114 Interestingly, the self-ward gesture mimicked a gesture made by the speaker on her previous 
turn, when she spoke the word parseelaakunam (“my parcels”). On this first instance, the gesture 
was repeated twice, apparently mirroring both the first person possessive marker and the plural 
marker. On its second occurrence with the demonstrative kay, it seems to reiterate this meaning, 
clarifying the identity between two overlapping referents of kay, as the current location and as the 




which “kay” did co-occur with pointing gestures, 26 involved bodily movements precisely 
oriented toward referents that ranged from 10 meters to 10 kilometers from the speakers’ bodies. 
These referents could not be construed as places in which the speaker was speaking, even when 
very close at hand. For example Isidora referred to a dwelling roughly 10m away with “kay,” 
simultaneously pointing at it, while elsewhere she referred to the manada in which both she and 
the nearby dwelling were located with kay but without a pointing gesture. However, such 
perceptually accessible referents constituted a minority of these cases. Referents were visible to 
the speaker in only four of the 26 instances in which kay co-occurred with pointing gestures to 
indicate referent other than the speaker’s location (there were also two references to a place 
whose visibility I could not determine). These four visible referents were spread out among the 
range of all 26 cases, from 10 m to 10 km from the speaker. The twenty remaining referents were 
not visible from the speaker’s position, either because they were indoors or because the referents 
were obscured by the landscape itself. These ranged similarly from 0.2 to 9 km from the speaker.   
 The remaining seven instances in which “kay” co-occurred with pointing gestures referred 
to the speaker’s currents location. However, these pointing gestures also shared similarities to the 
non-pointing gestures that often co-occurred with “kay” when referring to the speaker’s current 
location. Specifically, two of these involved a pointing hand-shape moving in a circle in the air, 
and five involved a pointing hand-shape aimed toward the ground at the speaker’s feet. These 
pointing gestures are clearly not oriented, and not surprisingly, they occur when the reference is to 







4. Speaking and pointing with the oriented body  
 At first glance, it’s not surprising that “kay” does not refer to the location of the speech 
event when accompanied by the gesture of an outward pointing hand—it would of course seem 
very strange to find that a group of people habitually gestured in directions unrelated to their 
referents.115 However, what is relevant here is the fact that the same form, “kay,” is used for both 
reference to the location of the speech event and for reference to places elsewhere, often distant 
from and invisible to the speaker. If “hay” is a clearly opposed form in the demonstrative 
paradigm, why not use it to mark this seemingly salient distinction? If the saliency or accessibility 
of referents is an important factor in choosing between demonstratives (Enfield 2003; Fillmore 
1982; Hanks 2005; Piwek et al 2008), or alternatively their ambiguity (Cooperrider 2015), then 
we would have to conclude that, for these Quechua speakers, distant, imperceptible landmarks are 
as immediate—salient, accessible, and unambiguous—as the very location of the speech event 
from which they are indicated.  
This observation suggests an ethnocentric bias in the analysis of demonstrative reference. 
For speakers with a fairly limited awareness of their location and orientation within a landscape of 
named places—and more importantly, whose interactional common ground lacks this 
awareness—distinctions of ambiguity, salience, and accessibility will generally map onto a 
scheme of radial distance from the speaker. Even if this mapping does not amount to a categorical 
distinction, it will often be the case that the further away a referent is, the less accessible and 
salient and the more ambiguous it becomes. In contrast, when speakers share a rich, embodied 
                                                
115 It’s worth pointing out, however, that my reflexive awareness of my own gestures toward 
perceptually inaccessible referents do in fact seem to be habitually unrelated to their actual 
locations. This is presumably because of the temporal cost associated with orienting myself well 




sense of space, the criteria of saliency, accessibility, and ambiguity potentiates a different set of 
general distinctions.  
What is the shared source of immediacy in the various uses of “kay?” It can refer to the 
place where the speaker speaks, or to all the places like it, or to the present moment, or to the 
kinds of clothes on the speaker’s body in that moment. Such uses in the data analyzed above were 
sometimes accompanied by a downward point or with a finger or hand circling in the air. 
Alternatively, “kay” sometimes referred to the motions of the speaker’s hands themselves, 
drawing others to observe how they mimic the actions of preparing food or weaving straw. 
However, if speakers can assume that their own bodies and those of their interlocutors are 
oriented to the landscape, they can also refer to noncontiguous places with the aid of a finger 
pointing out into the world. For the same reason (that is, because they rely on shared knowledge 
of the landscape rather than shared access to it), speakers can use this combination of kay and 
pointing gesture to indicate visible referents just as easily as those obscured by walls, vegetation, 
or mountainsides.  
What makes all of these uses salient and accessible is the way they ground the act of 
reference in the speaker’s body. If there is anything certain in our infinitely defeasible verbal 
interactions—which perhaps only in dreamed and fictional conversations achieve their idealized 
form as precise communications of thoughts and emotional states—it is that speakers speak from 
their bodies. The body offers us the certainty of its presence in the here and now, and when it 
embodies a sense of orientation to a fixed constellation of named places, it extends that 
interactional bedrock into the terra incognita of the world beyond commonly associated with 
Bühler’s here-now-I (1990:117). Pointing out into the world and saying, “Here,” Quechua 




potential for immediacy. They can do so because their bodies and their words are already oriented 
to the world in such a way that their own habits of movement are also already contiguous with the 
world into which they point.   
What kinds of referents are left then for the ambiguous affinities of “hay?” If language 
stands in contrast to the body’s immediacy instead as a volatile and mutable projection, then it is 
no surprise that endophora—the self-referential meta-language of verbal place-holding—
constitutes the consistent function of this demonstrative. Indeed, anaphora and cataphora—the 
two forms of endophora—constitute basic uses of “hay” in Quechua.116 Because these references 
often coincide with referents in the world, “hay” can thus appear at first glance to have some kind 
of spatial meaning in contrast with “kay.” However, as I’ve shown, there is no principled reason 
to accept this explanation other than the assumption that the bodies that ground demonstrative 
reference are severed from the world around them and require the spatial semantics of 
demonstratives to reach out beyond their blindness. This is simply not the case in Río Negro, and 
when speakers’ bodies are oriented to their environments as they are here (in Río Negro), the 
distinction between the two basic demonstrative forms affords speakers a means of marking 
whether reference is made by virtue of the speaker’s body or not. Put simply, in Río Negro, 
space—in the form of speakers’ embodied sense of orientation and location within their 
                                                
116 Kockelman (2013) describes a similar difference between the “two conjoined joint-attentional 
processes” that characterize “human-specific modes of intentional communication” in the 
following way: “if the first sign causes your head to turn, the second sign, itself the object of the 
first sign, causes your mind to search” (23). For Kockelman, the first of these two attention-
directing signs has “proximal object” which then serves as a sign of a “distal object.” Yet, as I 
have argued in this chapter, the head-turning process of signification is grounded in the body, and 
its object is only as proximal as the boundaries of the embodied environment, while the mind-
searching process of signification is only proximal in contrast. Needless to say, the two process 




environment—plays an important role as a contextual factor in the use of Quechua demonstrative 
pronouns.  
 
4.1. The body environmental 
 But which body is it that lends its immediacy to this kind of referential practice? Certainly 
it is not the cellular body, nor the vascular body, nor the genetic body, for these bodies are far 
from immediate in our conscious awareness, at least without specialized tools designed to 
translate the imperceptible to the perceptible and coordinated practices that render its leaky 
multiplicity objectifiable as an individual whole (Mol 2002; Mol & Law 2004). Indeed, invoking 
such bodies begs the question: are Quechua speakers in Río Negro then somehow closer or more 
connected to their bodies? Such a claim is clearly problematic, as it surreptitiously begins to fit 
heterogeneous details into a neat mold that opposes and aligns body and mind, nature and culture, 
rendering Quechua speakers closer to nature as it renders them closer to their bodies, and at the 
same time further from an illusory cultural apogee.117 In fact, any notion of a single, universal 
body shared by humans will likely fall into a similar trap, even if we rigorously forge our 
universal bodies in the terms of local corporeal cosmologies.   
In contrast, if we define the body in semiotic terms—that is, as constituted by meaningful 
signs rather than ontological objects—then its presence may be its only universal quality.118 
Beyond presence, what is there in the body will always depend on who is interacting with it in a 
                                                
117 It may also lead to separating gesture and language in such a way as to undermine the entire 
basis of my argument. 
118 Interestingly, this definition of body may also have the unintended but perhaps welcome 
consequence of generalizing the term body to refer not only to animals, but also to any collection 
of materials that coalesces as a subject or actor in relation to an environment simultaneously 
defined in the same coalescence. Bodies, then, may have some theoretical advantages over 




meaningful way. For this reason, when Paulina contorts her body and bends her wrist back to 
point over her should toward Atuq Waqanqa canyon (Figure 19), one of the most salient 
characteristics of her body beyond its mere presence is its orientation and location. This contrasts 
markedly with my own body whose orientation and location in relation to the constellation of 
named places in Río Negro was far from clear to me during much of the time I spent there. As a 
result, I felt something physically lacking in my body—not its genetic material, and not its 
cellular structure, but rather its semiotic capacity to align with the landscape. You could say that 
among Río Negro Quechua speakers, to the extent that I was lost in the world, I was just as lost in 
my own body.   
  
Figure 19. Pointing to Atuq Waqanqa. 
  
Leaving the body semiotically open to the world in its role as the mediator of interactional 




but also for reconsidering universalizing assumptions about grammar and cognition. For example, 
in a recent paper, Diessel wrote:  
 
The universality and frequency of demonstratives are closely related to their 
communicative function to establish joint attention, for which speakers of all languages 
employ an egocentric coordinate system that is anchored by the speaker’s body at the time 
of the utterance. (2014:128). 
 
Diessel’s argument relies on his assertion that demonstratives cannot be used outside of 
egocentric Frames of Reference, and that they in fact render geocentric descriptions deictic. The 
body presupposed in this argument is closed to the world, and must be connected to it through the 
use of signs. Diessel assumes that communicative behavior is the unique domain of signification, 
and reduces the body to the individual subject of this behavior. In so doing, he also forecloses any 
possibility of the kind of intersubjective body that embodies social relations that Hanks (1990) 
describes, and likewise the possibility of the kind of environmental body that embodies spatial 
relations, as I have described here. 
 Beyond the problem of the limits on the body’s universalizability, Hanks perceived 
another problem in placing the body at the center of referential practice. Namely, the body 
presupposes the individual, obscuring “the interactive foundation of body space” (1990:84). This 
critique, in fact, is central to his approach to deixis more generally. Both in “Referential Practice” 
(1990) and in his more recent work on the subject (e.g., 2005; 2016), he is preoccupied with 
establishing, defining, and delimiting the ways that deixis is embedded in social interaction and 




conception in shamanic practice and its articulation with local cosmology, grammatical patterns, 
and moral evaluations (1990). He then goes on to argue that referential categories, such as those 
involved in the use of demonstratives, are “embodied in aspects of activities that are not traceable 
to the body” (86).  
Hanks’ point is important—the “body space” that becomes meaningful for the purposes of 
referential practice is already “culturally saturated” (94). What I am arguing here is not in 
contrary to the intersubjective, interactional, and cultural foundations of deixis, which Hanks, 
Enfield, and Silverstein (respectively) have very convincingly established. Rather, I am simply 
pointing out that the world in which reference occurs is not composed only of other humans, but 
also of their intersubjective environments. Likewise, the intersubjective body is not constituted 
merely by social relationships, but also by spatial relationships. Hanks wrote, “embodiment takes 
place not only when the body is the focal object referred to but, more pervasively, when the body 
belongs to the ground from which reference takes place” (132). For this very reason, grounding 
deixis sociocentrically rather than egocentrically should not necessary preclude the “apparent self-
evidence of pointing to the ground one stands on” (134). While Hanks himself is preoccupied 
with his argument that such self-evidence belies the social embeddness and situatedness of 
reference, once we accept his argument and step beyond its rhetoric, the spatial and the 
intersubjective can then be seen as having virtually parallel positions in the practice of reference. 
Moreover, when the ground to which the referring and embodying body belongs is populated not 
merely by humans but also by places, as in Río Negro, then we should expect that any separation 





This understanding of demonstrative reference circles back on a point I made in Chapter 2. 
The fact that the named places that constitute the Río Negro landscape are social persons 
significantly erodes the principled grounds on which sociocentric and geocentric forms of 
embedding can be distinguished. For example, knowing a person well in Río Negro is not just 
knowing one’s social connectedness through relations of mutual obligation and debt, hierarchy, or 
kin, but is also knowing where that person resides and habitually works; likewise, knowing a 
place well does not merely consist of the ability to locate it, but depends also on the same social 
connections of mutual obligation, debt, hierarchy, and kinship. So, just as we can speak of our 
social relationships as embodied because of our bodies’ participation in interactions that ground 
those relationship, so we can speak of spatial relationships as embodied in the same way when our 
bodies have participated in the process of getting to know a place, whether simply physically as 
when we move about our environment getting to know the lay of the land, or also socially as 
when herders in Ruriq canyon address ritual offerings to the peaks that surround them. And when 
spatial and social relationships are embodied for the same reasons, acts of reference that 
presuppose embodied social relationships—such as those that involve demonstratives and 




                                                
119 This also raises some important questions. If there is no principled reason to assume an a priori 
separation between the social and spatial embedding of demonstrative reference, is there any 
principled reason to give primacy to one or the other, or to even treat them as distinct? And is this 
a matter to be deferred to a neurobiological eschatology or can it be resolved simply by a semiotic 
approach to the environment that follows the habitual practices through which a group of people 
engages their environment, including all meaningful things regardless of their “natural” or 




5. Conclusion: From the distant here to the disembodied here 
Instead of a summary conclusion, I want to illustrate how my analysis of Quechua 
demonstrative pronouns can be used to account for a segment of text that has previously been 
interpreted in “spatialist” terms. To do so, I reconsider Willem Adelaar’s (1997) discussion of 
deixis in the Huarochiri manuscript. The Huarochiri manuscript is a document from around the 
turn of the seventeenth century. It is one of the few non-pastoral colonial texts in Quechua. The 
circumstances of its authorship are complex (Durston 2007), and though it appears to be southern 
Quechua, it was composed in the highlands close to Lima, an area where languages in the Central 
Quechua branch of the language family, Ancash Quechua among them, are spoken.  
In Adelaar’s analysis, he suggests that the distinction between the two demonstrative 
pronouns, “cay” and “chay,”120 is one of proximal and non-proximal (1997:137). Along these 
lines, he argues that “cay” is always used to indicate the speaker’s location, while “chay” is a 
“more neutral” pronoun that does not require the referent to be in the speaker’s proximity. 
Nevertheless, Adelaar retains a spatial meaning at the core of the distinction between the two 
pronouns.  A closer look at some of the material he uses to illustrate this point reveals that 
proximity is not a consistent factor in their use, suggesting that the analysis of Quechua 
demonstratives I present in this chapter better explains this material. For example, consider the 
following segment of the manuscript from Adelaar’s analysis (I have italicized the relevant 
demonstratives and their translations): 
 
chaysi chay quintecunaca anchatac cay checacunacta chicnircan. (Salomon & Urioste, chap. 
11, sec. 153)  
                                                





Adelaar’s translation: Those Quintis held these Checas in extreme contempt. Or: The Quintis 
there held the Checas here in extreme contempt. (Adelaar 1997:138) 
 
Adelaar’s account of demonstratives seems to make sense here, as the Quintis were an ethnic 
group mainly residing in Huarochiri, at some distance from the location at which the manuscript 
is believed to have been written, in the village of San Damían de Checas. However, consider the 
text immediately preceding Adelaar’s example: 
 
Ñaupa pachaca cay checaconapas quintes carcan quintecunap sullca huauquen (Salomon & 
Urioste, chap. 11, sec. 153)   
 
Salomon & Urioste’s translation “In early times, they say, the Checa were Quinti, the younger 
brothers of the Quinti.” 
  
 There is no evidence in the text that makes it possible to determine whether “chay” 
indicates a non-proximal referent or is simply anaphoric in nature, as the referent, “checas,” was 
the focus of the preceding sentence. Nevertheless, it seems clear enough that “those Quintis” 
refers not to “those Quintis over there in Huarochiri,” but simply to “those Quintis of whom these 
Checas were the younger brothers.” The latter interpretation is simpler, as it only includes 
information already present in the text. Furthermore, as I’ve shown in this chapter, spatial 




“kay” and “chay,” but rather by the inside/outside distinction that pertains between “kay” and 
“taqay.”  
However, a complete analysis of demonstrative reference in this text is inherently 
problematic. The circumstances of the manuscript’s authorship are not well known, and one 
distinct possibility is that it was assembled from fragments dictated to a scribe (Durston 
2007:231). If the manuscript is even partially the transcript of an oral text, some of the 
demonstratives may in fact have been accompanied by pointing gestures that would have changed 
their interpretation, but were hence lost in the written text. With this possibility in mind, we are 
led to consider the different potentials of demonstrative reference between face-to-face interaction 
and printed or written text. In socially embedded interactions, as I have argued above, the 
presence of speakers’ bodies, their location and orientation to a surrounding world, and their 
ability to make physical gestures alongside speech together constitute a pragmatic horizon that 
significantly shapes the way demonstrative pronouns are used.121 In reading, however, none of 
these are factors. The reason is not merely their absence—readers and writers still have present 
bodies, located and oriented to some world, and may gesture freely—but rather the absence of the 
assumption that any of this serves as a possible relevant context for demonstrative reference.  
 Finally, and to return to the starting point, the centrality in Quechua demonstrative 
reference of the body environmental—that is, the body that is oriented to an intersubjective 
environment and thus at once social and spatial—belies the distinction between spatiality and 
subjectivity that pervades studies of deixis, and regiments their relationship to studies of 
orientation. Bodily presence always potentiates social and spatial orientation and location, but the 
                                                
121 Hanks (2016) uses the term “horizon” to describe the part of a social field relevant to a 
referential theme embedded in it. Here I have expanded the term to include both the 




spatial is only activated to the extent that there is an embodied sense of space, as in the Río Negro 
context. Whether it is because such cases have not constituted the basis for the study of deixis, or 
because the presumed dichotomy between spatiality and (inter)subjectivity has obscured the 
relevance of spatial orientation in the study of deixis as a social practice, the importance of space 
in the common ground that informs demonstrative reference has been treated as either obvious or 
absent. Yet, as I have argued here, in some cases, spatial orientation is not merely one among 
many elements of this common ground, but contributes substantially to the way that Río Negro 


















Chapter 5: Thinking with the environment: Spatial 
Frames of Reference in cognition 
 
1. Introduction 
 Humans engage with space through mental representations, linguistic descriptions, and 
physical actions ranging from walking to celestial navigation and instrument-guided flight. These 
cognitive, linguistic, and practical engagements with space are related in complex ways. Even a 
single step requires some representation of starting position, destination, and trajectory. Likewise, 
a description of this movement requires the presupposition of both a coordinate system and 
perspective. Research in psychology and linguistics has focused particularly on the relationship 
between grammatical and cognitive representations of space, suggesting a strong link between 
them (e.g., Boroditsky & Gaby 2010; Brown & Levinson 1993; Danziger 2011; Haun et al 2011; 
Hermer-Vazquez et al 1999; Levinson 2003; Majid et al 2004; O’Meara & Pérez Báez 2011; 
Pederson et al 1998; Shusterman et al 2011; Shusterman & Spelke 2005).  
 However, this research leaves the role of differing physical engagements with space as an 
open question. In the previous chapters, I showed how patterns of environmental practice shape 
social life, political action, and the common ground presupposed in the use of spatial language, 
demonstrative pronouns, and pointing gestures. This chapter in turn raises the question of how 




and linguistic representations of space. This question has been addressed in more recent work by 
examining the relationship between topographic features, linguistic characteristics, and 
performance on cognitive tasks (Bohnemeyer et al 2014; Marghetis et al 2014; Palmer 2015; 
Polian & Bohnemeyer 2011). The results suggest that topography—for example the alignment of 
riverine or slope-based orientation systems (Polian & Bohnemeyer 2011)—does play a role in 
shaping the specifics of spatial reasoning, while maintaining that language remains the primary 
predictor of the cognitive representations of space. Yet, while these studies have taken the role of 
topography more seriously, they share the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural emphasis of prior 
research.122 Polian & Bohnemeyer, for example, are concerned specifically with contesting Li & 
Gleitman’s (2002) strong case for environmental determination of FoR usage (2011:889). In order 
to make this case, they consider FoR use in four communities that represent variation across 
population geography (roughly urban vs. rural) and a dialectal distinction. In contrast, Marghetis 
et al (2014) compare two communities that differ in landscape (also roughly urban vs. rural) as 
well as extent of bilingualism, showing that both have have an influence on the use of FoRs in 
spatial cognition. In all cases, the topographic factors they examine are coterminous with the 
contrasted populations, and thus they do not address variation among individuals’ interactions 
with the world around them. In contrast, I embark here from the premise that in order to better 
understand the role of the environment in spatial cognition, it is necessary to examine its 
variability in relation to human practice within a single geographically and linguistically defined 
                                                
122 Pederson (1998) shows a correlation between variation in performance on linguistic and non-
linguistic spatial tasks across several communities in the Madurai district of Tamil Nadu. 
However, he also notes that the linguistic sub-groups (Relative and Absolute) correlate with urban 
and rural environments (p. 114). The present study differs in that it focuses on variation in 





population. This goal is supported by the ethnographic and linguistic research presented in 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4. 
 I address this question through a study of the use of spatial Frames of Reference (FoRs) 
for nonverbal memory.123 FoRs are the underlying systems that orient spatial representations in 
language and thought, providing a means of interpreting descriptions that would otherwise be 
semantically underspecified such as “in front of the car,” “on the left side of the desk,” or “down 
from the school.” They do so by specifying the assignment of the ground, anchor, and coordinate 
system. For example, a Relative FoR uses the speaker’s own body as an anchor for coordinates 
(front, back, left, and right), and projects this onto a ground from which to search for the referent. 
Thus, “on the left side of the desk” specifies a search area projected out from the desk with an 
egocentric (i.e., speaker-centered) coordinate system. In contrast, an Absolute FoR uses a fixed 
coordinate system anchored in some aspect of the physical world such as river flow or cardinal 
directions, which is projected onto a ground. In this FoR, “down from the school” can specify a 
search area projected from the school according to a coordinate system either abstracted from the 
overall slope of the landscape or fixed to local topography (Palmer 2015).124 One consequence of 
the difference between Relative and Absolute FoRs is that as the speaker moves in relation to his 
referent, Relative descriptions must change, while Absolute descriptions remain stable.  
 The question of the effect of experience on linguistic and cognitive representations of 
space falls at the intersection of two fields of research. The first of these takes the cross-linguistic 
                                                
123 Chapter 3 includes a more detailed, critical examination of spatial FoRs.  
124 Terrill and Burenhult (2008) suggest that the latter in fact involves no FoR, and is rather what 
they call an “orientational strategy” to solve the problem of spatial description. Palmer (2015), 
however, shows that there is no operational difference between local, ad hoc coordinates and 
those that are abstract and generalized. Another possible classification drawing on typological 
observations of Mesoamerican languages makes finer distinctions between Geomorphic, 
Landmark-based, and Absolute FoRs (O’Meara & Pérez Báez 2011). For the purposes of this 




diversity of grammatical resources for descriptions of space as a point of departure. English 
speakers, for example, habitually relate their surroundings to the left and right sides of their 
bodies (Relative FoR), while Quechua speakers rely primarily on fixed, geocentric coordinates 
and landmarks (Absolute FoR) to describe motion and location (see Chapter 3). A body of cross-
cultural research in linguistics and psychology has identified a strong link between such linguistic 
characteristics and behavior on non-verbal tasks involving spatial memory (e.g., Boroditsky & 
Gaby 2010; Brown & Levinson 1993; Danziger 2011; Haun et al. 2011; Levinson 2003; Majid et 
al 2004; O’Meara & Pérez Báez 2011; Pederson et al 1998).  
 Another body of research has given evidence for the argument that language provides 
crucial input for the development of human spatial cognition beyond the basic abilities we share 
with other animals (e.g., Hermer-Vazquez et al 2011; Shusterman & Spelke 2005). Specifically, 
humans have an innate ability to represent location with respect to the distance and direction of 
environmental boundaries (Hermer & Spelke 1996; Learmonth et al 2012; Lee & Spelke 2010), 
also shared with rats (Cheng & Gallistel 1984; Tommasi & Thinus-Blanc 2014) and ants 
(Wystrach & Beugnon 2009). However, humans alone are able to maintain more complex 
representations that encode the locations of objects in relation to other, nonadjacent objects. 
Hermer-Vasquez et al (2001) showed that the ability to remember the location of a hidden prize in 
relation to a freestanding landmark emerges between 5-7 years of age, and was significantly 
correlated with language development. Shusterman et al (2011) further demonstrated that 
specifically goal-oriented language, relating the hidden prize to the landmark, significantly aided 
children’s ability to locate the prize.   
 The combined results of these two areas of research suggest a developmental sequence. 




environmental geometry (Hermer & Spelke 1996; Learmonth et al 2001; Lee et al 2012; Lee & 
Spelke 2010). As they begin to develop more sophisticated linguistic abilities, they gain the 
ability to remember locations in relation to landmarks (Shusterman et al 2011). At first, these are 
limited to “direct” relations. That is, they simply encode locations at landmarks. Then, between 5-
7 years of age, children begin to represent “indirect” relations, in which locations are not 
contiguous with the referential landmarks (Lee et al 2012; Lee & Spelke 2010). However, to 
remember “indirect” relations, a FoR is required, and the ways that FoRs are used to remember 
these “indirect” relations is partly shaped by the specific pattern of FoRs used in the child’s 
developing language.  
 This developmental sequence raises a question that has not been adequately addressed. 
While prior research has shown that language plays a significant role in shaping patterns of spatial 
cognition, and helps to account for cross-cultural variation, we know little about the role played 
by human groups’ distinct ways of engaging practically with space—for example those of pilots, 
urban shop-owners, farmers, and shepherds. Can differing ways of engaging with the environment 
also help explain the variability of FoRs in adult spatial cognition? Previous research on cross-
linguistic variation in spatial cognition suggested that cultural and environmental factors were not 
sufficient (Haun et al 2011; Levinson 2003:193; Majid et al 2004:110; Mishra et al  2003:379) to 
explain linguistic patterns. In these studies, cultural and environmental types were controlled for, 
and thus not treated as a dimension of variation within the linguistic groups they compared. 
Consequently, the argument was limited to the claim that environmental and cultural types alone 
do not determine FoR use in language or cognition.125 As I argued in Chapter 3, because this work 
                                                
125 The types used by Majid et al. (2004) are also themselves problematic, as they correspond to a 




was focused primarily on the relationship between language and cognition, controlling for 
environmental and cultural types, it has not explored the roles such factors might play within a 
single, culturally or linguistically defined group.126  
 There is an important consideration that makes it necessary to examine the role of 
environmental experience in the use of FoRs more closely. Many of the original studies suggest 
that the use of the Absolute FoR requires speakers to maintain a constant sense of their orientation 
with relation to the surrounding environment, even when indoors or far away from contextually 
relevant landmarks (Brown 2008:159; Haviland 1998:30; Levinson 2003:243). However, humans 
do not appear to have an innate ability to achieve this level of orientation (Levinson 2003:277), 
and speakers of languages that do not rely on Absolute FoRs do not habitually use them to 
remember large scale spaces (Beusman 1996 [cited in Levinson, 2003:272]), instead “piloting” 
their way along paths with reference to egocentrically anchored images (Gallistel 1990). 
Regardless of the possible causality of the link between the preference for FoRs in language and 
cognition, the use of a Relative FoR—English-speakers’ use of “left” and “right,” for example—
requires the very specific experiential input of learning to differentially distinguish one’s own 
lateral halves. In contrast, an Absolute FoR—defined broadly to include descriptions with both 
ad-hoc and conventionalized coordinate systems (Palmer 2015)—seems to require not only the 
particular experiences of the environment needed to establish coordinates or landmarks, but also 
continual attention to one’s surroundings to keep track of one’s own orientation within an 
externally anchored coordinate system. The necessary input varies according to the nature of the 
                                                                                                                                                         
individualism,” five general modes of subsistence, and ten types of environment (Majid et al 
2004:112). 
126 Another reason for this is the assumption that Absolute or environmentally anchored FoRs are 
objective, as opposed to the subjectivity of Relative or participant-anchored FoRs. I develop this 




Absolute system. For example, wind direction (Levinson & Wilkins 2006:542), sun position 
(Núñez & Cornejo 2012), or watershed orientation (Brown 2006:263) all may provide relevant 
information. 
 The importance of this experiential, non-linguistic input, suggests another possible factor 
that may contribute to the shaping of FoR preferences alongside language structure. While 
linguistic patterns may support a habitual pattern of FoR use, this may be accompanied by a 
requirement for experiential input from speakers’ own bodies and/or surrounding environments. It 
may also be accompanied by a requirement for socialization into this pattern of experience. If 
these linguistic and experiential inputs are equally important, or if the experiential input is 
primary, a certain threshold of environmental experience may be necessary for the maintenance of 
a predominantly Absolute pattern of FoR use. The following hypothesis can thus be formed: 
 
Particular environmental experiences are necessary for the habitual use of an Absolute 
FoR. Thus, linguistically similar individuals with dramatically different environmental 
experience should demonstrate different patterns of nonverbal Absolute FoR use. 
  
 Until now, few studies have been able to provide data that could address this hypothesis 
because the cultural and environmental variations have mostly been cross-linguistic. Two 
exceptional studies—one contrasting urban and rural communities of Tamil speakers in a single 
district (Pederson 1998), and another contrasting Hindi spoken in village and city contexts 
(Mishra et al., 2003)—suggested some environmental influence on both spatial description and 
nonverbal memory. However, while the study distinguished variability among individuals in 




studied. The experiment I present in this chapter provides a large sample that differs in several 
ways from previous studies. First, it includes participants who are speakers of the same variety of 
Ancash Quechua and are all residents in the same community. Second, participants are also 
distinguished by fine-grained differences in environmental experience. As I described in Chapter 
2, many members of the community spend or have spent considerable periods herding in the high 
pastures like Ruriq and Waraqayuq, while others have little to no experience herding and are not 
familiar with the high pastures, spending most of their time working in the heavily farmed hills 
around Huaripampa and Canray Grande.  
 
1.1 Research setting 
 The study presented here was conducted specifically in and with residents of the 
Populated Center of Huaripampa. Chapters 1 and 2 include a detailed account of this sociological 
and cultural context. 
 
1.2 Ancash Quechua spatial grammar127 
 Ancash Quechua speakers have an overwhelming preference for allocentric FoRs—that is, 
the Absolute and Intrinsic FoRs—in spatial description.128 While the Intrinsic FoR is preferred in 
a particular small-scale context, as described below, the Absolute FoR is preferred for large-scale 
descriptions as well as other small-scale contexts. Rather than a fully abstracted, conventionalized 
coordinate system such as cardinal directions, speakers draw on a number of other strategies that 
                                                
127 This section provides a review of the linguistic aspects of Ancash Quechua most relevant to 
the study presented in this chapter. Chapter 3 provides a more detailed description of the 
language’s spatial grammar.  
128 For the details of the study on Ancash Quechua spatial language see Chapter 3. The preference 
for allocentric FoRs is also manifest in spatial gestures, which are geocentric by rule (see Chapter 




rely on fixed landmarks or a generalized sense of local topography for describing spatial relations 
in the Absolute and Embodied Absolute FoR (see Chapter 3). Conventionalized or situational 
landmarks (Mishra et al 2003) and a number of slope terms serve as the most frequent means for 
describing spatial relations in both tabletop and large-scale space. The use of slope frequently 
coincides with the local terrain, but can also be used in direct contradiction. For example, the path 
that steeply climbs nearly 100 meters up from the Sawan river valley to the highest neighborhood 
in the town of Huaripampa can be described as “downhill” because it goes westward, the 
canonical direction associated with downhill slope. Example (1) illustrates this: 
 
(1) 
Uray-pa-m        kutimu-nki Sawanruri-pita-qa       Wantsa-man   chaa-na-yki-paq 
down-GEN-EV return-2     Sawanruri-ABL-TOP  Wantsa-DAT arrive-NOM-2-PURP 
“From Sawanruri you return downward in order to get to Wantsa.” 
 
 There are terms for “left” and “right” attested in Ancash Quechua, but they are not in use 
in the Río Negro watershed. Nevertheless, speakers do sometimes use Spanish borrowings to 




Waaka-pa derecha laadu-n-chaw monti shaa-ra-yka-n     
cow-GEN right      side-3-LOC    tree    stand-STAT-CONT-3   





 Such utterances draw on the Intrinsic FoR, and are distinct from the use of left and right 
terms in the Relative FoR (absent in Ancash Quechua), as the coordinate system defining “right 
side” is grounded neither in the speaker or the referent figure (the tree). In other words, 
designations of left and right within the Intrinsic FoR are view-independent, while those in the 
Relative FoR are view-dependent (Haun et al 2011:72). In Ancash Quechua such descriptions are 
limited to specific conditions, such as those present in elicitations in which pairs of participants 
had to communicate the arrangement of a model cow and tree hidden from their partners.129 In 
these elicitations, Intrinsic “right” and “left” were still only rarely used. The more common use of 
the Intrinsic FoR was to describe front/back relations, as in example (3) below. 
 
(3) 
Monti waaka-pa  qipa-n-chaw shaa-ra-yka-n 
tree     cow-GEN rear-3-LOC  stand-DUR-CONT-3   
“The tree is at the cow’s rear”  
 
 The use of Intrinsic and Absolute FoRs in this type of elicitation had a very regular 
distribution. Descriptions instantiating the Intrinsic FoR such as the one above were used almost 
exclusively for describing the location of a referent that is in a sagittal relationship to a ground 
with fixed sides (e.g., the tree is at the rear or head of the cow). The use of intrinsic left or right to 
describe the position of the tree when located at the cow’s side is a rare exception to this rule: the 
predominant description in such cases uses the Absolute FoR to select the appropriate side of the 
                                                
129 This structured elicitation, described in detail in Chapter 3, was based on the “man and tree 




cow, as in “Monti uma laadunchaw shaaraykan” (the tree is standing at its [the cow’s] uphill 
side). Likewise, the Absolute FoR was used to describe the orientation of the cow itself, as in 
“waaka uraman rikaraykan” (the cow is facing downhill) or “waaka Ruriqman rikaraykan” (the 
cow is facing Ruriq [Canyon]).    
 In sum, Ancash Quechua speakers in the Río Negro watershed have an overwhelming 
preference for allocentric FoRs. Within this overall pattern, an Absolute FoR is preferred for 
describing large-scale relations and some small-scale relations, while an Intrinsic FoR is preferred 
when an object that has sides fixed with respect to an inherent direction of movement, such as an 
animal or vehicle, can serve as a ground for the referent figure. 
 
2. Methods 
 The experiment described here was a slight modification of the “chips task,” originally 
described in Levinson (2003, p. 159).130 The aim of this task was to test whether participants 
remember spatial relationships in an allocentric (Absolute or Intrinsic) or an egocentric (Relative 
or Direct131) FoR. This was done by means of a selection task in which participants chose one of 
four cards depicting an arrangement of two circles matching a stimulus seen previously at a 180-
degree rotation. Absolute and Relative FoRs are distinguished from Intrinsic and Direct FoRs by 
the transposition of the coordinate system onto an object other than the figure. Because the “chips 
task” relies on rotation, it only tests whether participants remember the array of cards in relation 
                                                
130 I chose the “chips task” rather than the “animals in a row” task (Pederson et al 1998) for two 
reasons. First, the latter assesses only relations on the transverse axis, and thus provides a less 
complete picture of possible spatial relations. Second, the “chips task” generally yields more 
variable results (Mishra et al 2003), allowing me to look more closely at the influence of other 
factors.   
131 Danziger (2010) introduced the Direct FoR in order to account for descriptions with non-




to themselves or not and is not sensitive to transposition. For this reason, the “chips task” only 
distinguishes allocentric and egocentric FoRs.   
 
2.1. Participants 
The study included 97 participants. All participants in this study (N = 97, 53 women, 44 
men, Mage = 24, age range: 8-77 years)132 were residents of Huaripampa, district of Olleros, 
province of Huaraz, Ancash Region, Peru, and belonged to Quechua speaking households. I 
removed three participants’ data (two men, ages 18 and 73, and one woman, age 65) because 
more than three of their responses were coded “untypable” (see section 2.3 below), which I took 
to indicate miscomprehension of the task. 
In addition to age and gender, I measured two other variables: language ability, and extent 
of experience in the highland pastures in the hallqa region (3,700-4,700 masl).     
I used two means to assess language ability during testing, though only one was used to 
define the variable. I began with the initial assumption that all participants were Quechua 
speakers, as they all came from Quechua-speaking households. I thus gave the minimal 
instructions for the task in Quechua. However, some younger participants displayed or expressed 
incomprehension of these instructions. In these cases, I repeated instructions in Spanish. I also 
asked participants in a post-test questionnaire if they spoke Quechua. I grouped participants who 
received instructions in Spanish as Spanish-dominant bilingual/Spanish speaking (N = 22, 15 
women, 7 men, Mage = 11, age range = 8-17), and all other participants as Quechua-dominant 
speakers (N = 72, 37 women, 35 men, Mage = 26, age range = 8-77). It should be noted that in the 
Andes, Quechua speakers and non-speakers alike generally perceive Quechua as a domestic 
                                                




language, and consider Spanish to be the appropriate language for interaction with outsiders and 
in official contexts. This suggests that some or all members of the group classified as Spanish-
dominant may in fact have been fully bilingual or even Quechua-dominant bilingual.133 Also for 
this reason, the groups were defined only by the instructions that participants received, and not the 
explicit self-judgments that likely qualified the social context rather than individual linguistic 
competence.   
I assessed the second variable—environmental experience—by means of a series of 
questions asked to each participant at the conclusion of the study activities (see Appendix 3). The 
questions addressed the extent, content, and consistency of participants’ experience in the hallqa. 
Due to a number of political and sociological factors (see Chapter 2), participants fell into two 
distinct groups. One group (N = 40, 19 women, 21 men, Mage = 30, age range = 8-77) spends 
either two or more consecutive nights per week, or two or more consecutive months per year in 
the hallqa. The other group (N = 54, 33 women, 21 men, Mage = 17, age range = 8-46) has made, 
at the most, only sporadic single-day visits to the hallqa. While there were a number of 
participants with significantly more experience in the hallqa, due to sociological factors there 
were none who fell into an intermediate category. 
 
2.2. Materials and procedures 
The aim of this task was to test whether participants remember spatial relationships in an 
allocentric or an egocentric FoR. To access this distinction, the task required that the participant 
rotate 180 degrees after seeing the stimulus at table I to table II, where I asked them to select a 
matching image from a set of four (Figure 20). The stimulus at table I was a square card with two 
                                                




adjacent circles—a large white circle and a small black circle; at table II there were four identical 
cards, each rotated in a different direction so that the small black circles were to the north, south, 
east, and west.  
I first showed each participant a stimulus alongside the set of four cards at table 1, and 
asked to identify the matching card while the stimulus remained uncovered. Once participants 
grasped the task, I covered the arrangement of four cards, and asked them to remember the 
stimulus. I then covered the stimulus and uncovered the four cards and asked them to select the 
matching card. I repeated this three times. This method of training established understanding of 
the task with the least reliance on any explicit verbal instructions (see Appendix 3).  
After training, participants then completed eight trials, consisting of a fixed order that 
repeated each possible rotation of the stimulus twice, and was identical for all participants. The 
array of cards on table II was identical in all trials. The two tables were in separate but adjacent 
rooms in order to increase the reliance on memory and to eliminate the possibility that 
participants would orient to physical features of the room itself. Likewise, locating the task 
indoors assured that participants would not fixate on prominent, visible landmarks. For this 
reason, allocentric responses suggest that participants did not merely relate the orientation of 
cards to their immediate surroundings, but rather to an internalized sense of bearing. To control 
for the possible existence of a “weak” or “defective” Absolute axis (Levinson, 2003, p. 207), I 
conducted half of the participants’ tests at a 90-degree rotation. Thus, for half the participants, the 
two seating positions were at the west and east side of the two tables, while for the other half, the 
positions were at the north and south side (see Section 3.6). At the end of the eight trials, all 






Figure 20. Setup for “Chips Task.”  
 
2.3. Coding 
Figure 20 illustrates how participants’ choice at table II reflects the FoR underlying their 
memory of the stimulus. The egocentric solution involves a representation framed with reference 
to the body, for example, with the white dot adjacent to the participant. Such responses were 
coded as EGOCENTRIC. The allocentric solution involves a representation framed with 




ALLOCENTRIC. All other responses were coded UNTYPABLE. Arrays parallel to the line of 
sight (front-back, or east-west in the illustration in Figure 20) are sagittal while those 
perpendicular to the line of sight (left-right, or north-south here) are transverse. Untypable 
responses resulted when participants chose cards corresponding to the transverse axis after seeing 
a sagittal stimulus, or vice versa. Such responses accounted for only four percent of all responses. 
I assigned each participant an “egocentric-to-allocentric Gradient” (EA Gradient) score 
between 0 and 1 that ranked their responses from completely egocentric to completely allocentric. 
I calculated the Gradient (G) by assigning a value of 1 to allocentric responses (A), a value of 0 to 
egocentric responses (E), and a value of 0.5 to untypable responses (U), and then calculating the 
mean across the 8 trials [G=(1A+0E+0.5U)/8]. Assigning untypable responses a value of 0.5 
made it possible to include these “errors” without contributing to the overall allocentric or 
egocentric tendency of each score. This score is based on the RA Gradient proposed by Levinson 
(2003:176-178). 
Furthermore, I characterized each response as either sagittal or transverse (see Figure 20). 
The set of eight stimuli given to each participant consisted of four sagittal and four transverse 
arrangements. To capture this difference, I calculated two separate EA Gradients for the four 
transverse trials and the four sagittal trials.   
 
3. Results 
 First, I assessed all participants’ performance on the chips task in terms of the overall EA 
Gradient as well as for sagittal and transverse trial types (Section 3.1). Then, I tested the effects of 
language ability and herding experience in the hallqa region on participants’ performance 




may be explained by the factors of gender (Section 3.4) or age (Section 3.5). Last, I tested 
whether the two types of trial orientation may in part account for differences in EA Gradients 
(Section 3.6). 
  
3.1. Preliminary analyses 
 The mean EA Gradient across all 94 participants was 0.37 (SD = 0.33). I also calculated 
two separate EA Gradients to test whether performance on sagittal and transverse trial types was 
equivalent. Table 22 shows the mean EA Gradient across all participants as well as on sagittal and 
transverse trials.  
 
EA Gradient N Mean Std. Deviation 
Sagittal Condition 94 .25 .37 
Transverse Condition 94 .49 .40 
 Overall 94 .37 .33 
Table 22. Mean Egocentric Allocentric (EA) Gradients. 
Note: Scores range from 0-1. 
 
The mean EA Gradient for sagittal and transverse trial types varied considerably. In the 
transverse condition, participants were twice as likely to use an allocentric FoR. A one-sample t-
test confirmed that the difference between the transverse and sagittal trial types (MDifference = .24, 
SD = .41) was indeed significant, t(93) = 5.69, p < .01. The following analyses test whether these 
means vary with respect to participants’ environmental experience, language ability, gender, age, 





3.2. Environmental experience  
The first factor I tested was environmental experience. To begin, I tested the overall effect 
of the herding experience factor across all participants (N = 94, 52 women, 42 men, Mage = 23, age 
range: 8-77). An independent samples t-test indicated that the overall EA Gradient for participants 
with extensive herding experience (MOverall = .46, SD = .31) was significantly higher than those 
with limited experience (MOverall = .30, SD = .33), t(92) = 2.36, p = .02. However, to test this 
factor’s effects on performance on this task, it was necessary to examine only the group of 
participants in the Quechua-speaking group (N = 72, 37 women, 35 men, Mage = 26, age range = 
8-77). Table 23 demonstrates the relationship between language and herding experience. Most 
important here is that only three participants were both Spanish-dominant and had significant 
herding experience in the hallqa (two female participants, 14 and 17 years old, and one male, 17 
years old).  
 
Herding experience Spanish-dominant Quechua-dominant Total 
Limited  19 35 54 
Extensive  3 37 40 
Total 22 72 94 
Table 23. Language ability and herding experience. 
 
 An independent samples t-test indicated that the overall EA Gradient for Quechua-
dominant speakers with extensive herding experience (MOverall = .49, SD = .31) was significantly 
higher than for those with limited experience (MOverall = .31, SD = .34), t(70) = 2.43, p = .02. I 




condition for individuals with extensive herding experience in the Quechua-dominant group 
(MTransverse = .64, SD = .37) was significantly higher than for those with limited herding 
experience (MTransverse = .40, SD = .42), t(70) = 2.53, p = .01. However, the EA Gradient in the 
sagittal condition for individuals with extensive herding experience in the Quechua-dominant 
group (MSagittal = .34, SD = .40) was not significantly greater than for Quechua speakers with 
limited herding experience (MSagittal = .21, SD = .35), t(70) = 1.46, p = .15. These results indicate 
that the effect of environmental experience was significant only in the transverse condition.  
  
3.3. Language ability 
The next factor I examined was language ability. As demonstrated in Table 23, only 3 of 
the 40 participants with extensive herding experience were Spanish-dominant. Testing language 
ability thus required that the analysis be limited only to the group of speakers without extensive 
herding experience (N = 54, 33 women, 21 men, Mage = 17, age range = 8-46).  
An independent samples t-test indicated that the overall EA Gradient for Quechua-
dominant participants with limited herding experience (MOverall = .31, SD = .34) was not 
significantly different than for Spanish-dominant participants with limited herding experience 
(MOverall = .30, SD = .31), t(52) = .14, p = .89. I repeated the test for sagittal and transverse trial 
types as well. The EA Gradient in the transverse condition for Quechua-dominant participants 
with limited herding experience (MTransverse = .40, SD = .42) was also not significantly different 
than for Spanish-dominant participants with limited herding experience (MTransverse = .41, SD = 
.36), t(52) = .04, p = .97. Likewise, the EA Gradient in the sagittal condition for Quechua-
dominant participants with limited herding experience (MSagittal = .21, SD = .35) was not 




(MSagittal = .18, SD = .33), t(70) = 1.46, p = .15, d = .09. These results indicate that the effect of 
language ability was not significantly related to performance on the task. It is important to note 
here that the nature of the language ability tested here is not the same as that tested in previous 
work on spatial language and cognition, as it represents a dimension of variability within a single 
language community (see discussion, Section 4.2). 
 
3.4. Gender 
 After establishing that environmental experience, but not language ability, was 
significantly correlated with participants’ behavior on this task, I considered three other factors: 
gender, age (Section 3.5), and trial orientation (Section 3.6).  
An independent samples t-test showed that female participants (N = 52, Mage = 25, age 
range = 8-66) and male participants (N = 42, Mage = 20, age range = 8-77) had very similar mean 
EA Gradients (MOverall = .37 and .38, respectively), t(92) = .17, p = .87. Examination of the 
sagittal and transverse cases yielded similar results. In the transverse case, both female and male 
participants had a mean EA Gradient of .49, t(92) = .07, p=.943. In the sagittal case, female 
participants had a mean EA Gradient of .24, and male participants .25, t(92) = .22, p = .83.  
 A Pearson chi-square test indicated that the percentages of Quechua-dominant and 
Spanish-dominant participants did not vary significantly by gender, c2(1, N = 94) = 1.92, p = .17. 
Likewise, another Pearson chi-square test indicated that the percentages of participants with little 
or extensive herding experience in the hallqa also did not vary significantly by gender, c2(1, N = 







Age as a factor in environmental experience was only tested in the Quechua-dominant 
group due to the distribution of data explained in Section 3.2. A preliminary independent samples 
t-test suggested that in the Quechua-dominant group (N = 72), participants with extensive herding 
experience in the hallqa (N = 37, Mage = 31, SD = 20, age range = 8-76) were significantly older 
than those without (N = 35, Mage = 20, SD = 13, age range = 8-46), t(70) = 2.74, p = .01. 
However, there were no participants over 46 years old who did not also have extensive herding 
experience. I thus conducted a further independent samples t-test with participants under 46 years 
old, to test whether the age difference found in the first test was specifically attributable to the 
group of participants over 46 years old. The results indicated that age was no longer significantly 
correlated with environmental experience in the age range of 8-46 (N = 63), t(61) = .39, p = .70. I 
then conducted a last independent samples t-test in this age range to test whether the correlation 
between environmental experience and performance on the task persisted. The results indicated 
that even in the reduced age range, participants with extensive herding experience (N = 28, 
MOverall = .47, SD = .29) remained significantly more likely to have higher EA gradients than 
participants with limited experience (N = 35, MOverall = .31, SD = .34), t(61) = 2.03, p = .05. The 
localization of this correlation in the transverse condition also persisted, t(61) = 2.44, p = .02. . 
Likewise, I still found no significant correlation in the sagittal condition, t(61) = .88, p = .38. 
I also examined the possibility of a relationship between age and language ability. Again, 
for the reasons given in Section 3.2, age as a factor in language was only tested in the group with 
extensive herding experience. A preliminary independent samples t-test suggested that in the 
group of participants with extensive herding experience (N = 54), Quechua-dominant participants 




participants (N = 19, Mage = 11, SD = 3, age range = 8-16), t(52) = 3.24, p < .01. However, there 
were no participants over 16 years old in the group of Spanish-dominant participants. I thus 
conducted a further independent samples t-test to determine whether the difference found in the 
initial test was specifically attributable to the group of participants over 16 years old. The results 
indicated that language ability persisted as a significant factor for age in the age group of 8-16 (N 
= 40), t(38) = 2.32, p = .03. The significant relation between language and age is most likely 
related to sociolinguistic dynamics discussed in Section 4.2. However, this does not pose a 
problem for the hypothesis considered in Section 1, as I only tested environmental experience as a 
factor among the group of Quechua-dominant participants. 
 
3.6 Trial orientation 
 It was necessary to determine whether some of the variation in participants’ performance 
could be due to the possibility that the north-south axis was more weakly encoded in the 
generalized, slope-based coordinates used in the linguistic system, as these most closely 
correspond to the east-west axis (for a similar case, see Levinson, 2003, p. 207). To test this 
possibility, I employed two types of trials. Half of the participants (N = 47, 25 women, 22 men, 
MAge = 23, Age range = 8-77) participated in Trial A: The sagittal axis was aligned with the east-
west axis, and transverse with north-south. The other half (N = 47, 27 women, 20 men, MAge = 22, 
Age range = 8-65) participated in Trial B: The sagittal axis was aligned with the north-south axis, 
and the transverse with east-west. Because the sagittal axis is considered the strong Absolute axis 
in general, if the possible strong Absolute east-west axis in the language was responsible for 
variation in performance, it would be expected that the greatest disparity between sagittal and 




stimuli most allocentric. A score of axial difference was calculated by subtracting each 
participant’s EA Gradient score for the sagittal condition from their score for the transverse 
condition. An independent samples t-test indicated that the difference between participants’ 
performance in sagittal and transverse cases in Trial A (N = 47, MDifference = .29, SD = .38) was not 
significantly different from the difference between performances in Trial B (N = 47, MDifference = 
.19, SD = .42), t(92) = 1.18, p = .24. In fact, as indicated by the respective means, the difference 
was greater on Trial A, though not significantly so.  
 
4. Discussion 
 I tested the hypothesis proposed in Section 1 in the population studied here by determining 
whether environmental experience proved to be significantly correlated with the preference of 
FoRs used to remember spatial arrays. The results supported the hypothesis, suggesting that 
environmental experience can play a decisive role in the shaping of FoR use in spatial cognition. 
Furthermore the results showed that the higher allocentric tendency found to be associated with 
extensive herding experience in the hallqa couldn’t be explained by gender, age, trial orientation, 
or other linguistic differences.134 However, it is important to emphasize that the results do not 
provide positive evidence with respect to whether linguistic characteristics shape spatial 
                                                
134 Some reviewers of an article presenting this study in the journal, Cognitive Science, suggested 
the use of a mixed model analysis (Shapero 2016). A generalized linear regression with repeated 
measures for trials in place of the EA gradient yielded results consistent with those reported 
above, with environmental experience and sagittal/transverse trial type as the only factors 
significantly correlated with an increased likelihood of allocentric response. Because of the small 
number of Spanish-dominant participants with significant herding experience, I could not test for 
an interaction between language and herding experience in the mixed model. Instead, I tested a 
three-group model comparing all Spanish-dominant participants as a reference group to Quechua-
dominant participants with and without herding experience. The results showed a trend of 
increasingly greater probability of allocentric response from the Spanish-dominant group to the 
Quechua-dominant groups, with the Quechua-dominant group with herding experience the only 




cognition, as I am not presenting coordinated data on FoR preference in language. Furthermore, 
because the sample is drawn from a single linguistic, social, and geographical community, the 
linguistic contrasts are subtler than those that have been shown to be associated with cognitive 
differences. At the same time, this makes it possible to look specifically at the role of variability 
in environmental experience within a single population.  
  
4.1. Sources of variability in the data 
 At first, the finding of a relatively low rate of allocentric responses (MOverall = .37) seems 
to contradict the assertion in previous studies that Absolute type languages such as Quechua are 
associated with allocentric performance on spatial memory tasks (Levinson 2003; Majid et al 
2004; Pederson et al 1998). However, it is important to bear in mind that in many of the cases that 
have been examined before, Absolute languages show more variation than Relative languages. 
For example, 95% of Dutch speakers preferred Relative FoRs (Levinson 2003:181), whereas 84% 
of Arrernte speakers preferred Absolute, and 74% and 19% of Tseltal speakers coded Absolute 
and untypable, respectively (180). In cross-linguistic comparison, however, this difference in 
consistency has proven insignificant. Furthermore, considering the near-categorical absence of 
Relative FoR use in speech, it is likely that most egocentric solutions were instead instances of the 
Direct FoR. This interpretation is further supported by the context of use, in which the participant 
is only asked to remember the arrangement, and is not primed for rotation. This raises the 
question of whether the egocentric tendency would decrease in a test condition in which 
participants practiced both selection with and without rotation compared to the current condition 
in which only selection without rotation was practiced. Finally, the use of the Direct FoR for 




argument that the Direct FoR, unlike the Relative and Absolute, is universally present in all 
languages (Danziger 2010:180).  
 Terrill & Burenhult (2008) proposed an alternative explanation for the high degree of 
variability in FoR preference in linguistic descriptions in a number of languages, including Jahai 
and Lavukaleve. Speakers of these languages describe the orientation of objects in tabletop space 
rather than location with respect to one another. As a result, they use cues that appear 
heterogeneous within Levinson’s definition of FoRs. However, this may sometimes be due to the 
stipulation that the coordinates presupposed by an Absolute FoR be fixed and abstract. Such 
languages can be reevaluated along the lines of Palmer’s (2015) definition of Absolute FoR as 
simply relying on an externally anchored coordinate system. Quechua is a good example, as 
linguistic descriptions of objects in tabletop space demonstrate a preference for orientational 
characteristics (Terrill & Burenhult 2008), while at the same time relying consistently on 
externally anchored coordinate systems. In this sense, a preference for orientational descriptions 
does not contradict the evaluation of a language as Absolute as long as the use of FoR is 
consistent. For example, Ancash Quechua speakers would describe the orientation of a toy cow 
by saying that the cow is looking uphill or toward the school, for example, rather than toward or 
away from a speech participant.  
 The ambiguity presented by Ancash Quechua speakers’ rate of allocentric responses on a 
cognitive task might not have been of much value for a cross-linguistic study, but the underlying 
variability alone made it possible to test the hypothesis that experiential input is necessary for the 
maintenance of an Absolute FoR. Considering the evidence presented in Chapters 2-4, this 
finding is all the more significant, as it suggests that distinct patterns in language (FoR use) and 




distributed patterns of nonverbal cognition. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if further linguistic 
variations, such as Spanish-dominant bilingualism or the presence of a weak Absolute or strong 
Egocentric axis, might account for the variation. Furthermore, it raises the question of what other 
than the pattern of FoR use in the Ancash Quechua language could account for the variability. A 
possible explanation is that the preference for the Absolute FoR is cultural, and that simple 
nonlinguistic representations leave room for speakers to use conceptual resources for producing 
descriptions in other FoRs, whether drawing on concepts of linguistic or innate cognitive origin. 
However, previous research has shown that linguistic preference for a particular FoR in languages 
is born out in cognitive tasks of increasing complexity even when these languages also have the 
verbal resources to produce descriptions in other FoRs as well (Haun et al 2011:76). 
 The distinction between sagittal and transverse stimuli was another source of variability. 
There are two compatible explanations for the finding that transverse stimuli were associated with 
significantly more allocentric responses. First, an egocentric frame is arguably more salient on the 
front-back axis than on the left/right. Supporting evidence for this comes from the slow 
development of left-right terms (Piaget 1928) and their complete absence in many languages 
(Levinson & Wilkins 2006). Moreover, the “animals in a row task,” another test of spatial 
memory that involves only the transverse axis, consistently yields higher rates of allocentric 
responses than the “chips task” among the same populations (Mishra et al 2003:376). Second, 
considering that languages such as Ancash Quechua that don’t use left-right terms in the Relative 
FoR tend to use Absolute FoRs in nonverbal memory tasks (Majid et al 2004), the transverse axis 
would be expected to be the most allocentric. Indeed, the results indicated that participants were 
significantly more likely (p < .01) to use an allocentric FoR to remember transverse stimuli. This 




FoRs between sagittal and transverse axes. Nevertheless, the mean EA Gradient on transverse 
cases for all participants was just under .5, indicating that a great deal of variability remained 
unexplained. The remaining analyses demonstrated that this variability was best explained by the 
proposed hypothesis, namely that environmental experience shapes FoR preference. 
  
4.2. Environmental experience and language ability 
 The findings suggested the validity of the initial hypothesis that environmental experience 
shapes the preference for FoRs in spatial cognition. Specifically, I found that participants with 
more extensive herding experience in the high pasturelands surrounding the community were 
more likely to use an allocentric FoR to remember the stimuli. In contrast, when language ability 
was tested as a factor in performance, no significant difference was found. I also conducted half 
of the participants’ trials at a 90-degree rotation in order to test for effects due to the possibility 
that the language encoded only a strong north-south or east-west axis, but not both. The results, 
however, indicated that this difference had no significant relation to performance. Clearly, there 
may be other linguistic factors not accounted for here, and there is no way to rule out the 
possibility that they were wholly or partly responsible for the variation. Yet, the fact that a non-
linguistic factor (environmental experience) did result to be significantly related to the use of 
FoRs suggests that the hypothesis is indeed correct.  
 These findings raise the question of what it is about participants with greater experience in 
the high grasslands that makes them prefer allocentric FoRs for nonverbal memory. There are 
several candidate explanations, and unfortunately the results provide no sure way to distinguish 
among them. One possible explanation is simply the amount of time spent outdoors. However, I 




outdoors. While this may be a factor in the linguistic preference for the Absolute FoR, it does not 
seem to be relevant in explaining cognitive variability. A more likely candidate is the size of the 
territory that participants were familiar with. Pastoral work requires constant and long-ranging 
movement. On an average day working with herders in Ruriq, we climbed both of the 500-meter 
high sides of the 9 km long canyon and then followed the river to its source at the canyon’s 
head.135 
 Some previous studies of spatial language and cognition have considered the role of 
similar non-linguistic factors. For example, a correlation was found between allocentric nonverbal 
FoR use and rural populations in some languages that are spoken in both urban and rural contexts 
(Levinson, 2003:189; Pederson 1993, 1998). Li and Gleitman have made the stronger case that 
FoR preference is a result of circumstantial rather than linguistic factors (2002:290). The latter 
argument ultimately aims to support the view that language serves to express non-linguistic 
thought, and is the authors’ response to a strong version of linguistic relativity. Setting aside the 
directionality or strength of the relationship between language and thought, their study is actually 
similar to that presented in Levinson (2003) and Pederson (1993, 1998) in that none of the studies 
focus on the actual practices and experiences through which speakers perceive and know their 
surroundings. The current study differs from both sides of this debate in that it does not 
presuppose that either language or context shape spatial cognition, but rather proposes a particular 
interaction of the two by testing the effects of an ethnographically sensitive measure of 
environmental experience within a single community of speakers.  
 The results of this study must be taken as specific to Ancash Quechua, and even to the 
community where the study was carried out. The distinct pattern of linguistic ability, 
                                                
135 Chapter 2 includes a detailed narrative account of herding practices that may serve as a more 




environmental experience, age distribution, literacy, and historical changes in land use all 
contribute to a unique constellation of variables. Nevertheless, such social and cultural variability 
is itself a constant in the sense that any population can be expected to have similar idiosyncracies. 
Also, not all such distinctions may be expected to relate with spatial cognition. For example, a 
social division between animal husbandry and agriculture within the same geographical 
boundaries would not seem likely to affect FoR use. On the other hand, a population with a more 
distinct split between bilingual and monolingual speakers of languages differing in terms of FoR 
use would provide another perspective on this issue.  
 Along these lines, a study found that native English speakers living among speakers of 
Arrernte (an Absolute language) in Central Australia were more likely to use an Absolute FoR on 
nonverbal tasks than their counterparts living among other English speakers on the coast 
(Levinson 2003:191). Likwise, Marghetis et al. showed that bilingualism did not account for 
variability in FoR use among Juchitán Zapotec speakers, as the bilingual community of La 
Ventosa was consistently allocentric while another—the nearby Juchitán—was highly variable. 
The authors argue that “spatial reasoning is not reliably predicted solely by a community’s 
linguistic codes ” (2014:5). Rather, they suggest that the variability results from the saliency of 
topographical features; Juchitán has more dense architecture, obscuring the horizon, and its 
residents have less necessity to travel than those in La Ventosa. These factors suggest that 
residents of Juchitán have less recourse to allocentric FoRs in daily life. Cases like these 
demonstrate that environmental experience and linguistic practice can indeed shape habits of non-
linguistic spatial representation, entangling them with situational processes such as social 




within a single community, the current study provides more concrete evidence supporting this 
possibility.  
 
4.3. Gender and age 
I also tested gender and age as possible alternative explanations for variation in the data. 
The results indicated no significant relation to gender, ruling out this factor. Age was more 
complex. Initially, it seemed that the age of participants in the Quechua-dominant group was 
confounded with herding experience, therefore potentially confounding the correlation between 
herding experience and FoR preference as well. However, this appeared to be the result of the fact 
that all Quechua-dominant participants in the age group over 46 had extensive herding 
experience. The confound between factors was confirmed and then resolved by removing the age 
group over 46. In this new sub-group (age range = 8 - 46), the significant correlation between 
environmental experience and allocentric FoR preference persisted. It is still important to point 
out that this study does not make any specific claims about the relevance of age other than that it 
is not significantly related to allocentric or egocentric performance on this experiment. Further 
investigation along these lines, especially with children younger than those included here, would 
provide a critical complement to the study.   
 Though age proved to be insignificant in this study, it remained confounded with language 
ability. In order to further examine fine-grained linguistic difference due to dialectal variation, 
language change, or multilingualism, the frequently inevitable confound between linguistic 
characteristics and age must be confronted. Furthermore, even in the community studied, 
environmental experience and age would likely have been impossible to disarticulate in the 




1980; Mayer 2009). In this sense, the ethnographic research that accompanied this study was 
invaluable in identifying a reasonable variable to study. Likewise, what was appropriate here 
would not necessarily be so elsewhere.  
 
4.4. Other social and cultural factors 
 Literacy has been proposed as a possible factor in the use of FoRs in spatial cognition 
(Danziger & Pederson 1998; Levinson 2003:194). Danziger & Pederson (1998) provided 
evidence that distinguishing among mirror images is an acquired trait and is related to literacy, 
perhaps related to script directionality and the related need to distinguish between mirror-image 
symbols such as “b” and “d.” Levinson (2003) reported that in Belhare and Tamil (Pederson, 
2003), literacy correlated moreover with a difference in FoR use. This difference was found in a 
task testing for transitive inference, but not in a simple rotation task like the one presented here. 
Danziger (2011) further explored the possibility that literacy affected the ability to distinguish 
between mirror images, which are equivalent within an Intrinsic FoR, and determined that literacy 
was not a relevant factor after all, as both literate and non-literate Mopan Maya speakers did not 
distinguish between pairs of mirror-image 3D forms. In the population studied here, literacy was 
not explicitly measured, but in general it is confounded with age.136 Since age did not prove to be 
a significant factor, it is unlikely that literacy would differ, however it remains a question open to 
further investigation.  
 Another factor that was not examined, but may in fact be confounded with environmental 
experience, is social and economic class. However, these categories, along with environmental 
                                                
136 Measuring literacy is a complex task in Río Negro, as the availability, social significance, and 
methods of public education have changed dramatically there during the lives of adult residents. 




experience are to some extent mutually constitutive. For example, community members with 
significant economic resources may choose to pay or accrue debt to another to take care of their 
herds and pastures. Moreover, residing in the highland pastures reduces the possibility of 
accumulating wealth through wage labor. Finally, because there is nothing about social class in 
itself that would lead to an expected difference in spatial cognition other than the associated 
environmental experience, the more parsimonious explanation is that the latter is the decisive 
element. The precise nature of this role cannot be determined with the results of this study, but 
some possibilities were discussed in Section 4.2. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Previous studies have shown that language both contributes to humans’ ability to orient 
using landmarks (e.g., Hermer-Vazquez et al 1999; Shusterman et al 2011; Shusterman & Spelke 
2005) and shapes the use of FoRs in nonverbal spatial cognition (e.g., Boroditsky & Gaby 2010; 
Brown & Levinson 1993; Danziger 2011; Haun et al 2011; Levinson 2003; Majid et al 2004; 
O’Meara & Pérez Báez 2011; Pederson et al 1998). The study presented in this chapter departs 
from a question raised at the intersection of these two observations: How do humans’ habitual 
engagements with and experience of their surrounding environment affect their cognitive 
representations of space? The results of the study demonstrate that patterned variation in the 
environmental experiences137 of individuals in a single population is significantly related to 
variation in preference for allocentric FoRs in a nonverbal memory task. The study raises a 
number of questions that could be fruitfully explored in future research, and by no means 
                                                
137 Environmental experience is always embedded in cultural as well as linguistic contexts. As 
such, there is no way to completely tease these layers apart. However, sub-cultural distinctions 
such as agricultural and pastoral livelihoods entail different forms of access to geographical 




challenges the possibility that in communities with distinct characteristics, other relevant factors 
may be found. However, it also demonstrates that experience can play a role alongside language 
in shaping habits of spatial representation in at least one context.  
 The present study also raises questions about the nature of the relationships among 
language, cognition, experience, and culture. How exactly do lived experience and culture come 
to bear on linguistic and cognitive patterns? The results presented here suggest the importance of 
this question, indicating that extensive experience with herding in highland pastures was 
associated with a significantly higher use of allocentric FoRs in nonverbal spatial memory. The 
factor of environmental experience in itself bridges cultural and natural domains in the sense that 
it represents a habitual and social pattern of practice that involves a spatially and temporally 
particular type of engagement with the environment. Similarly, I argued in Chapter 3 that the 
habitual use of the Absolute FoR in Río Negro requires Quechua speakers to continually orient to 
the surrounding world. In this sense, both highland pastoralism and the use of the Absolute FoR 
draw on a similar cognitive ability to keep track of one’s position among various landmarks in a 
fixed coordinate system. While previous studies have generally demonstrated that environmental 
and social types alone do not predict the use of FoRs in language and cognition (Majid et al 
2004:112), it remains to be seen whether the nature of the surrounding environment itself affects 
the particular cues that populations use to establish and maintain their bearings in a fixed 
coordinate system. Likewise, while there is experimental evidence that the Absolute FoR 
precedes the Relative in cognitive development among speakers of some Absolute languages 
(Mishra et al 2003), there is as of yet only anecdotal evidence as to how young speakers manage 




 This study also serves as a point of convergence between research on the emergence of 
distinctly human forms of spatial cognition (e.g., Learmonth et al 2001; Lee et al 2012; Lee & 
Spelke,2010) and the impact of language on its particulars (e.g., Levinson 2003; Majid et al 2004; 
Danziger 2010). The former research has been especially concerned with distinguishing humans’ 
inheritance from genetic ancestors, our innate abilities, and those that emerge during cognitive 
and linguistic development. The latter research, in contrast, has focused more on the question of 
whether and how linguistic structure shapes nonverbal cognition. In contrast, this study steps back 
to examine part of the context in which language and cognition interact—specifically, the 
variations in individuals’ environmental experiences that may shape their preference for FoRs in 
nonverbal memory. The results offer evidence suggesting that at least under certain conditions, 
cultural practices of environmental engagement are a crucial piece of the puzzle.138  
 Reframing this suggestive conclusion in more critical and prescriptive terms, future 
research on the relation between spatial language, thought, and culture must take local 
particularities of environmental practice and experience seriously. Yet more plainly: no matter the 
extent of nuance in a study’s grasp of linguistic or cognitive diversity, it will always yield 
ethnocentric results if the diversity of ways in which the human groups involved engage with their 
environments139 is not treated with the same rigorous level of nuance.  
  
 
                                                
138 More specifically, I would further argue that any claim of unidirectional causal vectors 
between culture and language (i.e., either side of the linguistic relativity debate, weak or strong) 
either involves a generalizing idealization that cordons off practice and experience from language 
and cosmology (not culture, which is inherently dynamic), or is limited to a context in which 
geocentric orientation does not ground habitual practices, language use, or thought.  
139 I am defining the environment here, as in the rest of this dissertation, widely defined as 
encompassing social both social and spatial relations among humans as well as with places when 






Chapter 6: Conclusion 
  
 Each chapter has examined explored a different way in which patterned engagements with 
the environment shape life in Río Negro, addressing specific questions about sociality, language, 
body, and thought. As I have indicated throughout the text, the chapters are in dialogue with one 
another. For example, the only variable that correlated significantly with egocentric and 
allocentric responses on the experimental task presented in Chapter 5 was the distinction between 
herders and farmers, a variable whose social and cultural significance in Río Negro is a central to 
the ethnographic description in Chapter 2. Likewise, my observation of quotidian environmental 
practices in Chapter 2 are instrumental to the argument in Chapter 3 that the use of spatial 
language in Río Negro presupposes a shared sense of location in and orientation to a familiar 
landscape. Chapter 4 in turn builds on this insight to explore how this shared awareness informs 
speakers’ use of demonstrative pronouns that do not directly encode spatial relations.  
Despite their interdependence, the chapters also represent separate analytical projects. For 
each one, I conducted distinct analyses of my field notes, recordings, and experimental results 
(see Chapter 1, Section 6). This structure helped me to conceptualize a multifaceted problem that 
lay at the intersection of the domains of language, environmental practice, and cognition, each of 
which is already complex. As a complement to these inevitably artificial distinctions among the 
chapters, my concluding goal is to draw out four common threads and tie them back together as 
overarching themes, as if unraveling a textile to return each color to its original spool. The four 




engagements with individual places; the role of Theory of Mind in environmental in these 
engagements; and the intermediate role of language between individual bodies and the 
environments they share.  
 
1. Spatiality and sociality  
 In Chapter 4 I noted the disciplinary division of labor that distinguishes demonstrative 
reference and deixis from spatial language and orientation as social and spatial domains of 
language, respectively. Instead, I suggested, the social and the spatial are intertwined at every 
level. Evidence for this claim is spread across each chapter. First, Chapter 2 gives concrete 
evidence that people in Río Negro form familiar relationships with individual places through the 
same forms of sociality as with other humans—habitual interactions, co-residence, feeding and 
care, and reciprocal debt.140 I also observe here that these relationships are conditioned 
specifically on patterns of environmental practice such as those that distinguish herders and 
farmers. In a very concrete way, then, spatial relationships are also social relationships, and vice 
versa. Chapter 3 goes on to show that the use of spatial language in everyday conversation in Río 
Negro presupposes this simultaneously geographical and social relationship to the landscape. The 
reliance on landmarks and the use of words like “up” and “down” as cardinal directions require 
speakers to maintain a constant awareness of their location and orientation with respect to an 
extensive territory of named places—what I refer to as an embodied sense of space. Chapter 4 
continues along these lines to show that the same “sense of space” grounds speakers’ use of 
demonstrative pronouns. Specifically, I show that relative proximity or distance cannot explain 
the alternation of Quechua demonstratives. Instead, spatial interpretations such as distance emerge 
                                                
140 This claim is related to that made by Salas Carreño (2016) and Mannheim & Salas Carreño 




alongside social ones in relation to the unfolding of individual verbal interactions. Once again, 
spatiality and sociality are thoroughly intertwined. Finally, in Chapter 5, I offered experimental 
evidence that there was variability in nonverbal spatial orientation. Specifically, I showed that 
farmers were more likely to form egocentric representations of spatial relationships, while herders 
were more likely to form allocentric (or geocentric) representations. I interpreted this as an 
indication that the distinct spatiality of herders’ and farmers’ respective environmental practices 
shapes their basic cognitive habits.  
 
 2. Environmental particularities 
 While this association between social categories and strategies for spatial memory 
illustrates another way in which sociality and spatiality are intertwined, it also points out that the 
particularities of humans’ relationships with places resonate across domains of human life. These 
relationships are thus important to study with ethnographic nuance across disciplinary boundaries. 
The other chapters of this dissertation likewise reflect the importance of recognizing the diversity 
and specificity of human-place relationships. For example, Chapter 2 observes that just as the 
relationships humans form among one another are diverse in nature, so are those they form with 
places. The same distinction between farmers’ and herders’ environmental practices, which 
correlates with spatial thought in Chapter 5, first emerges here as the relevant difference for 
explaining why only a subset of Río Negro residents—namely herders—communicate directly 
with mountains through divination. Herders’ work takes them into constant co-presence with 
mountains, and leads them to establish familiar social relationships of mutual debt and obligation. 
It is this relationship, I argued, that positions them as divinatory intermediaries for mountains. 




habitual engagements with the environment open a frame for action that grounds interactions with 
less familiar entities—e.g., state hospitals—in the familiar sociality of the surrounding landscape.  
The analyses in Chapters 2 and 5 hinge on variability in the way people relate with places; 
Chapter 3 and 4 foreground the specificity of these relationships. These chapters argue that the 
use of spatial language and demonstrative reference in Río Negro presupposes speakers’ shared 
awareness of their location and orientation. This “sense of space” is in no way general. While we 
tend to think of allocentric or geocentric orientation as objective, and thus as abstracted from the 
specificity of any particular landscape, these chapters show instead that in reality Quechua 
speakers in Río Negro orient themselves to a territory of individual, named places. This has 
concrete linguistic consequences. For example, Chapter 4 shows that this orientation to the 
particularities of a landscape shapes speakers’ use of demonstrative pronouns. Because so-called 
“proximal” demonstrative are used for referents that are present in speakers’ shared common 
ground, Quechua speakers use these forms even to speak about distant and imperceptible places. I 
argue that the apparent strangeness of using the pronoun “here” to refer to a distant mountain 
obscured by a wall is not due to a linguistic difference, but rather to a difference in common 
ground. In contrast, if the landscape to which speakers oriented did not include its 
particularities—the places, paths, and contours within it—it would be necessary to develop a 
uniquely complex theory of demonstrative pronouns to explain their use in Río Negro.  
  
 3. Theory of Mind 
 In the introductory chapter (Section 4), I suggested that the concept of Theory of Mind—
the cognitive ability to attribute mental states to self and others (Wellman 2013, Carlson et al 




claim has three parts. First, it suggests that humans interact with the environment as social 
entities, and do so with respect to their own social positions. A farmer tills the soil not because of 
an autonomous impulse, but rather because of his obligations to his family and others, in order to 
maintain or recover his reputation as a productive member of the community, or for other similar 
reasons. There is nothing particularly new about this part of the claim. Second, humans also 
sometimes attribute mental states to the environment just as they do to other humans. For 
example, in Chapter 2, I describe Río Negro herders’ interactions with individual hirka in ritual 
offerings and divination. Speaking or engaging in exchange with a hirka involves Theory of 
Mind, as it not only requires that herders attribute to hirka mental states such as enjoyment, 
appreciation, or debt, but also that they attribute to hirka the ability to recognize them as having 
similar mental states. This is not as uncontroversial as the first part of the claim, but it nonetheless 
echoes recent research on sentient places in the Andes (Salas Carreño 2016, Mannheim & Salas 
Carrreño 2015; de la Cadena 2015), animism and perspectivalism in the South American 
lowlands (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2004; Descola 2013a), and the anthropology of the nonhuman 
more generally (Kohn 2013; Tsing 2014).  
 Neither of these parts of my claim about Theory of Mind represents a substantial 
modification of the theory itself. This is not the case for the third part, which suggests that, in 
addition to basic mental states such as false belief, intention, or desire, humans also attribute to 
one another mental states such as awareness of one’s position and orientation in the world. In 
other words, when I tell the person sitting next to me on a bus that he’ll turn to the right to get to 
the library once he gets off, I attribute to him an awareness of the right and left sides of his body. 
In contrast, if I tell him to turn toward the old post office (which is now an office building), I 




location of the old post office. In both cases, I also assume that he will similarly attribute to me 
the ability to attribute all of this to him (unless he seems explicitly dismissive of my directions). 
Whether this mutual and recursive attribution of spatial awareness is part of Theory of Mind or 
rather merely a specific kind of interactional common ground is a point to be explored elsewhere. 
For the material in this dissertation, the relevant point is that speaking Quechua in Río Negro 
presupposes a great deal of the latter kind of spatial awareness—constant dead reckoning and a 
rich knowledge of the location of named places. This is one of the central arguments of Chapter 3, 
while Chapter 4 shows how the use of demonstrative pronouns and pointing gestures likewise rely 
on this mutually presumed spatial awareness. The most poignant example is the frequent use of 
the demonstrative pronoun “kay,” which translates to “here” or “this,” when pointing to distant 
places, even when these are obscured by walls or landscape features. In making such utterances, 
speakers attribute to their interlocutors a representation of the surrounding world sufficiently 
detailed to be able to treat the pointing gesture as if it were indicating a place on a map.  
 
 4. Language as a bridge between bodies and their environments 
 The example of the pointing gesture suggests something more than Río Negro Quechua 
speakers’ mutual assumptions about mental states. It illuminates a concrete way in which 
language serves as a link articulating individual human bodies with the environments they share. 
First, language clearly does this in the sense that it gives speakers a shared resource for 
communicating about the world around them. Yet the signs through which language orients and 
coordinates our attention to the environment are commonly understood as only arbitrarily 
connected to the environment. Linguistic anthropologists have drawn on Peirce’s semiotics to 




least partially motivated both in form and use (Peirce 1955; Friedrich 1979; Parmentier 1997; 
Keane 2003). However, this work has generally focused on socially and politically charged 
linguistic domains such as gendered language (Inoue 2004), and grammatical agency (Duranti 
2014). In contrast, as I pointed out in the introductory chapter, spatial orientation has been 
neglected in a way that seems to imply its arbitrariness. Or rather, the motivation of the 
relationship between signs such as the word “up” seems to be relatively stable, as they draw on 
permanent physical forms.  
From this point of view, the connection that language affords us to an environment is none 
other than a direct reflection of its physical qualities. Instead, in the previous chapter I have 
shown how social and physical dimensions of environments are interrelated through habitual 
practice (Chapter 2), language (Chapters 3 and 4), gesture (Chapter 4) and thought (Chapter 5). 
My own interventions aside, any treatment of the relationship between language and environment 
as purely material also poses a problem to recent theorization of environments as defined relative 
to the organisms that engage with them and to the related, cross-disciplinary theoretical 
movement from space to place (e.g., Bachelard 1969[1958]; Tuan 1977; Foucault 1986; Gupta & 
Ferguson 1992; Casey 1996; Ingold 2011, 2010141). The problem arises because these approaches 
claim to theoretically transcend purely materialist definitions of the environment as a set of 
physical conditions that pre-exist its inhabitants and of space as uniform and neutral in value. 
However, the solution offered in this dissertation is distinct from the now-standard critique of 
material spatiality as a non-humanistic; rather, I find that certain indissolubly material (and 
arguably Cartesian) aspects of space such as position, angle, coordinate systems, and projection 
                                                





are in fact crucial for understanding the particular constellations of human-environment 
engagement.  
The argument woven through this dissertation is instead that spatial orientation in 
communicative language and gestures is not arbitrarily related to the world it represents, nor is it 
motivated merely by selective attention to a specific set of physical characteristics such as 
landmarks, topology, or lateral asymmetry. Rather, the use of spatial language, demonstrative 
reference, and pointing gestures described in Chapters 3 and 4 is grounded in the patterns of 
experience and practice through which speakers come to know the world around them. The 
Embodied Absolute Frame of Reference (FoR) described in Chapter 3 provides a concrete 
example of linguistically mediated embodiment, as it is used to frame descriptions with respect to 
a coordinate system that is anchored in the environment and project onto the speaker’s body. 
Neither this FoR nor any of the other communicative practices I described, for that matter, would 
be possible without participants’ socialization into a world where people make frequent use of 
landmarks to orient spatial descriptions, or without the knowledge they gained of the lay of the 
land by moving through it and observing it over the course of their daily lives. The use of 
language in Río Negro does not then reflect an arbitrary social contract for labeling the world, nor 
does it directly reflect the physical characteristics of that world. Instead, it is intimately bound to 
the ways its speakers engage their surroundings. In this sense, language links humans and 
environments through patterns of both verbal interaction and cultural practice, two fundamental 







 5. Implications for further research 
Combining these four themes leads to several implications that merit further research. 
Consider these premises: first, basic verbal communication in Río Negro is contingent on a sense 
of space that is not generalized, but is rather anchored in the particularities of a familiar territory; 
second, this sense of space is central to both individual and collective modes of thought—that is, 
in nonverbal representations of space and in the common ground speakers presume as shared in 
social interaction. The implication of these propositions is that changes in the way people 
habitually relate to their environments can resonate in language and cognition, and at both 
individual and collective levels. This implication in turn raises questions about both the past and 
the future.  
First, do differences in spatial language, such as the preference for allocentric or 
egocentric Frames of Reference, reflect histories of environmental change? This is a provocative 
question, as it foregrounds emerging research that suggests an association between egocentric 
orientation and urban environments, and furthermore articulates this possibility with the 
centralization of populations associated with state formation. It also suggests the question of how 
quickly environmentally anchored linguistic and cognitive patterns change, and whether some 
kinds of changes may take longer than others. Second, the implication that environmental changes 
resonate in language and cognition suggests questions about ongoing changes both in how human 
populations interact with their environments and about changes in that environment itself. Are 
there long-term linguistic and cognitive consequences of the growing concern with separating 
large portions of the planet’s surface from human influence through conservation and urban 
centralization? Are there linguistic and cognitive implications of the acceleration of 




 I have drawn these implications and questions out of observations of language and 
practice that are not themselves generalizable beyond Río Negro. This is not a caveat—it is 
directly related to my central argument that environments are relevant across linguistic, social, 
and cognitive domains of human life not merely because of their symbolic associations or 
material affordances, but rather because of the nuanced particularities of specific patterns of 
environmental practice. The broader implications of the study then are not extensions or 
applications of my findings, but rather templates for studying these questions elsewhere. I do not 
see any shortcut for a single theoretical model that could predict how environmental changes or 
population shifts will affect language or cognition. This is in part because the domain of language 
linked with environmental practice is not the cognitive capacity for grammar—Chomsky’s 
competence—but rather its situated use. Likewise, the cognitive patterns that will vary with 
respect to environmental practice are not universal tendencies such as Theory of Mind, but rather 
subtle and sometimes overlapping differences like the variation described in Chapter 5. In both 
cases, these ways of speaking and thinking are always oriented and located with respect to 
particular social and spatial worlds. With this in mind, the broader implication of this dissertation 
is that detailed ethnographic work is crucial not only to the anthropology of the environment and 
of language, but that it is also an essential complement to research in any field that asks questions 











Appendix 1: “Do mountains speak?” 
 
 Quechua English 




A parlan ari. Parlan ari. Kawan 
ari. Hirka kawan. A kawanshi. 
Ah, sure, they speak. Sure, they speak. Sure, 
they live. The mountains live. Ah, it’s said they 
live. 
 




Qayanakuyan. Imapis kaynaw 
kaptin qayanakuyanmi. 
Qayanakuyan. 
They call to one another. They call to one 
another when they’re like this [turns head from 
side to side]. They call to one another. 
 




Hirkapura hirka. Hirkapura. 
Hirkapura hirka 
Mountains among mountains. Among 
mountains. Mountains among mountains. 
 
 Por ejemplo, Collawasi hirka, kay 
hirkash qayanakuyan. 
For example, they say Collawasi mountain and 
this mountain call to one another. 
 
  Here the speaker’s husband, who had been 
sitting at her side briefly interrupts, speaking 
about another matter, then walks away. 
 
 A, haynaw qayanakun, a. Ah, they call to each other like that, ah. 
 
 Kay waraakuy tuurukunapis 
unayqa kay llullu killakunachaw 
yarquqshi. 
And they say that a long time ago these 
Waraakuy Bulls would come out during the new 
moon. 
 
 Waq frentipitash kay frentipitash 
peliyakuykayaq llullu killachaw. 
They say from across yonder and from across 
here they would be out fighting during the new 
moon. 
 





 Kananqa rikantsu. Akasu llullu 
killachaw pitaq yarqun ampipa. 
But now it's not seen. By any chance someone 














































Appendix 2: Pointing gestures 
 
 
1a.       1b. & 1c.                2. 
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5.       6. 
 








































Appendix 3: “Chips Task” study instructions and post-test 
questions 
 
The following are the instructions given to participants in Ancash Quechua during training. Each 
instruction is followed by its English translation in italics: 
  
 Kay chusku fichakunapitaqa mayqantaq kay fichawan kikinnaw churaraykan.  
 Which of these four cards is placed the same way as this one? 
 Kananqa kay fichata allita rikaaraykur yarpanaykipaqmi.  
 Now, look well at this card for a while in order to remember it. 
 Kananqa kay chuskupitaqa mayqantaq kikinnaw churaraykan.  
 Now, which of these four is placed the same? 
 Kananqa kay fichata allita rikaaraykur hay kwartuchawna kikinnawta ashinaykipaq. 
 Now, look well at this card for a while in order to look for the similar one in that room. 
 Mayqantaq kikinnaw churaraykan. 
 Which one is placed the same? 
 
 The following are the questions given to participants in Ancash Quechua at the conclusion 





 Aykataq watayuqmi kanki. 
 How old are you? 
 Maychawtaq taaraaraykanki. 
 Where do you reside? 
 Hallqata riqinkiku. 
 Are you familiar with the hallqa? 
 Imaypis hallqachawku taaraq kanki.  
 Have you ever stayed in the hallqa?  
 Imaytaq hallqachaw taaraq aywanki? Aykataq paqaspaq. 
 When do you go to stay in the hallqa? For how many nights? 
 Maypataq. Pikunawantaq. Imakunata ruranaykipaq. 
In what part(s)? With whom? In order to do what things?  
 Hallqachaw imakunataq shumaqmi. 
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